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Abstract 
This study undertakes an analysis of political leader-
ship through case studies of four major political leaders in 
India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh, namely, Indira Gandhi, 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Shaikh Mujibur 
Rahman. It is a cofnparative study of these four leaders from 
the year 1967 when all of them came to the lime light whether 
in power (Mrs. Indira Gandhi) or in opposition (the other three) 
till the year 1977 — the year all of them lost power with 
the exception of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman v^o was killed two years 
earlier in a military coup. 
The study is divided into five chapters. The first 
one deals with leadership in a theoretical framework in the 
light of leadership styles in the South Asian region. Itie 
other four chapters are on each of the leaders selected for 
this study. The second chapter discusses the leadership pattern 
in Pakistan commencing from, the freedom struggle until the 
post-Independence period, analysing in detail tne leadership 
of Z.A. Bhutto right frorr his early life till his douTifall 
in a bloodless military coup led by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. 
Itiis chapter analyses the conditions that led to a crisis in 
Bhutto's leadership culminating in his execution in 1979. 
The third chapter attempts a study of the leadership 
of the biggest democracy in the world — India frotr the pre-
independence days till the assumption of power by Indira Gandhi. 
The chapter traces the trajectory of Indira Gandhi's pclitical 
leadership from her childhood till she became Prime minister, 
analysing her performance/ her successes and failures. The 
chapter in particular, examines her capabilities which were 
instrumental in the creation of Bangladesh and her drawbacks 
that led to her miserable defeat in the general election of 
1977. It also discusses her returning to power after less 
than three years with landslide victory. 
In the background of the political situation in Bengal 
from the British days through the Pakistan period till the 
creation of Bangladesh, chapter four is a detailed study of 
the rise of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman starting from his career 
as a student leader in Calcutta, to his assumption of power, 
first as President of the newly bom nation of Bangladesh and 
then as Prime Minister of that nation. Against this oackdrop, 
the chapter attempts to put into perspective and analyses i»1ujib's 
policies in independent Bangladesh leading to the period of 
a bloody coup in which Mujibur Rahman and his entire family 
were massacred. 
The fifth chapter discusses the background of political 
leadership in the island nation of Sri Lanka tracing the ups 
and downs in the qualities of leadership before and iirmediately 
after the independence of that country. It discusses the leader-
ship of Sirimavo Bandaranaike, highlighting her early life, 
her education and alliance with the seasoned politician/ S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike. It gives a detailed account of the political 
crisis prevailing in the country as a result of the assassi-
nation of Mr. Bandaranaike and the factors leading to the aner-
gence of Mrs. Bandaranaike which led her to become the first 
woman Prime Minister not only in her country but in the world. 
The chapter studies her performance as a nation leader, her 
success in the field of foreign relations and her failure in 
solving the social and economic problems of the country. Special 
mention is made of her alliance with the left parties which 
compelled her to accommodate different points of view and the 
consequences thereof. 
The sixth and concluding chapter provides a summary 
of the previous chapters. It also raises some questions on 
the differing styles of leadership between women cind men that 
emerged from this study. 
The nature and scope of the present study required 
both primary and secondary rraterials which were collected during 
the researcher's stay in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. A 
special visit to Sri Lanka was made for the purpose. Interviev^ 's 
with many senior and important dignitaries were conducted in 
each of these countries. Anongst the leaders under study here, 
a detailed interview was conducted with Sirimavo Bandaranaike 
of Sri Lanka. Other essential information and material was 
retrieved through close interaction with scholars in the field 
in each of the four countries. 
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This study is the outcore cf nvy' experiencer and en'i'O'jn-
ters in the countries of the region of South Asia over the 
past 25 years. As a diplomat in the Saudi Arabia's foreign 
service/ I was first posted to work in the Saudi Arabian Emba-
ssy in Pakistan in the year 1965. Few months after my arrival 
in Karachi, the war broke up between India and Pakistan which 
gave me a rare exposure to the political, economic and social 
affairs of the sub-continent. Ttie ceasefire, the subsequent 
suimit conference which was held in Tashkent and attended 
by Lai Bahadur Shastri of India and field Marshal Mohd. Ayub 
Khcin of Pakistan on the initiative of the Soviet Union that 
culminated in what is known as Tashkent declaration increased 
my curiosity and academic interest in the politics of the 
sub-continent. The untimely denise of Lai Bahadur Shastri 
and the succession of Indira Gandhi, the rift between Ayub 
Khan and his foreign minister Z.A. Bhutto and the emergence 
of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman as the absolute leader of the Bengalis 
and also the downfall of Mrs. Bandaranaike in Sri Lanka after 
the election, created a daunting curiosity in my mind and 
convinced me that there is an urgent need tc stud>' the poli-
tical leadership of the South Asian region. 
] 1 
The year 1969 witnessed the dov-nfaJl of Av-jr K^ sr 
in Pakistan and subsequently the rise of Z.A. Bhutto. In 
India, Indira Gandhi emerged stronger after the split i- the 
Congress party, while Mujib became the undisputed leader of 
the then East Pakistan. hJot only that/ when Yahya Khan declared 
that free and fair elections would be held soon, some over-
enthusiastic observers even thought that Mujib might become 
the future Prime Minister of the whole of PaOcistan. 
In Sri Lanka, Mrs. Bandaranaike regained her popularity 
and started preparing herself to win the election which was 
due in 1970 and which in fact she won. In such circumstances 
I found it essential to undertake a study of four major poli-
tical leaders in India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
namely, Indira Gandhi, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto and Shaikh Mujibur Rahman. 
Itiis research is a comparative study of these four 
leaders from the year 1969 when all of then came to the lime 
light whether in power (Mrs. Indira Gandhi) or in opposition 
(the other three) till the year 1977 — the year all cf ther-
lost power with the exception of Shaikh Mujibur Rahrrnn who 
was killed two years earlier in a military coup. 
: 1 j 
I have divided the study into five cnapters. In the 
first one I have dealt with leadersnip in a theoretical frarri---
work with special emphasis on leadership in Sojth Asian reaion. 
The other four chapters are on each of the leaders sele'^ted 
for this study. In the second chapter I have discussed the 
leadership crisis in Pakistan starting from the freedcxn stru-
ggle days, and touching upon the post-Independence period 
and discussing in deteail the leadership of Z.A. Bhutto right 
from his early life till his downfall in a bloodless military 
coup led by General Zia ul Haq in 1977. Zia ul Haq arrested 
his own mentor on criminal charges and ultimately executed 
him in 1979. 
The third chapter makes a study of the leadership 
in India from the pre-independence days till the assumption 
of power by Indira Gandhi. In this chapter I made a survey 
of Indira Gandhi's political leadership frotr- her childhood 
till she became Prime Minister of the biggest democracy in 
the world analysing her performance, her successes and failures. 
I made special emphasis on her success in creating Bangladesh 
and deserving the title of EXirga of India anc her riseratle 
defeat in the general election of 1977 after two years of 
IV 
her dictatorial rjJe during the emergen^/. It als- discusser, 
her corring back tc power after less than three years and the-
landslide victory which restored her to pou-er. 
The fourth chapter deals with leadership in Bengal 
right from the British days through the Pakistan period till 
the creation of Bangladesh. I made a detailed study of the 
leadership of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman from his student life 
when he was student leader in Calcutta, and coming to his 
struggle against the Pakistan army and his involvement in 
what was known as Agartala conspiracy case till he declared 
the dis(±>edience movement against the Pakistan authorities 
and the army crack down against the Awami League workers and 
his subsequent arrest, his release after the surrender of 
Pakistan army in E*iaka and his assumption of power, first 
as President of the newly bom nation and then as Prime Mini-
ster of that nation following the British pattern, I put 
more aiphasis on Shaikh Mujib's wrong policies which led to 
the worsening of law and order situation and resulted in the 
introduction of one party system and changing the constitution, 
turning his rule as a dictatorial one which led the army to 
launch a bloody' coup in which Mujibur Rahman and his entire 
family were massacred. The chapter describes the reaction 
which prevailed in Dhaka after the news of the killing of 
Shaikh Mujib came to be knov^ n. There were different opinions 
in this regard. According to some writers there was a sense 
o 
f lo£5 that filled the heart and mind of FenqaUs v-riile c". n^ TF 
mentioned that no tears were shed for Snaik^ , y.sii-, *-nr 
photographs of Mujib were pulled down in the Bangladesh Err>arpy 
in London by some Bengali students and then his home village, 
his ancestoral home was ransacked. 
The fifth chapter discusses the background of the leader-
ship in the island nation of Sri Lanka tracing the ups and 
downs in the qualities of leadership before and irrmediately 
after the independence of that country. It discusses the 
leadership of Sirimavo Bandaranaike/ highlighting her early 
life, her education and her marriage to the seasoned politi-
cian, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. It gives a detailed account 
of the confusion prevailing in the country as a result of 
the assassination of Mr.Bandaranaike and the de-cision of the 
old guards of the party to invite Mrs. Bandaranaike to succeed 
her husband in the leadership of the party which led her to 
become the first woman Prime Minister in her country and in 
the world as a whole. I touched upon her performance, her 
success in the field of foreign relations and her failure 
in solving the social and economic problems of the cojntrv'. 
I made a mention of her alliance with the left parties '^ tiich 
compelled her to accomnodate different points cf view, when 
she expelled LS5.' (Lanka Sa~a £a~-'- Tarty) frorr thf c-^":: 113'>-.. 
The communist left the coalitio- vr.ich led tc hpr f>:rtv'5 
defeat in the ele-tion of 1977. 
In the sixth chapter I have given a short sjmmary 
of the previous chapters with some emphasis on the difference 
between leadership styles of women and men with the cpuestion: 
Are women better democrats than men and why? We can find 
a positive answer in this study of two women and two men lea-
ders presented here. As we have seen in the case of two women, 
they came to power through democratic process and left power 
through the same process, while in the case of the two men, 
they came to power through democracy but they became undemo-
cratic. Therefore, they not only lost their position and 
power but they lost their lives too. 
The nature and scope of the present study required 
both primary and secondary materials which were collected 
during my study in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. A special 
visit was made tc Sri Lanka for the purpose as well. Inter-
views with many senior and important dignitaries were condu-
cted in each of these countries and essential infornaticn 
and material was retrieved through close interaction with 
scholars in the field in each of the four countries. 
Ali M.S. AlghaTdy 
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CHAPTER I 
WHAT IS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
CHAri'r.i' ] 
W-1A7' 15' K)LITICAI LEADER3HIP 
PROBLEM OF APPROACH CR METHODOLOGY 
Political leadership is a highly corplex phenomenon 
which has eluded attempts by political scientists in arriving 
at a generally acceptable comprehensive definition. Itie main 
difficulty in an operational definition arises frotr the fact 
that political leadership, as a category of analysis has to 
be studied through its variables, that demand a high degree 
of precision and cannot be manipulated by researchers or be 
1 2 
subjected to experimental control. The variations from 
individual to individual, society to society or time to time 
depending upon historical experience, political tradition, 
economic factors, and external influence make it difficult 
for analysts to arrive at tentative generalisations. In order 
to bypass these problems, several political scientists expound-
ing a "Behavioural" approach to the study of leadership, have 
1. Redd\-, G. Rair and Seshadri, K., 'Stud^ 'inc cf Leadershio', 
Leadership : Political System (New Delhi, 1979), p.101. 
2. International Encyclopaedia of Social Science, vol.IX, 
p.24. 
7. 
dinged to the "Great Men" theory" that some individuals 
naturally possess leadership traits which distinguish these 
handful of leaders in any group or society from the mass of 
people who follow them, while some others have tried the 
"Positional" approach explaining leadership through the posit-
4 ion of authority the leaders occupy. Both these theories/ 
though generally appear correct, have obvious flaws. A nurTt>er 
of studies have been conducted by psychologists in the West 
on leadership traits but none of them could come to emy agreed 
conclusion with any amount of finality as to what traits con-
stitute leadership qualities. These traits have neither been 
5 
isolated and studied nor is it easily possible to do so. 
On the other hand, reducing the study of political 
leadership to an analysis of power has its own theoretical 
limitations. First of all, power itself is a concept which 
is difficult to adequately theorize and quantify, eluding 
a clear definition which could be used as a standard and uni-
versal variable. Secondly, there is only a very thin border-
line between power and coercion making it incorrect to asso-
ciate power in general with leadership; therefore a distinc-
3. Tucken, Robert C./ "Leadership", Political Science Quar-
terly, Vol.92, no.l, Spring 1977, p-.1ET. 
4. Blondel, Jean, World Leaders (London, 1980), p.12. 
5. Reddy & Seshadri, n.l, p.101. 
tion has to be made of types of power associated with leader-
ship and those which do not come within that broad gamut. 
Evolving a general criterion to identify these types of power 
would pose fresh problems of theoretical conceptualization 
cind quantitative measurement. A major study has, however, 
been made by K.F. Janda on how to relate power with leader-
6 
ship. Janda says : "Leadership phenomena can be distinguished 
from other power phenomena \*en power relationships occur 
among the members of the same group emd these relationships 
are based on the group members' "perception that another group 
manber may, with reference to their group activities, legi-
timately prescribe behaviour patterns for then to follow" 
(Emphasis added). Janda thus implies that it is legitimacy 
which distinguishes leadership power from coercive power. 
However, the trouble arises from his use of the word 'Legiti-
macy' which itself is as ambiguous as power or leadership. 
Janda is also not clear whether legitimacy is only a subjective 
view v^en members of the group themselves recognise someone 
as their leader giving him legitimacy to direct them or he 
means an objective normative standard. If legitimacy is taken 
to mean in its stymological sense v^ich related it to law 
and legal framework, the definition of leadership would become 
6. Janda, K.F., "Towards the Explication of the Concept of 
Leadership in Terms of the Concept of Power", in Blondel, 
n.4, p.13. 
too restrictive to exclude revolutionary' leader? who fought 
for and succeeded in overthrowing the social and political 
system and the body of laws prevalent in their time. 
In view of such conceptual problems, it is, however, 
necessary for the study of leadership to give more emphasis 
on identifying a greater number of variables contributing 
to the process of leadership development. It may include 
the socio-political milieu in which the leadership operates, 
interaction between a v^ole range of variables, character 
traits and support structures of an emergent leader. Social 
psychologists have for a generation or more looked at the 
characteristics of leadership. In general they have been 
concerned with developing cind testing certain types of leaders 
in certain types of situations and have developed successive 
7 
models and theories to account for their finding. Ilieir 
models, however cannot be applied because the characteristics 
of political leadership are rather different from those of 
leadership in organisations; the tasks and responsibilities 
are m ore varied and the environmental context is also different, 
7. Blondel, n.4, p.11 
ASPECTS OF LEADERSHIP 
One of the basic reasons for a lack of adequate defini-
tion is an assunption on the part of the theoreticists that 
most groups are same as far as their leaders' role is concerned. 
Itiis oversinplification creates problens in the study of leader-
ship in situations and groups structurally different from 
each other. The generalisation ignores the fact that leadership 
g 
involves recognition of a cotrplex relationships which vary 
from situation to situatiOTi, group to group/ and individual 
to individual and demand a conplex approach. Glenn D. Paige 
summarises the initial approach in answer to these fundamental 
questions about leadership . 
Wherever one lives - in village, town, coimiune, city, 
state, province, territory, nation or world (Itie one habitat 
shared by everyone) - a beginning can be made by looking sharply 
at the surrounding environment and asking such questions as 
who are the political leaders? What difference do they make 
in the social life? What alternative forms of political leader-
ships are possible? The first question will raise problems 
of identifying political leaders; the second will lead to 
analysis of leadership influences upon the political system 
8. International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, p.95. 
and other aspects of society; the third will demand departure 
from the enpirically given present to extrapolation, compa-
ssion, experimentation and theoretical elaboration in search 
9 
of action related understanding . Paige also suggests 
a further approach to study of leaders "In terms of their 
relationship to the great issues of an era. Outstanding twen-
tieth century issues, for example, include freedom versus 
dictatorship, poverty versus wealth, war versus peace, dis-
crimination versus equality, and ecological survival versus 
ecological catastrophe. Many other salient issues are readily 
recognisable. Ilius starting with a significant issue of inte-
rest we may trace its relationship to the behaviour of local, 
provincial, national and international leaders". However 
scholars may not agree with this Is ituational" approach. 
According to the 'Great Men" theory, leadership does not depend 
upon situation or issues but on personal qualities which get 
individual recognition as leadership qualities irrespective 
of the issues at the time. 
9. Paig e, Glenn D., Political Leadership : Reading for an 
Emerging Field, "(New York : 1972), p.4. 
10 ibid, p.2. 
The individual with the right personality will emerge 
as a good leader in most, if not all/ groups and organisa-
tions. The complexities of the leadership role can be asse-
ssed from the following definitions based on various attri-
12 
butes or functions as a leader : 
(i) Leadership is the exercise of authority, the 
making and shaping of decisions, 
(ii) Leadership is the imitation of acts which result 
in consistent pattern of group interaction directed 
toward the solution of mutual and moral problems. 
Xiii) "ttie leader is the person who comes close to rea-
lising the norms the group values highest; this 
conformity gives him/her high rank, which attracts 
people and irtplies the right to assume the poli-
tical control of the group. 
(iv) Leader is one who succeeds in getting others 
to svipport and follow him. 
(v) Leadership is cin ability to persuade or direct 
people without use of the prestige or power of 
formal office or external circumstances. 
(vi) Leadership, in group discussion, is the assum-
ption of the tasks of initiating, organising, 
summarising, and formulating conclusions; hence, 
11. Fielder, Fred E., A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness 
(New York : 1967) p.l6. 
12. As quoted by Fielder, ibid, pp.7-8. 
the person who spends the most time talking to 
the group, since he or she carries out most of 
these verbal tasks, 
(vii) Leadership/is the art of influencing group towards 
goal-setting and goal ach ievement. 
(viii) The leader is that person identified and accepted 
as such by his/her followers, 
(ix) The leader is the person who creates the most 
effective change in group performance. 
The above definition relate to three broad categories 
of functions a leader performs in his or her exercise of autho-
rity or influence in social collectivities. These are : 
Establishing the goals, purpose or objectives of the 
collectivity, creating the structures through which the purposes 
of the collectivity are fulfilled and maintaining or enhancing 
13 
these strucrtures. On the basis of these functions a leader 
performs in a group, organisation, community or nation. Leader-
ship can be classified into three general types : Patriarchal 
leadership, in which the person upon whom the members perceive 
themselves to be dependent, is both loved and feared; tyrannical 
leadership, where the emotional leadership is dominated by 
13. International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, p.101. 
fear; and "Ideal" or charismatic leadership, in which the 
interpersonal relationship is characterised by love or affe-
ction. ' 
The degree of obedience the leader commands from members 
of the group varies in each category. In the case of legal 
authority, according to Max Weber, obedience is owed to the 
legally established impersonal order. in extends the person 
exercising the authority of office under it only by virtue 
of the formal legality of their commands and only within the 
scope of authority of the office, in the case of traditional 
authority, obedience is owed to the person of the chief who 
occupies the traditionally sanctined position of authority 
and who is (within its sphere) bound by tradition. But here 
the obligation of obedience is not based on the impersonal 
order but is a matter of personal loyalty within the area 
of accustomed obligation. In the case of charismatic authority, 
it is the charismatically qualified leader as such who is 
obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him and his revelation, 
his heroism or his exemplary qualities so far as they fall 
15 
within the scope of individual belief in his charisma . 
14. ibid, p.95. 
15. Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisa-
tion, (New York : 1953 ), p.328. ~ 
10 
In view of the socio-political complexities of the 
leadership phenomenon, it is almost impossible to arrive at 
a unidimensional definition. It is, therefore, essential 
to take into consideration the following four interacting 
factors : 
(i) Traits : Leaders have different psychological 
make-up from other people (General pattern story) 
(i') Situation : The situation determines which mixture 
of traits and capabilities work (for example, 
Churchill flopped as Prime Minister in Peace 
time). 
(iii) Function : Leaders plan and initiate, provide 
information and advice, make decisions and provide 
symbolic (Kingship) imaginery. 
(iv) Birth or fate : Leaders are 'Great Men" and 
also "Great Women" who are born that way and 
make history. 
Caution must, however, be exercised here against confu-
sing leaders with leadership. The study of leaders empha-
sise their birth, their strength and the way they make their 
decisions from social, political and sociological angle whereas 
16 Passett, Barry A., Leadership Development for Public 
Service (Houston : 1973 ), pp.9-10. 
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a mutual interaction between those who lead and those who 
are led, though the change that the leader brings on his/her 
followers is more than the change that could have ordinarily 
17 
occured. Simon ^escribes political ledership as akin to 
"A bus driver whose passengers will leve him unless he takes 
them in the direction in which they wish to go. They leave 
1 D 
him only minor discretion as to the road to be followed. This 
view was criticised by Tsurutani as being "not only contejctually 
19 inappropriate but substamtially irrelevant". 
According to him, "The role of political leadership 
(In its political strategic, hence manipulative dimension) 
is indeed the most crucial factor to be ascertained in the 
process of national development. An important, and as far 
as this effort is concerned, crucial idea emerges from it; 
that political leadership is the arbiter of, rather than one 
participant or factor among many in the process of national 
development. Further, political leadership, according to 
Tsurutani, can be associated with politial system as it is 
the agent of the system. If the political leadership is effi-
cient and capable it can be reflected in the functioning of 
the political system. 
17. n.l, p. 99. 
18. Nash. M., The Meaning of Political Leadership, p 25-
19. Ibid, p. 26.. 
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SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF LEADERSHIP 
Besides behavioural, situational and functional aspects, 
there are certain social and political variables which play 
an independent role in the emergence of leadership?*^ These 
can be divided into three broad categories. 
The Socio-Economic Structure of Policy 
This relates to the wealth or affluence of the country 
which can be easily gauged from gross national product, gross 
domestic product, per capita income and related statistics 
about the economic performance. It is generally observed 
that a country's affluence or distribution of wealth among 
its population has a direct impact on its political stability. 
Richer countries are likely to have more stable political 
systems than the poor countries to meet the rising expectations 
of its people, leading to socio-political tensions. Richer 
countries are also likely to have a more tolerant and liberal 
political structure than the poor countries except perhaps 
in the case of communist countries which are rich and stable 
but do not have a liberal open political system (inspite of 
the significant political developments within the Soviet Union 
and the East European countries ). Economic development of 
20. Rogowski, R., Rational Legitimacy, (Princeton : 1974). 
21. Dahl, R.A., Polyarchy (Yale : 1970), pp. 48-80. 
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a country, therefore, has a definite bearing on the characte-
ristics of its politial system and pattern of leadership 
though there could be certain exceptional cases and exceptional 
historical circumstances. 
National Identity 
This component plays a significant and direct influence 
on leadership unlike wealth it is difficult to quantify. However/ 
it can be understood by using three indicators: duration of 
independence, its socio-cultural unity, and political culture. 
It is perhaps reasonable to assume that an old country 
is likely to achieve a higher degree of national identity 
than a new country and that every year which passes clearly 
adds to the sense of national belonging among its citizens. 
An old country is also likely to have passed through many 
crises thus cementing its identity and unit. It may be possible 
that unity is willy nilly forces on certain regions causing 
political, ethnic and linguistic tensions. It is also possible 
that a country facing problems may not be able to cope with 
the tensions whereas a new country experiencing progress may 
be able to achieve greater unity. However, it is reasonable 
to expect some kind of relationship between the age of a country 
and national characteristics and political tradition. the 
sectoral or communal feeling may affect national unity but 
it wholly depends upon the intensity of feeling with which 
14 
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the cleavages exist. This cleavage could be on the basis 
of region, religion or tribal and ethnic origins/ as for ins-
tance in the case of the Punjab problem in India, Baluchistan 
in Pakistan and the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka. Though the 
cleavage creates broadly distinctive social groups, the degree 
of tension depends upon the intensity of feeling. 
It is impossible to measure the intensity of feeling 
but certain acts of protest or violaxe could provide an indica-
tion. ' Thirdly, political culture often plays a far greater 
influence on political life of a country than is generally 
assumed. Some nations have militaristic tendencies while 
others could be tolerant or be prone to caesarism. Though 
it is difficult to directly assess the impact of these trends 
they do contribute to the future shape of political movements 
and style of leadership. 
It may be difficult to quantify precisely either 
national identity, unity or political culture, such assessment 
23 
could be aided by introducing a geographical substitute. 
As a result of "historical accidents" the world has been divided 
into several geographical groupings providing natural frontiers 
between nations - rivers, mountains etc. Those living in 
one geographical location are apt to have a closer sense of 
22. Taylor, R. and Hudson M., World Handbook of Political 
Indicators (Yale: Up, 1972^. It Is also analysed in 
detail by Rogowski, n.20, Chapter 1. 
23. Blondel, n.4, p.29. 
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unity and profound cultural similarities than people living 
in other areas. 
Political System 
The impact of political variables on leadership is 
far more easy to understand than socio - economic variables, 
the kind of political system prevalent at a time explains 
the nature and role of leadership. For instance, a country 
under colonial domination is more likely to produce leadership 
of a self - sacrificing type than a sovereign nation. 
At present the political system in a majority of states 
is marked with two structural distinctions— political parties 
and the military which are the main linkage betwen the govern-
ment and the people. "With the decline of tribal and feudal 
ties, parties and the railicary have become increasingly the 
only structures on which the government rely for obedience 
and support". Parties are somewhat broadly related to social 
groups even though they seem to"float over" them and contri-
bute to a large extent the political characteristics of a 
nation. The military though has a far narrower social base 
is the most important single variable in explaining the political 
24 
stability of the country. 
24. Ibid. pp. 30-32, 
16 
These varia bles do not constitute the whole of envi-
ronment - for which every facet of national life is to be 
taken into consideration - but offer a broad model for under-
standing the political life of a nation. Before the second 
world war it was difficult to think of military rule as it 
was considered an unnatural phenomenon, A government domi-
nated by an army was considered '"unnatural not because it 
was a n ew ohenomenon - it has been recognised by political 
philosophers from Machiavelli to Mosca - but because some 
social scientists refused to accept military rule as being 
as natural as civilian rule. This hesitation of social scien-
tists to study the military has had a variety of causes / rang-
ing from ignorance of historical and political facts to antago-
nism towards war and the military professior As recently 
as 1930s a military government was identified as the ultimate 
25 
type of totalitarianism . There is no example where we 
can find a pure military rule. Usually military officers 
who come to power by overthrowing a civilian government cannot 
afford excluding civilians from government they formed because 
25. Perlmutter, A. "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian 
Army— Toward a Taxonomy of Civil - Militairy Relations 
and Developing Politics:"/ in Janson L. Finkle and Ri-
chard W. Gable, ed., Political Development and Social 
Change (New York : 1971), p.305. 
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they lack experience which they find in the bureaucracy of 
the civil services. Although the present analysis treats 
the civilian and military spheres of action analytically as 
independent variable, in conflict and interaction, the military 
organisation cannot be fully divorced from the civilian social 
conteva that determines civilian politics. 
DEVELOPMENT OF LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH ASIA 
For a comprehensive study of leadership in the sub-
continent it is perhaps necessary to go back into history 
for a broader understanding of socio-political variables and 
leadership traits which are so unique in the region. 
Historically, South Asia, though a distinct geogra-
phical entity, has been divided into various princely states 
and it is only with the advent of British Colonial rule in 
the nineteenth century that it assumed a political unity on 
the scale hither to unknown. Although various kings and empe-
rors in different periods of history attempted to expand their 
empires to encompass the entire subcontinent, their efforts 
were either abortive or short. The Britisn ed in 
Z. ibid, p.315. 
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unifying the region under their rule providing a central 
political and economic administration which initiated a new 
process of national assimilation. It is perhaps the British 
rule that started in the subcontinent a wide social awareness 
which culminated into freedom struggle and inaugurated a new 
era in the political life of the people of subcontinent. 
Political leadership has its origins in the freedom struggle 
and for the purpose of the present study can be categorised 
into the following stages of development. 
Hirst/ in the initial days of nationalism/ the freedom 
struggle was confined to a few intellectuals whose aspira-
tions led to the formation of the Indian National Congress 
in 1885. This forms the most important event in the poli-
tical history of the subcontinent as it initiated the pro-
cess of political socialisation of the masses giving a wider 
ideological base to the struggle for ^independence. As a 
result of increasing awareness/ the Muslim League and Hindu 
Mahasabha came into being. Later on/ economic-oriented 
parties like the communist Party and the Socialist Party were 
created. These parties/ along with peasant organisations 
and trade unions/ provided interest articulation and intensified 
political communication which became a leadership function."It 
19 
spreaded its wings as leaders started emerging at various 
places performing different functions and taking the whole 
27 
sub-continent in their sweep". 
Second/ the entry of Mahatma Gandhi followed by Jinnah/ 
Nehru and others started a new era of leadership between 
leaders and their followers. For the first time it is seen 
that a leader/ without an institutional support or by virtue 
of his position or office/ came to the fore and by virtue 
of exhibiting certain qualities was surrounded by a mass of 
followers who were influenced by his own action. Here a 
leader is loved, respected and followed not essentially because 
he could offer rewards for agreement or could inflict punish-
ment for disagreement/ but essentially gave his followers 
a psychic satisfaction. This major goal itself is broken 
into different smaller goals and many leaders where certain 
individuals displaying a certain mix of individual traits 
acquire leadership in a given situation. 
27. ibid/ p.102. 
28. ibid, 
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From this a third stage emerged vrfnich continued 
till the achievement of independence. During this period 
the political activity widened with a whole range of 
leaders performing different functions and even working 
at times at cross-purposes. The delineation of leadership 
also proliferated with various leaders articulating the 
interest of a community or region. For instance Jinnah 
stood for the Muslim community whereas Ambedkar cham-
pioned ' the cause of scheduled castes. Various regional 
leaders claimed to represent the aspirations of their 
region but despite such sectarian outlook the leaders 
co-existed with each other working for the main goal 
of independence. 
Fourth, the independence and creation of Pakistan 
and India brought a major shift in the political process. 
The leaders no longer claimed to represent a community 
or region but claimed to be policy-makers by virtue of 
the positions they acquired in the government. Every 
political aspirant to a public office had to perform 
certain functions, forge an alliance and declare poli-
cies to win the support of the people. If a platform 
proved inadequate for his/her purpose he/she would leave 
it, join another or build new structure with the help 
of others. This created a maze of political relationships 
21 
where a leader would claim the following of a section of people 
as well as would voice his/her obedience to some stronger figure. 
This created a leadership hierarchy where a bigger leader would 
have the following of lesser leaders who would in turn have 
the following of those below him/her, finally reaching down 
29 
to the mass level. The ambition to wield power gave rise to 
rivalries within the members of the same political group thus 
creating "unscrupulousness" , "betrayal" and "opportunism" as 
one of the main characteristics of political behaviour. Gone 
were the days of "self - sacrificer" type of the pre-independence 
days and the "self-seeker" came to the force undermining even 
those leaders with an honest and sincere commitment to a cause. 
There is no wonder that in the four decades of independence 
the political system in the countries of South Asia has been 
facing crises where leaders are being challenged by their own 
people. 
As political leaders could not deliver the goods the people 
looked for alternatives which were found in the army in some 
countries of South Asia especially those with weak democratic 
institution. 
29. Ibid. p. 104. 
30. Ibid., p. 105. 
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Few of these countries possessed strong democratic tradi-
tions vvtiich might have prevented a drift towards authori-
tarianism. The displacement of civilian government by 
the military has/ therefore, been a common feature in most 
countries which have gained independence from colonial 
rule in the second half of the twentieth century. Wherever 
the social and political conditions deteriorated and an 
ambitious general was at hand, the country went through 
a period of military rule. The bureaucracy, claiming 
to be the natural rulers, found it convenient to function 
behind the military shield much as they had done for their 
colonial masters , 
The emergence of women as politieal leaders is indeed 
a unique characteristic of the leadership in South Asia. Mrs. 
Bandaranaike became the first woman prime minister in the world 
followed by Mrs. Gandhi in the same region and more recently 
Mrs. Bhutto, the first woman prime minister of an Islamic state. 
This phenomena has not been witnessed in any other region in 
that these neighbouring countries of South Asia have produced 
three women prime ministers within a span of three decades. 
And this political phenomenon requires scholarly attention and 
academic explanation taking into consideration the total socio-
political configuration of the subcontinent. Is it a mere 
historical accident that this region has produced these women 
leaders? Or are there political and social factors responsible 
31. Khan, Mohammad Asghar, Generals in Politics( New Delhi; 
1983), p. 2. 
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for producing these women leaders? Or that these women became 
leaders simply because of the inheritance of power, as it can 
be said that Mrs. Gandhi inherited her father Nehru's political 
fortunes/ and the same with Mrs. Bhutto. Again Mrs. Bandarnaike 
could be seen as a mere inheritor of her husband's political 
patrimony. This last question, however, cannot be taken for granted 
for the simple reason that none of these women leaders immediately 
succeeded to the positions of powr after the death of their fathers 
(Mrs. Gandhi and Mrs. Bhutto) or spouse (Mrs. Bandarnaike). There 
were periods of transition to power and during the interrums poli-
tical changes took place and they earnings of the people for their 
old leaders prevailed in each single case of the countries in 
the region. Clearly, the women leaders were not the immediate 
successors to the positions of pofer vacated by their near ones. 
32. EXjring the interviews conducted for the present research 
the women leaders interviewed including Mrs. Bandaranaike 
nd Sheikh Hasina Wazed who mentioned that they were not 
planning to enter public life or politics at the time of 
the demise of their husband and father respectively. The 
decision to enter politics came after a considerable period 
of time. 
CHAPTER II 
LEADERSHIP CRISIS IN PAKISTAN 
CHAPTER II 
LEADERSHIP CRISIS IN PAKISTAN 
Pakistan/ like any other sub-continental country lacked 
a stable, permanent and a democratically strong institutional 
set up which could produce a genuine leadership. An analysis 
of the history of various institutions of the sub-continent 
reveals that there have been a tradition of starting Insti-
tutions which later fade out for want of proper leadership 
and guidance. This phenomena had been prophesized ^Y ^ 
western observer on the politics of the sub-continent long 
before the independence of the present countries of the sub-
continent. This observer is no less than Jan Melwille Ste-
phen who was the editor and director of the famous Indian 
newspaper "The Statesman" . In an article he wrote 
"It is characteristic of Indian jLastitutions and 
ashrams to pivot a single personality which gra-
dually becomes surrounded with unquestioning adu-
lation. This is a long term danger". 
This prophesy seemed almost to have some truth. 
In India the Congress Party of independent India was closely 
1. The Statesman, September 14, 1941. 
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attached to the name of Nehru. When he died his daughter 
Indira took over and all other leaders of the party became 
subordinate to her. Those who could not tolerate her domina-
tion had to quit the party. Her assasination left a vacuum. 
in the Congress with nobody to succeed her except her son, 
who was a pilot with practically no political experience. 
It is alleged that he draws his strength more from Congress 
'Musclemen' than from these "'veterans who sacrificed their 
lives for establishing grass root foundation of the Congress 
Party. The same could be applied to the Muslim League of 
Pakistan and Awami League of Bangladesh. In case of Pakistan, 
"the long term danger" came too early. 
So the leadership crisis in Pakistan is not a recent 
phenomenon. Its origin can be traced back to the days of 
Pakistan Movement which was completely dominated by the chari-
smatic figure of Mohamad Ali Jinnah. He was like the pro-
verbial banyan tree under which nothing grows. His dynamic 
personality did not accept an inferior position in the Indian 
politics and that is why he grew from an ambassador of Hindu-
Muslim unity to a father of a separate homeland for the Indian 
Muslim. Although, a member of Khoja community which is a 
minority within a minority in the sub-continent he could 
rise to the highest position in the iMusliir politics of the 
sub-continent? 
2. Page,David, "M.A. Jinnah and the System of Imperial Control" 
in B.N. Pandey, Leadership in South Asia (Delhi : 1969), 
p.633. 
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It was his return from political refuge in London 
which introduced a new vigour in the so far sluggish 
struggle for the creation of Pakistan being carried out 
by the Muslim League. His public appeal among the Muslims 
of the sub-continent was overwhelming and the Muslim 
League leaders were aware of it. That is why Loyagat 
Ali Khan spent days in London trying to persuade Jinnah 
to return to India and assume the leadership of Muslim 
League so that he can effectively counter the challenge 
posed by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru to the Paki-
stan Movement. Under these circumstances he became the 
undisputable leader of Pakistan and laid the party poli-
cies according to his wishes. The phase under which 
the movement was passing through justified what could 
otherwise have been described as dictatorial tendencies 
in him. The situation could not afford any differences 
of opinion among the leaders of the Muslim League. His 
ability to tackle constitutional issues won the admira-
tion of his friends and foes alike and it was largely 
the leadership provided by him that made possible the 
creation of Pakistan on 14 August, 1947. 
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Stanley Wolpert wrote in the preface of his book 
entitled "Jinnah of Pakistan" that 
"Few individuals significantly alter the course 
of history. Fewer still modify the map of the 
world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creat-
ing a nation-state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all 
three". 
The untimely death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah left the 
mantle of responsibility on the second-in-command Liyaqat 
Ali Khan who had proved his capability during the movement 
to lead the new state. However/ the unfortunate assasination 
of Liyaqat Ali Khan in 1951 led to leadership vacuum as there 
were no prominent leaders of the national stature. Those 
who appeared on the political scene were inefficient/ incapa-
ble and selfish. They were more interested in personal gains 
than in national interest. 
Ghulam Mohammad became the Governor General and he 
depended mainly on his finance Minister Chaudhri Mohammad 
Ali and defence secretary Iskander Mirza. This group had 
no political base; its support came mainly from the senior 
officers in the army and the civil service. Thus/ in the 
first few years of Pakistan/ administrators replaced the 
elected representatives of the people as effective decision-
makers. The decisions of 'decisive consequence' 
3. Wolpert Stanley/ Jinnah of Pakistan (London : 1985)/ 
p.IIV. 
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for Pakistan during this period - the imposition of Martial 
Law in Lahore, the removal of Khawaja Nazimuddin from office 
in 1953, the dismissal of the first popularly elected United 
Front Ministry of East Bengal in May 1954, the dissolution 
of the first constituent assembly in October 1954, the forced 
unification of West Pakistan into one .province and the impo-
sition of the formula of Parity on East Bengal on 1955 -
were all taken by the^. groip of bureaucrats that clustered 
4 
around Jinnah and Liyaqat. 
Although, Pakistan was based on Islam yet it was diffi-
cult to define an Islamic state. There were different groups 
giving myraid different definitions and perceptions of an 
Islamic state. Each group accused the other of being 'anti-
Islamic*. "Ironically, Islam united the Muslim masses of 
India only to divide them when the dream of a separate home-
5 
land for the Muslims of the sub-continent became a reality". 
4. Talukdar Muniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution and its 
After (Dacca : 1980), p.24. 
5. Khan, Zillar R., Leadership Crisis in Bangladesh 
(Dacca : 1984), p.5. 
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The new born state was without a constitution for 
nearly nine years. It was being run by the Government of 
India Act of 1935 for all these long years. This delay in 
deciding what political system should be introduced for the 
new state hampered the process of democratization as crucial 
time was lost when the popular enthusiasm was at its height 
and thepublic could have been asked to mould themselves to 
the new system. When the constitution was finally introdu-
ced, it was simply taken as a piece of legal document and 
not as a testament which determined the destiny of the nation. 
When the politicians failed to generate an interpretation 
of Islam which could be accepted as an ideology of the new 
State/ chaos prevailed and the rulers found it necessary 
to find a new method to continue their dominance. Iskander 
Mirza argued that the politicians "make a mess of things". 
He stated further, "some underdeveloped countries have to 
learn democracy, and until they do so they have to be contro-
lled". The same argument was used by Ayub Khan after he 
got rid of Iskander Mirza and successfully established his 
authority. He outlawed all political parties and many leaders 
including Mujibur Rehman, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Maulana Bhashani 
6. The Times (London), October 30, 1954. 
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and G .M . Syed were arrested. 
The situation could have been salvaged by the system 
of Basic Democracy introduced by Ayub Khan as it had some 
inherent strong points and was hailed by people like Arnold 
Toynbee and Jayaparkash Narayan. Its strongest and the weakest 
point was in the limited number of Basic Democrats or the 
people constituting the electoral college. In a third world 
country where illiteracy and poverty are rampant universal 
sufferage becomes meaningless as people do not know how to 
exercise their democratic rights. In this sense the Basic 
Democracy system could "have proved to be an asset. Only 
those people could be elected who were conscious of the great 
responsibility endowed upon them. But the system had the 
basic flaw that the fewer the number the easier it was to 
manipulate them by the underlying powers. And for this reason 
Basic Democracy could never completely win the confidence 
of public and was looked down upon with suspicion. These 
suspicions were confirmed in the presidential election of 
1965 when Ayub defeated Fatima Jinnah whose victory was 
thought to be foregone conclusion for the massive popular 
support she enjoyed. Another example of the failure of the 
Basic Democracy was demonstrated by the fact that only 
31 
7 members of the Awami League - the most popular party in 
East Pakistan were elected as members of the National Assembly 
7 in the election of 1962 under Basic Democracy. 
In October 1968 Ayub Khan celebrated his decade of 
progress and development but at the same time trouble started 
for him in both East and West Pakistan. In the West, the 
main trouble came from Z.A. Bhutto, the foreign Minister 
under AyUb and who taking advantage of Ayub's political 
weakness turned the time appropriate to fulfil his ambition 
of becoming the absolute leader of Pakistan. In the East 
wing, Awami League and its Chairman Shaikh Mujibur Rahman 
launched a campaign against Ayub Khan by raising the long 
Q 
Standing grievances of East Pakistan. 
7. Talukder Muniruzzman , n.4, p.10. 
8. These were outlined by Abul Mansur Ahmad - one of the 
prominent Awami Leaguers as the following : 
a) greater regional autonomy; b) the economic disparity 
growing out of geographical condition; c) cultural diff-
erences between the two Bengalis ; d) negligence by the 
central government in redressing Bengali grievances; 
e) inadequate representation of Bengalis in the govern-
ment services, and f) ;need for limiting the central 
government to matters relating to foreign affairs and 
currency only, while giving a larger share of the adminis-
tration to the Provinces. Rashidduzzman M. "East-West 
Conflict in Pakistan : Bengali Regionalism, 1947-1970", 
in Jayaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton, The State ol 
South Asia (Delhi : 1982), p.113. 
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It may however be stated that Ayub Khan may not have 
been solely responsible for the grievances of the Bengalis. 
They were there even when a Bengali Zahra Wardy was the Prime 
Minister of Pakistan. On the contrary, Ayub Khan did take 
some actions to redress Bengali grievances when he realised 
the inadequate Bengali representation in the administration. 
He, in fact, publicly admitted that there was economic 
disparity between the two wings of the country and that it 
should be narrowed; he decided to place Bengali Officers 
in important administrative positions in East Pakistan; he 
agreed to appoint a Finance Commission to recommend a more 
equitable allocation of resources between the centre and 
provinces and lastly, he transferred some of the government-
run development agencies like Water and Power Development 
Authority (W.A.P.D.A.) and Pakistan Industrial Development 
9 
Corporation (P.I.D.C.) to East Pakistan. The downfall of 
Ayub Khan in March 1969, in fact, ended a decade of political 
stability and economic development v^ich neither Pakistan 
nor Bangladesh witnessed ever since. 
Yahya Khan took over from Ayub Khan when the country 
was passing through a very critical time and therefore he 
concentrated on internal problems. 
9. ibid, p.117. 
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There were three clear and unambiguous promises 
first, transfer of power to the elected - represen-
tatives of the people; Second,a the election would 
be held on the basis of direct adult franchise 
- Ayub's system of indirect election through Basic 
Democracy was rejected; and thirdly, the future 
constitution of the,^ountry would be framed by 
the elected members. 
Yahya Khan kept his promises but there were certain 
quarters who were not interested in a United Pakistan topmost 
amongst them being Shaikh Mujibur Rahman and Z.A. Bhutto. 
It is reported that Bhutto had addressed -"Mujib in the follow-
ing expression after refusing to attend the National Assembly 
meeting in Dhaka "You on that side and I on this side". 
This was indeed symptomatic of the future dismemberment of 
Pakistan, 
10. Chaudhry, G.W. : The Last Days of United Pakistan (London: 
1974), p.73, 
11. Munir Muhammad, From Jinnah to Zia, (Delhi : 1981), 
p.85. 
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ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO 
Z.A. Bhutto was one of the most controversial" leaders 
not only in the region of South Asia but all over the World. 
Indira Ganthi once described him as an "imbalanced man" and 
in reply to her; he said that the only thing that he accepted 
from the philosopher John Locke was that "consistency is 
12 
the virtue of small minds". His childhood friend Piloo Modi, 
in justifying the writing of the book Zulf i, My Friend 'wrote 
in its acknowledgement. 
But for the fact that Zulfikar Ali Shahnawaz Bhutto 
has become the president of Pakistan, this book would 
never have been written; no one would have asked me 
to write one. But for the fact that an architect 
had turned politician, my publishers would never have 
staked their money ,Qr risked their reputation and 
asked me to write it. 
The same author wrote. 
Zulfikar Ali Shahnawas Bhutto has been and will always 
continue to be a very dear triend - not because he 
is the most sensible of men, not because he is balanced 
and fair-minded, not because he is truthful and forth-
right, not because he is the President of Pakistan, 
12. Fallaci, Oriana, Interview with History (New York: 
1976), pp. 183, 184, 201. 
13. Mody, Piloo, Zulfi My Friend (Delhi: 1973), p. 7 
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but because he is Zulfi/ warm and loyal to those whom 
he loves, affectionate and tolerant of human weakness, 
he also happens to be the central figure and dominant 
personality in the six most formative years of my 
life bet^en 1945 and 1950, between the ages of 18 
and 24. 
Son of a wealthy family living in Bombay, one of the 
biggest cities of Asia and one of the largest commercial 
centres of the British Empire at that time. Z.A. Bhutto 
was a complex person. He himself never denied this comple-
xity. On the contrary he admitted in the interview with 
the same journalist mentioned above that, 
there are many conflicts in me. I am aware of 
that. I try to reconcile them, overcome them, 
but I do not succeed and I remain this strange 
mixture of Asia and Europe. I have a layman's 
education and a Muslim upbringing.^ My mind is 
western and my soul is eastern". Further he 
claimed that : "the reason I have been able to 
overcome the trouble is that I know the fundamental 
rule of this profession. What is the rule? Well, 
in politics you sometimes have to pretend to be 
stupid and make others believe they are the only 
intelligent ones". 
One can define him in may ways : liberal and authori-
tarian, fascist and communisty sincere' and liar. He is un-
doubtedly one of the most complex leaders of our time and 
the only interesting one his country has so far produced. 
14. ibid, p.l. 
15. Fallaci, Oriana, Interview with Histor\^ (New York 
1976), p.202. '~ 
16. ibid, p.209. 
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He reminds less of Indira Gandhi than of King Hussain. 
Like Hussain/ he is accused of leading a nation artificially 
bom. Like Hussain, he seemed to be like an earthernware 
pot, sqeezed among iron pots - the Soviet Union, India, China 
and America. Like Hussain, he was determined not to yield, 
but resisted with the courage of a trapped artist with no 
net to protect him. In many other ways he seemed to be 
like John F. Kennedy. He grew up in the kind of wealth for 
which nothing was impossible, not even the conquest of politi-
cal power. Like Kennedy, he had a comfortable, happy, pri-
vileged childhood. Finally, like Kennedy, he began his 
rise to power very early. 
He studied at Berkeley and Oxford, taking his degree 
in International Law. At little over thirty years, he was 
one of Ayub Khan's Ministers, and soon after a Minister under 
Yahya Khan, though he despised both of them. He arrived 
at the Presidency with painful patience, without letting 
himself be bothered by the bad odour of certain associates. 
He loved power. It is difficult to guess the nature 
of this power. His own response to it was ambuiguous, he 
warned against politicians who tell the truth or exhibit 
a boy-scout morality. While listening to him, you are almost 
led to believe that his ambition was a noble one, that he 
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really intended to build socialism. But then a visit to 
his splendid library in Karachi revealed volumes on Mussolini 
and Hitler, bound in silver. However, there is also no doubt 
that he valued the friendship of Sukarno and Nasser — two 
individuals perhaps moved by good intentions but certainly 
not too liberal. Was it then 
his secret dream to become dictator, to be exalted 
one day by sumptuous volumes bound in silver? Mind 
you, this is the kind of question asked by Westerners 
ignorant of the tragedy of a country where freedom, 
democracy, and political opposition have never had 
any meaning and have always been replaced by hunger 
injustice and humiliation. But it is still a valid 
question, as ominous as the expression that fires 
up his gaze v^en something displeases him". 
These seemed to be personal characteristics of Bhutto. 
They also reflected the policies of the Pakistani governmem: 
during his regime. He started his political life as a mini-
ster in the Ayub Khan Cabinet and for a long time performed 
his duties faithfully. He then turned against his master 
and contributed largely to Ayub's downfall. He was autoitious 
and his main aim was to capture power and to keep it. No 
doubt, he came to power in the most critical time in the 
history of Pakistan which can only be compared with the early 
days of the country when it was created. According to Fallaci 
17. ibid, p.184. 
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Bhutto had to a large extent a tendency towards dictatorship. 
Asqhar Khan described him as one who 
possessed the qualities and the feeling of his class 
and the polish and presence of a person with a broad 
western education. He had both the arrogance and 
indictiveness of the worst in our feudal aristocracy 
and the unity and charm of the best in western society. 
I was told by one who was very close to him that when 
he entered his office on the day following Bhutto's 
swearing-in as President, he found him a different 
man. his few hours in office had made him conscious 
of power. He had, even on his first day in office, 
began to show signs of arrogance. He was not a demo-
crat by temperament or conviction. He was a believer 
in the concept of absolute power and was determined 
to use his position as a vehicle to achieve that goal. 
It is said that as Secretary General of the convention 
Muslim League, he had suggested to Ayub Khan that 
the district commissioner should also be the district 
president and the Superintendent of Police, the District 
General Secretary of the Party. On assuming office, 
therefore, he began to move swiftly to consolidate 
his power base, which was to be built henceforth -
around the bureaucratic government machine, rather 
than the willing support of the people. He believed 
that the government machine rather than the public 
was a m ore reliable ally and the source of his power 
began to shift rapidly into the hands of the bureau-
cracy and the .police/ about whom he had learnt a great 
deal during his eight years with Ayub Khan. He began 
to lean heavily and rely more and more on these tradi-
tional tools of power and became less dependent on 
public support for the implementation of his politics 
and actions for those who dared oppose him in the 
hey-day of power, he had nothing but contempt. 
18. Mohammad Asghar BChan, Generals in Politics, (Delhi 
1983), pp.48-49. 
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Explanining his own experience with Bhutto, Asghar 
Khan wrote that when he joined politics and before he esta-
blished his political party Tehrik-i-Istiqlal oarty 
Bhutto had asked me to join the Pakistan people's 
Party. We had two long discussions and I had 
tried to learn something about his political phi-
losophy and economic programme. This was a little 
less than a year after the people's movement of 
1968-69 which I had led against Ayub Khan, while 
Bhutto was in jail. He told me that he was sure 
that I joined hands with him and if we both set 
off from Karachi, he tO' Dadu and Larkana and 
I to Hyderabad and Nawabshah meeting at Sukhur 
and then again forging out in different directions 
and meeting at Multan, then to Lahore and so on, 
by the time we reached Rawalpindi, Yahva Khan 
would be at 'the Railway Station to receive us. 
'We can then rule together' he had said. i had 
asked what his programme would be after he had 
been installed in power. He had laughed at this 
enquiry and had replied that 'The Programme is 
to rule, the people are stupid ;and I know how 
to make a fool of them. I will have the danda 
(stick) in my hand and no one will be able to 
remove me for twenty years'. I was grateful to 
him for his frank expression of views and -.wade 
up my mind that our paths would be different." 
This complex, highly skilled, and ambitious politi-
cian was given the mandate to refashion Jinnah's dream minus 
the east wing. 
19. ibid, p.51, 
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If we compare Pakistan in 1947 with Pakistan in 1971, the 
political problems appear to be almost identical. The 
search for national identity/ the development of political 
rules of the game, consensus - development regarding a 
new constitution, relation between the centre and provinces 
(political and economic), the roles of political parties, 
the Military and the Civil Services, among others". ^^ 
It was a difficult job for Bhutto to solve all these problems 
but he was committed to the task. He started his tenure by freeing 
Mujibur Rahman who was in prison since March 1971 and offered 
him the post of Prime Minister or the President if that could 
21 
preser\^ e the "oneness of Pakistan". This was a typical 'Bhutto 
Gimmick'. At the same time, such a move would enhance his popu- • 
larity among the Pakistani masses. There was another reason 
behind the offer to the Shaikh. Bhutto's rivals had accused 
him of being responsible for breaking up the country as there 
would be no future for him in a United Pakistan, since he had 
his base and support only in West Pakistan. By having the country 
dismembered he would be left with no strong rivals. 
20. Leoparte, Robert Jr., Power & Privileges, Influence and 
Decision Making ""n Pakistan (London i 1975) , pp"! 99-100. 
21. Washington Post, 18 January, 1972. 
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Mohammad Munir too points out that: 
It is alleged that Mr. Bhutto was primarily responsible 
for the cessation of East Pakistan. In this connection 
it is stated that as the national assembly was to sit at 
Dacca/ Mr. Bhutto prevented members of the national assembly 
going to Dacca by threatening them that he would break 
the legs of those who went to Dacca. He also tore to pieces 
the Polish resolution in the UNO which had proposed that 
the two belligerent states should revert to their original 
position before the war had begun. You on that side and 
I on this side/ is another expression on which Bhutto is 
alleged to have addressed to Mujib. So to get rid of this 
charge/ Bhutto offered Mujib the presidentship or the prime 
ministership. It is clearly evident then that Bhutto's 
offer to Mujib was a technical and political more aimed 
at enhancing his popularity.22 
MANAGING HOME 
With the Mujibur Rahman issue se t t l ed / Bhutto turned his 
a t tent ion towards in te rna l problems of Pakistan. The f i r s t 
issue was the demand by the opposition that mart ial law should 
be l i f t e d . A l t h o u g h , some of t h e m a r t i a l law r e g u l a -
t i o n s r ema ined e f f e c t i v e t i l l August 1 9 7 3 , i t was 
f o r m a l l y l i f t e d i n A p r i l 1972 t h a t i s , o n l y a f t e r 
22. Munir Mohanmad, n. 11. 
the adoption of the interim constitution as desired by him 
and according to which Bhutto remained the President. He 
later on agreed to return to parliamentary form of government 
and a compromise was reached by the end of 1972 between the 
government and the opposition: 
The main points of accord between the government and 
the opposition were : (i) a federal parliamentary system 
with a Prime Minister as chief executive answerable 
to the National Assembly; (ii) the President would be 
elected by absolute majority of a joint session of the 
Senate and the National Assembly and would be a figure 
head only; (iii) the Senate would be composed of sixty 
three members — fourteen elected by each Provincial 
Assembly, five from tribal areas and two from Islamabad; 
-(iv) the national assembly would be elected by the popu-
lation as a whole; (v) vote of no confidence could be 
moved against the Prime Minister only if the mover gave 
the name of successor; and (vi) two lists of powers, 
federal and concurrent, would be established. ^-^  
Thus Pakistan, finally got a civilian Constitution and 
the parliamentary form government under Bhutto. 
The most difficult problem that faced Bhutto in the 
early days of his reign was the problem of prisoners of war 
who were languishing in India. 
23. Laporte, Robert, Jr., n. 20, pp. 106-107. 
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He struggled hard to solve this problem and his efforts resu-
lted in the Simla Agreement which he signed with the Indian 
prime minister/ Indira Gandhi. 
By the summer of 1972/ he had cooled passions at home 
sufficiently to be able to travel to Simla to meet 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi. After a week of bargaining, she 
and Bhutto signed the Simla Agreement/ which promised 
to give back to Pakistan both its prisoners and its 
territory in return for the acceptance by that nation 
(Pakistan) of the principle of 'bilateralism' in dealing 
with the problem concerning South Asia. -
In fact/ Bhutto took several measures which earned 
his sympathy and popularity inside the country, fired several 
high ranking officials in the army, the navy and the air 
force and ordered an inquiry into the military debacle. He 
visited several Muslim countries where he was assured of their 
support. All these measures helped him in his negotiations 
with India and led to the conclusion of Simla agreement and 
the return of the POWS. Kamleshwar Sinha quoted a political 
analyst as saying: 
Mr. Bhutto succeeded in getting an endorsement of the 
Pakistani position on withdrawal of troops and 
repatriation of POWS from most of the countries he 
visited. Abu Dhabi, Kuwait/ Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
24., Singh, Kamleshwar, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Delhi: 1972), 
p. 19. 
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Sudan, Guinea, Turkey, Iran, and Mauritania clearly 
stated that the withdrawal of troops from each other's 
territory and repatriation of POWS should take place 
as early as possible in accordance with the UN resolu-
tions and international consltations. Turkey and Iran 
also laid stress on a 'durable and honourable settlement' 
which the Indo-Pak Summit should lead to. Somalia went 
a step further and expressed support for 'unity and 
integrity of Pakistan'. Lebanon and Iraq, on the other 
hand, only referred to the solution of Indo-Pakistan 
issues within the framework of the U.N. charger, or 
in accord with the U.N. resolutions. Ethiopia and 
Nigeria merely expressed the hope that the Indo-Pak 
summit would be fruitful.25 
The world wide clamour for the success of Indo-Pak Summit 
put pressure on Indira Gandhi to reach an accord with Pakistan. 
Thus by compaigning outside Pakistan, Bhutto managed to obtain 
release of more than eighty thousand prisoners of war. This 
enhanced his prestige at home as a statesman and helped him 
to fashion Pakistan according to his own wishes. 
The problem faced by Pakistan when the cessation of 
its eastern wing took place were no doubt enormous but in 
a way these proved advantageous for him. 
26. Singh, Kamleshwar, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, (Delhi: 1972), 
p. 19. 
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In addition, "He could not be associated in any way 
with the misdeeds of the administration he had displa-
ced/ since he had for long been its most unsparing 
critic. Secondly, he had 'clear-cut. ideas as to 
the shape which Pakistan's international relations 
should in future assume. In the third place, he had 
considerable experience of international diplomacy, 
in which field he had already won the respect of foreign 
statesmen". 
In short time, therefore, Bhutto could establish himself 
as an unchallenged politician'- of Pakistan. Once settled at 
home, he began to pay more attention towards the foreign policy. 
FOREIGN POLICY 
The main objectives for which Bhutto worked in the field 
of foreign relations were : 
First- to restore the confidence of friendly coun-
tries. in order to raise the morale of the nation. 
Second, to have friendly relations with the super 
powers. Third, to secure an honorable peace with 
India on equal terms. Fourth, to settle all problems 
with Bangladesh. Fifth, to restore foreign, econo-
mic assistance which was vital for her future de-
velopment Sixth, to improve the image of the country 
abroad, especially in the West where it had been 
badly marred. 
26. Williams Rushbrook L.F., Pakistan Under Challenge (London: 
1975), pp. 109-10. 
27. ibid, pp.110-11. 
d^ 
with the objectives in mind, and as a result of the media-
tion of Muslim leaders who came to participate in the Second 
Islamic Summit/ he recognised Bangladesh , Mujib too visited 
Lahore and was persuaded to drop his demand for the trial of 
28 
195 prisoners accused of war crimes. 
The Islamic Summit, held in Lahore in 1974 thus was a 
significant event for Pakistan and Bhutto as it enhanced his 
popularity internally and externally. Highlighting the impor-
tance of the Summit/ L.F. Rushbrook Williams wrote that : 
The events connected with the Islamic Summit posed 
a significance which did not escape the notice of 
foreign observers. It was remarked both in the 
USA and in Britain that the focus of influence in 
the sub-continent seemed to be moving away from New 
Delhi towards Islamabad, now secure in its position 
among the capitals of the brotherhood of Islamic 
countries. The Guardian noted that the Islamic 
Summit at Lahore was a bigger meeting than the Band-
ung Conference which started the non-aligned movement 
in 1955/ and the paper described the world's newest 
club as richer and potentially more powerful than 
most of the old like the Commonwealth and the non-
aligned club. 
By 1974 then Bhutto had both the Simla agreement and 
the Islamic conference to his creit. Pakistan's relations 
with both the super powers had considerably improved. In fact/ 
28. ibid, pp. 119-20. 
29. ibid. 
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Bhutto's management of foreign relations earned great respecta-
bility for Pakistan which had been in doldrums after the 1971 
war. 
ECONOMIC POLICIES 
While Bhutto was busy framing a new constitution and 
a new foreign policy for Pakistan, he could not pay personal 
attention to the economy of the country. Till 1974, the economy 
was looked after by the left faction within the PPP. This 
had far reaching effects for Bhutto. According to Shahid Javed 
Burki : 
While Bhutto busied himself improving Pakistan's 
image abroad and providing the country a new set 
of political and administrative institutions, the 
left within the PPP administration assumed control 
of economic decision-making. The left was able to 
assume control as it was the only faction within 
the party and within the new administration that 
had developed a programme of action. It also had 
the leadership that was politically acceptable to 
Bhutto. 30 
But tnis was not liked by the other factions of the Paki-
stan People's Party (PPP). The political support of the left 
force s was far less than the power it wielded, and soon began 
to face organised resistance from those forces adversely affe-
cted even from within the PPP. Within less than three years 
30. Burki Shahid Javed, no.24, p.108. 
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of the left's management of the country's economic policies, 
sufficient counter pressures had built up for Bhutto to move 
against his socialist cabinet colleagues. A new cabinet was 
sworn in October 1974, in which the left lost several key posi-
tions. 
At this stage, an effort was made by the Prime Mini-
ster to depoliticise economic decision making but 
this effort for reasons that had to do a great deal 
with Bhutto's personality as well as with political 
dynamics generated by left oriented policies, did 
not succeed. In the autumn of 1974, Pakistan entered 
into a phase of decision-mamking withcjt constraints. 
There were thus two clear cut phases in the management 
of Pakistan's economy during the Bhutto era. First, economic 
management under the left faction of the PPP (from the time 
Bhutto assumed power till October 1974). Second, economic 
management under the direct supervision of Bhutto himself. 
Why did Bhutto allow the PPP left faction to take independent 
charge of the Pakistani economy and what alienated the 
left from other sections of the PPP? 
Among the reasons for the sweeping success of the Pakistan 
People's Party in the Punjab and Sind in the 1970 elections 
was its programme of social and economic reforms. This programme 
31. ibid, p. 109. 
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appealed most to industrialised zones/ 
but it also went far to confirm the misgivings very 
real if less articulately expressed in other areas/ 
that there was something radically wrong with the 
way in which ^ things had been managed in Pakistan 
in the past. 
The programne of social and eonomic reforms put forward 
in the PPP manifesto had raised the expectation of the Pakistani 
people, after Bhutto came to power. In order to meet the aspi-
rations of the people, Bhutto needed to take certain drastic 
measures, immediately after his victory in an attempt to conso-
lidate his position. The left was thus given the go-ahead, 
initially, thereby alienating other sections of the PPP. 
However, the economic measures taken by the Bhutto cabinet 
can broadly be divided into three heads : (i) nationalisation 
of industries and financial institutions, (ii) labour reforms 
and (iii) land reforms. During the election campaign Bhutto 
had accused 22 big industrial families of Pakistan for the 
accumulation of wealth in few hands. To improve the condition 
of the people of Pakistan he had promised to nationalize basic 
industries and 
32. Williams, n.26, p. 151. 
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within one month of assuming control of the 
administration, the PPP had fulfilled the essentials 
of this promise. In January 1972, the government 
announced a programme of nationalisation aimed 
at the public takeover of thirty-one large firms. 
In this 'basic' decision included iron and steeL 
basic metals, heavy engineering, motor vehicle 
assembly and manufacture, tractor assembly and 
manufacture, heavy and basic chemicals, petro-chemi-
cals, cement and public utilities. Domestically 
owned life insurance companies were also brought 
under the control of the government. 
To further weaken the hold of the industrialists on eco-
nomy, the Bhutto administration 
... under 'managing agency and election of directors 
order 1972' announced the abolition of managing 
agency system, terminating the agents' agreement 
and contracts without compensation (The order simul-
taneously abolished sole selling agencies). Control 
of companies previously wielded by the managing 
agencies was. transferred to the directors of the 
companies. 
Explaining the managing agency system Eric Gustafson 
says 
Under this system, the management of a company 
is given over by its directors to a managing agent, 
a separate corporate entity which then has a rela-
tively free hand in running things. The opportuni-
ties for siphoning off profits and putting them 
where the shareholders of the actual operating 
company have no control over them areobviously consi-
derable. Sole selling agents have the same conve-
nient property, goods produced can be sold to the 
sole selling agent at artificially low prices, 
thus allowing the profit on the books of selling 
agent and its control^jrather than under that of 
the operating company. 
3 3 . Burk i , n . 2 4 , p . 114. 
34. Gus ta fson , E r i c , l\\ , Contemporary Problems of Pak is tan 
(Lfcidon : 1974) , p . 82 . 
35 . i b i d , p . 8 3 . 
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Mabashir Hasan, the then Finance Minister of Pakistan 
dubbed the managing agency system as "one of the worst institu-
tions of loot and plunder through which the cream of profit 
was skimmed by a handful of people who were able to control 
capital worth about Rupees fifty thousand or so". 
These two measures had far reaching effects on Pakistan's 
economic life. The most important impact of the nationalisation 
programme was that a sense of uncertainty gripped big business 
houses of Pakistan. "The Private Enterprenuers were confused 
about the real intentions of the government and the administra-
37 tion was not directed to provide concrete assurance to them". 
By introducing the concept of nationalisation, Bhutto not only 
made the industrialists panic but also gave a completely new 
turn to the economy of Pakistan. 
LABOUR REFCKMS 
After nationalisation the Bhutto administration turned 
its attention towards the labour force of Pakistan and intro-
duced a number of labour reforms that radically changed labour 
36, Hasan, Mabashir, Pakistan Times, 17 January, 1972, pp. 
1-2. 
37. Burki, n.24, p. 115, 
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relations in the country. In fact, there were number of reasons 
for this. Shahid Javed Burki remarks that the 
Organised industrial labour • had played an important 
role in putting Ayub Khan out of office. In a number 
of cities, particularly in the industrial areas of 
Lahore and Layallpur, the industrial worker had been 
also significant in getting the PPP candidate to 
win National and Provincial Assembly seats The 
PPP had won the support of the some of the workers 
and unions on the basis of the promises that included 
a substantial increase in minimum wages. 
But this was not the only reason. There were, however, 
some important political factors also that compelled the PPP 
administration to go ahead with a new set of labour reforms. 
The year 1972 saw the eruption of industrial unrest all over 
the country in protest against poor wages and working conditions. 
In several other cases, the unrest was "deliberately fermented 
by political groups which, having failed in the elections to 
secure popular support, were now joining with subversive elements 
39 
to upset the government " 
Within seven weeks of assuming power, the Bhutto admini-
stration introduced labour reforms which ensured workers' right 
38. ibid, p. 120. 
39. Williams, n.26, p.252, 
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to form unions: their right to bargain collectively and to 
go on strike. According to Rushbrook Williams, 
Provisions of far-reaching consequences have been 
made in the law to ensure the unhindered growth 
of trade unions and the protection of the rights 
of their members. A major step in this direction 
is the setting up of the National Industrial Relations 
Commission which, besides being vested with judicial 
powers to deal with cases of unfair labour practices 
and labour disputes, has been assigned the respon-
sibility of promoting the formation of trade unions 
and their federations at local as well as at national 
level. 
Similarly, steps were taken to legally protect workers' 
right to collectively bargain and to go on strike. The emplo-
er would no longer "declare a lockout in consequence of a legal 
strike" nor would they 
remove any fixed assets from the establishments while 
a legal strike is in progress. This prohibition 
removes what was once a major weapon of the employer 
in frustrating legal strikes. Further to strengthen 
their position, representative unions now have the 
right to nominate shop stewards and workers represen-
tatives on the management of the Workers Participation 
Fund by means of which workers can purchase shares 
and acquire shareholding rights. They can also appoint 
auditors to check on iheir behalf the accounts of 
factories every year. 
40. ibid. 
41. ibid, pp.154-55. 
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To check arbitrary dismissal of workers from their jobs, 
the government amended labour laws in workers' favour. The 
labour force was given the right to take matters to the labour 
Cburt on their initiative/ a move that previously required 
the consent of management. Some other measures were also annou-
nced. Payment of bonus was made compulsory; profit sharing 
was raised from two to four percent; payment by the workers 
of two percent wages for medical facilities was abolished;provi-
sion for old-age pension was announced; and employers were 
required to provide education upto matric for one child of 
each worker-
After announcing such radical measures, Bhutto warned 
workers against unwanted strikes and unrests. In an address 
to the nation he declared 
Gheraos and Juloos (sit-ins and processions) seems 
to have become order of the day. This unruly and 
rowdy practice, negative in its purpose, anarchist 
in its approach, nihilistic in its results, has been 
endured regrettably by the government and the people 
for over seven weeks. it is a self-destructive pro-
cedure. The majority of the people have shown their 
disgust over these demonstrations of hooliganism... 
National leaders have spoken against it... Taking 
all these factors into account now I want to make 
it clear that the strength of the street will be 
met with the strength of the State.(This) intolerable 
form of threat and thunder must stop. 
42. ibid, pp. 85-86. 
43. Z.A. Bhutto, Pakistan Times, 2 November, 1972, pp.1-3. 
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Thus Bhutto's labour policy can briefly be summed up 
as the policy of carrot and stick. In order to consolidate 
its base within the working force of Pakistan, the Bhutto led 
PPP Government announced a number of radical labour reforms 
which were unheard of in the history of Pakistan. 
LAND REFORMS 
After winning over industrial workers Bhutto turned his 
attention towards the rural poor which formed a large majority 
in the country and was a very important constituency from the 
electoral point of view. 
We cannot leave the fate of our peasantry entirely 
to the anarchy of our private possession. There 
must be a bold and imaginative agrarian programme 
aimed at reformation. The remaining vestiges 
of feudalism require to be removed. State lands 
will be given to the landless peasants, cooperative 
farming will be introduced on a voluntary basis. 
The small land owners will be exempted from the 
payment of land revenue and self-cultivatmn will 
be laid down as a principle of land policy. 
So had Z.A. Bhutto promised to his rural voters during 
the 1970 election campaigns. Once voted to power, he initia-
ted such land reforms which no earlier administration had even 
thought in Pakistan. Though Ayub Khan had introduced the 
concept of land reforms in the country, Bhutto's land reform 
measures were far more radical than Ayub's. 
44. Z.A. Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, Rawalpindi, p.62. 
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"Previous attempts at land reforms failed to 
help the small farmer, bcause the ceilings 
imposed on individual landholdings were too 
high to start with, and were further relaxed 
by exemptions covering orchards, store, farms, 
game preserves and gifts of agricultural land 
to female relatives so that family property 
remained intact". 
But the Bhutto administration 
cut the limit on holdings per individual (not 
per family) from 500 to 150 irrigated acres 
and from 1,000 to 300 unirrigated acres. 
Lands above the ceiling were taken without 
compensation and it was announced that they 
would be given free to the peasantry. Instal-
ments due from farmers on account of the 1959 
reforms were cancelled, and arbitrary ejection 
of tenants from the land was no longer permi-
tted; they could be objected only for non-
payment of.,batain (the landlord's share of 
the crop). 
To plug loopholes in the legislation, the Government 
introduced certain measures that made it almost impractical 
for landlords'^  to circumvent reforms in their favour. These 
measures were : (i) No concession or exemption granted under 
the 1959 reforms to be retained (ii) transactions in land in 
excess of the new ceilings after 20 December 1971 (the date 
of Bhutto's take over) were void (iii) civilian officials were 
required to surrender all lands in excess of 100 acres acquired 
during their tenure of service or in course of retirement, 
45. Williams, no.26, p.159. 
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(iv) land on the Pat Feeder Canal in Baluchistan, the source 
of booldshed because of its apparent distribution to Govern-
ment favourites/ involving internal tribal struggles, was to 
be resumed in its entirety without compensation and distribu-
tion to poor families. 
New land regulations also took care to protect tenants' 
interests. For instance. 
in the new landlord-tenant relationship the burden 
of the taxation is now entirely on the landlords 
...Tenants now have the first option to buy the 
land on wkich' they are working if it is put up 
for sale. 
In a country where agriculture forms the ma]or share 
of economy, contributing 30 per cent of the Gross Domestic 
Product and accounting for about 40 per cent of the country's 
export, land reforms were more than a necessity. Secondly, 
more than 50 percent of the population of Pakistan lives in 
villages and to consolidate the PPP following amongst the rural 
poor land reforms were needed. Keeping all these factors in 
his mind, Bhutto introduced such land reforms which introduced 
new elements in F&kistan's agrarian relations. 
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TACKLING THE ARMY 
Besides taking a number of economic measures, Bhutto 
also saw to it that various 'power blocs' operating in the 
country did not throw any challenge to his Government. The 
army had always been a rival of a civilian Government in the 
country. Bhutto, an astute politician, took steps to check 
the army threat. There were number of political factors which 
had made the army a competitor of civilian political parties 
for power. 
Thirteen years of rule had left the Pakistan army 
an unpredictable political force. Senior officers 
had grown -accustomed to participating in and influe-
ncing events that had nothing to do with their 
jobs. Directorship of government corporations, 
ambassadorships, allotment of agricultural land 
at give away prices and a whole host of special 
privileges had become an accepted benefit of office. 
The Yanya Khan junta, in particular, had exceeded 
all previous norms by predicting- elections; nego-
tiating with political parties; manoeuvring and 
playing off one political group against the other, 
and so on. All these culminated in Yahya Khan's 
proposal in the murky twilight of his days in power 
that a constitution be drafited ensuring the army 
a permanent share of power. 
49. Taseer Salman, Bhutto : A Political Biography, (London: 
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Being very much conscious of all these factors, the 
first thing Bhutto did after assuming the reins of power was 
the reshuffling of the army. In his very first broadcast to 
the nation on the 20th of December 1971, Bhutto appointed Lieut-
enent General Gul Hasan as Commander-in-Chief of the army, 
and Air Marshal Rahim Khan as Commander-in-Chief of the Air 
Force. He announced the removal of six 'fat and flabby' generals 
followed by a Presidential order issued three days later in_ 
which he removed another three admirals, three major-generals 
and two air commanders, bringing the total number of sacked 
50 
up top brass to fourteen. 
The reshuffle brought in Butto's loyal men in key positions 
of the army and the air-force. -et Bhutto had no trust in 
the generals he had personally appointed. This was evident 
from his action on the 3rd March 1972 when Lieutenant General 
Gul Hasan and Air Marshal were "summoned to Rawalpindi and 
told to hand over their resignations." The two senior officers 
were placed by "unambitious professional soldiers"--General 
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Tikka Khan and Air Marshal Zafar Chowdhary. At the same 
time a series of steps were taken so that army stayed in the 
barracks, 
50. ibid, pp.148-49. 
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Structural changes were organised in the armed 
forces so that the Chief of Staff's tour of duty 
would be fixed. With no extension allowed, various 
para-military forces under independent command 
were set up in order to balance the army's power. 
Under Article six of 1973 Constitution by use 
of force or by other un-costitutional means, or 
aiding and abetting for the^ -same shall be an offence 
constituting high treason. 
In spite of all these precautionary measures, there was 
an attempt by the army to overthrow the Bhutto Government. 
"On 30th March 1973 the Ministery of Defence announced that 
a small group of military officers had conspired to seize power. 
During the course of trial, presided over by a little known 
Brigadier called Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Bhutto personally exa-
mined the relevant trial papers and intelligence reports and 
held discussions with prosecution lawyers. The officers were 
53 found guilty and sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment". 
Certain additional measures were taken to contain the threat 
the army posed. A Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee was crea-
ted on 5 February, 1976 in a bid to integrate the defence system. 
The Committee was headed by Lieutenant General Mohammad Shareef, 
a person somewhat removed from the other three services chiefs. 
The retiring Chief of Staff, General Tikka Khan, was appointed 
an advisor to the Prime Minister on national security. Bhutto's 
52. ibid, p.150. 
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objective in bringing about all these changes was primarily 
54 
to diffuse the political power weilded by the amry Bhutto 
had once said : 
The people of Pakistan and the armed forces them-
selves are equally determined to wipe out Bona-
partic influence in the armed forces. Bonapartism 
is an expression which means professional sold-
iers turning into professional politicians.,. 
The result of course was far from what Bhutto had imagined. 
None of his actions was to help him 'stave off the army coup 
in 1977, Bhutto the astute politician of Pakistan/ finally 
met his Waterloo at the hands of the army itself. 
BHUTTO AND THE OPPOSITION 
56 
"Bhutto was a man of paradoxes". The statement is not 
much off the mark if seen in the context of his attitude towards 
the opposition parties of Pakistan.'^  Bhutto firmly believed 
in electoral process, provided a civilian constitution to the 
country and tried his best to strengthen democratic system 
in Pakistan. But he could never tolerate any kind of opposi-
tion to his party rule. His attitude towards the civilian 
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opposition parties of Pakistan was highly undemocratic and 
authoritarian. 
When first came to power he had little competition 
from civilian opposition parties. None had any 
rational appeal, and Bhutto's domination of the 
domestic political scene seemed complete. Yet he 
acted towards them with an authoritarianism that 
was unnecessarily intolerant. Coercive methods 
were "osed such as withholding oi newspaper adverti-
sing/ the arrest of dissenting journalists and the 
breaking of public meetings (particularly those 
of Asghar Khan) by PPP toughs. The opposition was 
given no access to the media and newspaperes and 
broadcasting organisations propagated only a pro-
government stand. 
The three prom.inent opposition groups Wali Khan's 
National Awami party, Asghar Khan's Tehrik-e-Isteqlala and 
Islam 'pasand' parties like Jamaat-e-Islami had to bear the 
brunt of Bhutto's wrath against his political opponents. Though 
Bhutto had himself lifted the ban that Yahya Khan had imposed 
on the National Awamy Party (NAP) and had all allowed the 
NAP and Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam coalition to form governments 
in North West Frontier and Baluchistan, he dismissed the opposi-
tion ministries in these two provinces. 
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Bhutto for his part used his power in the centre 
to undermine the authority of provincial govern-
ment which, in their turn, refused to cooperate 
with the central government. After continuous 
tension and harsh -infighting the National Awamy 
Party and jammiat-e-Ulema Islam Coalition in 
Frontier, the National Awamy Party ministry in 
Baluchistan were dismissed, and Governor's rule 
imposed in both the provinces. The assasination 
in 1975 of Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpso, the young 
PPP Governor of Frontier and Bhutto's principal 
aide in the ban province gave Bhutto to excuse 
he needed to ban the NationalAwami Party and 
shut its leaders in jail • -^ 8 
Similarly, other opposition parties like Tehrik-e-Istaqlal, 
Jammat-e-Islami, Jamaiaat-a-Ulama, Markazi Jammiate-Ahle Hadis 
etc. were also the target of Bhutto's authoritarian policies. 
As mentioned their public meetings were disrupted by the PPP 
toughs and they were denied access to the media. 
While Bhutto harassed the National Awamii Party and Tehriq-
e-Isteqlal leadership by illegal means, he fought Islam 'pasand' 
parties on the political plane. His approach was simple but 
effective. Ho anticipated and fulfilled any demand before 
they could rise and raise it. For instance very soon after 
he came to power, he allowed a record number of persons to 
go for. " Haj"—the annual pilgrimage to Mecca; he provided in 
the 1973 constitution that Islam would be state religion and 
58. ibid. 
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the head of state a Muslim; in 1974, in deference to conserva-
tive Muslim opinion, he banned the Ahmadiya, quasi-Islamic 
sect: he made Friday into a national holiday, founded various 
government organisation for propagating Islamic teaching, encou-
raged the Arabic language and introduced the Koran into school 
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curricula. 
Bhutto's dislike for dissent was not confined only to 
the opposition parties, even his own party men, who were inde-
pendent minded and did not like his authoritarian functioning 
had to indure his wrath. By 1974 he had alienated himself 
from the leftists of the' PPP. Men like Dr. Mubashir Hasan 
and A.J. Rahim were not only forced to resign but were even 
forced to quit the party. Salman Taseet rightly points cut 
Bhutto saw enemies where none existed. In his years 
of power, he treated his political opponents as 
dangerous, subversives, and succeeded in making 
them so. The idealists and independent minded who 
joined with him in his early days to make the PPP 
an instrument in Pakistan's regeneration had all 
left him by the end . Some deserted him; most were 
pushed. And however they departed, they were often 
hounded by Bhutto and his men... He could not bear 
equals and ensured that even within the PPP, an 
alternative leadership never emerged. After his 
third arrest under the Martial Law government in 
59. ibid, p.152. 
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September/ his wife Nusrat was made party leader. 
Even at this critical time he preferred a surrogate 
to a potential rival. He directed an incredible 
amount of energy and skill in attacking his enemies. 
And like J)pn Quixote he often attacked imaginary 
monsters. 
ELECTIONS AND THE FALL 
This was the general political atmosphere in the country 
when the former Prime Minister of PaMstan, Z.A. Bhutto, decided 
to go to the polls. On 4th January, 1977 he announced elec-
tions for the following March. Apparently, he was in full 
command of the politics and was confident of another resounding 
victory at the poll, when he announced general elections under 
the constitution of 1973. He went to the polls 
a confident man, a strongman, arrogant in his exer-
cise of power; and fully convinced that Pakistan 
did not have a leader of equal determination to 
challenge him, let alone remove him. In January 
1977, Pakistan did not seem to have a viable alter-
native to Bhutto or his-People's Party. 
And there were reasons for Bhutto to be confident. The 
reforms he had introduced had earned him the support of two 
very important segments of society - industrial labour in urban 
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centres and the rural poor in villages. But he had lost support 
of the middle class - the backbone of the democratic system 
of any country. His economic reforms had seriously hurt this 
group's interests. 
The middle class had been hurt by the economic 
reforms that resulted in the transfer of incomes 
from them to low income groups and also by 
the education policy that resulted in the govern-
ment's take over of the institutions that had 
specifically catered to their needs. The restru-
cturing of the administrative system deprived 
them of employment opportunities in the sector 
which had been their more or less exclusive 
preserve for a long time and to which they 
had access on the basis of merit. 
Besides economic measures, Bhutto's disregard for civil 
liberties and his autocratic style of politics checked the 
middle class participation in decision making process. During 
the 1970 election and even earlier Bhutto had projected an 
image of a politician who would involve every section of the 
society in 'building' a new Pakistan. This was what had attra-
cted the educated middle class towards the Bhutto-led PPP and 
the class had by and large rallied behind the party. After 
assuming power, Bhutto turned an autocrat and the middle class 
had a very different experience during six years of his rule. 
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Many of his political actions like the ill treatment of 
the opposition parties, the imposition of heavy censorship on 
media, suspension of fundamental rights, etc. were far from what 
Bhutto had promised during the 1970 election compaign. During 
his six years of stewardship of Pakistan, the middle class felt 
suffocated and helpless. 
For the elections of 1977, Bhutto went to the polls'without 
support from large segment of the middle class, in parti-
cular from those several groups that had been hurt by his 
economic reforms his style of economic management and his 
party's inability to structure a political system that • 
would have brought- the middle class into active decision 
making roles.64 
After the disillusionment with the two successive military 
governments, the first led by Ayub Khan and the other by Yahya 
Khan, the intelligentia of the country too had been attracted 
to Bhutto. Bhutto's modernist approach with a socialist blending 
in politics had widely appealed this group. Shahid Javed Burki 
says that the intelligentia of Pakistan "had been attracted to 
Bhutto by his socialist leanings and the close ties that he had 
64. ibid. p. 187, 
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cultivated during the Ayub years. However, after having assumed 
the charge of the government Bhutto even failed to maintain a 
hold over this group. There were two reason for their disillu-
sionment with him. First, was his authoritarian temperament, 
and second, his consistant and systematic break with the socialist 
elements within his own party. "When Bhutto purged his cabinet 
of socialist elements, he lost the support of this segment of 
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the middle class too". Thus by 1977 he had lost support of 
another very important and vocal section of Pakistani society. 
Similarly, some other sections of the middle class like 
government employees, bureraucracy and industrialists were also 
unhappy with the policies of the Bhutto government. The encou-
ragement provided to the unskilled workers to migrate to the 
Middle East and the decision not to provide cost of living compen-
sation to government workers, disenchanted the government emp-
loyees. On the other hand, the reforms introduced by the FPP 
Government, alienated the powerful class of civilian bureaucrates. 
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The major grouse of the industrialists in Pakistan was 
the nationalisation programme introduced by Bhutto. The programme, 
covering thirty two companies and ten categories of basic indus-
try, including steel, chemicals, heavy engineering, cement, banks, 
insurance companies, shipping, vegetable oils, rice husking, 
cotton ginning and flour mills, was more than a blow for a group 
of people which had till then weilded a substantial influence 
in the power hierarchy of Pakistan. Quoting a famous Pakistani 
economist, Madhu Limaye has pointed out: 
Mahbub-ul-Haq, formerly chief economic adviser to the Ayub 
regime, has charged that 22 family groups controlled, in 
1966, two-thirds of industrial assets, 80 percent of banking 
and 70 percent of insurance in Pakistan. The military 
bureaucratic state was no threat to the new urban bourgeoisie. 
Bhutto's nationalisation programme altered the pattern of power 
structure and put the industrialists in a very defensive position. 
Naturally, this class was also looking for an opportunity to 
strike back. And, the 1977 elections proved a god-sent opportu-
nity. 
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By 1977, the political situation had taken an altogether 
different turn from what it was at the time of the 1970 polls. 
Bhutto had lost support of influential segments of society. 
Military/ bureaucracy, middle class, intelligensia, government 
employees and industrialists all had turned into arch rivals 
of Bhutto's Party. When he decided to go to the polls, 
he knew that he had been abandoned by the social, economic and 
69 political groups that made up the Pakistani middle class. Yet, 
he was confident of victory. He was depending on the achievements 
of his government. 
He believed that he had a strong record to defend him. 
Stabilising Pakistan after the trauma of 1971, promulgating 
a constitution, implementing a wide range of reformative 
and legislative measures particularly in the economic sphere, 
the return of responsibility in the foreign policy field, 
and perhaps the most important of all, holding the 1977 
General Elections '^'^ 
Bhutto had sensed the prevailing political atmosphere and 
he had prepared a new tactic for the 1977 elections. Unlike 
the 1970 elections when he had appealed to every section of society, 
this time he cultivated a 'new constituency'. 
69. ibid. p. 189. 
70. Taseer, n. 49, p. 161. 
71 
From the manner in which Bhutto prepared himself for the 
1977 elections it was clear that he understood that the 
most important challenge to the continuation of his rule 
would come from the middle class. He adopted two different 
tactics to broaden the base of his support by cultivating 
elements from both the upper and lower classes. Second; 
he attempted to prevent the emergence of a viable coalition 
among the political parties that represented the various 
middle class interests."^^ 
This time his emphasis was to woo the landed gentry and 
tb^ urban and rural poor. If his policies had hurt the interests 
of the middle class/ they had (^ finitely benefited the poor, both 
the industrial workers and the rural peasants. To that extent 
he still managed to maintain an impressive following. 
He undoubtedly increased their share in the national cake 
even though the cake may have shrunk . Government land was 
distributed to the poor, produce prices were subsidised 
by the Government and the taxes on small holdings were 
reduced or abolished. The land reforms promulgated in 
March 1972 drastically reduced permissible individual land 
holdings from 500 to 150 acres, and then again in January. 
1977 to 100 acres.72 
Similar was the case of industrial workers. Mazhar Ali 
Khan, the editor of the left-oriented Labour weekly View Point 
and no admirer of Bhutto too claimed, that the working class 
continued to support him, only because they were benefited in 
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73 his regime. Another factor that held the poor's loyalty towards 
Bhutto was the benefit it derived from the remittances sent 
home during the Bhutto era by migrants to the Middle East. The 
poor thus certainly saw change for the better in their economic 
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situation during the Bhutto period. This explained his desperate 
attempt at wooing the poorer sections of the society. And, 
In a country in whch nearly one half of the population 
.could be classified as 'absolute poor', and in a political 
system based at least in theory, on. one man-one-vote this 
strategy made a great deal of sense. 
To compensate the loss of the middle class support, Bhutto 
tried to win over the landed aristocracy. Though the land reforms 
had eroded the influence of the landlords, yet they traditionally 
commanded respect and awe within villages. Therefore, in the 
1977 elections Bhutto relied on support from landed interests. 
This was amply 
demostrated by the selection of candidates the PPP was 
to support in the election The Noors and Tiwaree of 
Surgodha, the Malik of Mianwali, the Querahis of Multan, 
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the Hayat of Rawalpindi and Campbalpur, the Lagharis and 
Mazaris of Dera Gazi Khan were back in the political arena 
as PPP candidates."^^ 
The second part of his election strategy was to stop any 
kind of unity amongst opposition parties which were in disarray 
till the elections were announced. Bhutto's hopes were rooted 
in the 1970 experience. But it was the opposition parties which 
were going to give him a big sh'Bck. "The opoosition shrewdly 
projected an image of disunity ... and... assured that the 
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squabbling opposition would never coalesce against this PPP. 
Two days, after the announcement of the election dates, the 
opposition announced the non-party Pakistan National Alliance. 
The new "nine opposition parties that merged to form the PNA 
included groups from both the left and the right. The Tufail 
Muhammad's Jammat-e-Islami, Maulana Mufti Mohammad's Jammat-
Ulema-e-Islara and Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani's Jamatul-Ulema-
i-Pakistan were Islamic parties representing various points of 
view regarding the conduct of the affairs of State on Islamic 
lines. Air Marshal Asghar Khan's Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, Pir Paguro's 
Pakistan Muslim League and Nawab Nasrullah Khan's Democratic 
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Party and Sardar Abdul Qayyum's Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference 
were essentially parties of the centre, advocating a return of 
parliamentary democracy and private enterprise. Sardar Sherbaz 
Mazari's National Democratic Party and Khan Mohammad Ashraf Khan's 
Khaksar Tehrik were parties of the left believing in some kind 
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of state ownership of capital and decentralised government. Mot 
only did the opposition parties of varied shades join hands under 
the PNA umbrella, they also demostrated their unity by unitedly 
electing Nawab Nasrullah as its President and Rafiq Bajiva as 
its Secretary General• 
The two rival groups PNA and PPP proved quite formidable 
for each other during the electioneering, until the PNA alliance 
soon began to gain momentum. It cashed on the failures of the 
Bhutto government and the middle class disillusionment. Its 
attack was 
directed at Bhutto personally and then centred on the issues 
of civil liberties and inflation. They accused the government 
of instituting oppressive laws, and pointed to the PPP's 
bleak record on press freedom, the curtailment of individual 
rights, media. 
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The PNA strategy proved a success. The compaign leading 
upto the elections proved a formidable challenge for Bhutto. 
He was appalled by the vehemence of the opposition against him. 
He, after all, was the man of masses and the Quaid-e-Awami and 
peoples' leader. Yet his opponents meetings were packed, whereas 
his own party men had to have recourse to massive government 
RO patronage and inducements to collect huge audiences. The PNA 
attack on the Government's failure on civil liberties, prices, 
inflation and law and order put Bhutto on defensive during his 
election speeches. For instances, in one speech he said : 
In 1970, I promised you democracy. In 1973, I gave you 
democracy. You asked for participation at all levels of 
decision-making, I provided you with that oportunity. 
I not only asked you to participate in the decisions I 
took, I also asked your permissicn when I took the decisions 
that affected all of us. You allowed me to send Mujibur 
Rahman home; you permitted me to go to Simla to discuss 
peace with Madam Gandhi, you permitted me to go to the 
countries of the Middle East to seek their help in our 
hour of need. You and I have trusted each other. But 
there- are people in this country that do not approve of 
our association. These people have attempted to put obstacles 
in our way; to stop us from building a new Pakistan. They 
can do this because we have allowed them to do so. Should 
we continue to permit them this Freedom? Must not we change 
the rules of game so that our programme towards a new dynamic 
Pakistan is not continuously thwarted. 
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The 'caiipaign ran for 45 days. The rival camps continued 
accusing each other. Bhutto won grounds during the close of 
the campaign. 
Slowly but surely the tide began to turn in his favour. 
Bhutto's personal compaigning brought massive crowds on 
the streets even in opposition cities like Karachi and 
there was growing evidence that while the spectacle of huge 
opposition rallies, the majority of Punjab voters in parti-
cular, would settle' in the end for stability and the populist 
policies that another term of Bhutto meant.° 
Nevertheless, the poll observers had predicted that the 
PNA would not be far behind PPP. The results, however, threw 
a surprise for every one. The PNA lost in three out of the four 
provinces. It won a majority of seats in only one city, Karachi, 
but was soundly beaten in Lahore, Lyallpur, Hyderabad, Multan 
and Rawalpindi. The PPP's success in Punjab where it won 93 
per cent of seats, surprised even the party's leadership. The 
Pakistan Times, the paper owned by the government's National 
Press Trust, admitted that the party had done even better than 
expected in Punjab. 
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Political observers expressed surprise at the results. 
The Urdu language daily Nawai Wakt stated that for the Prime 
Minister the first election period would not be a period of triumph 
84 but of trial. And this was precisely v4iat happened after the 
elections. Stunned by its defect at the polls, the opposition 
first decided to boycott the provincial elections. Bhutto went 
ahead with the provincial polls, where the PPP men again won 
handsomely. On 11 March, a day after the elections to the provin-
cial assemblies, the PNA decided to go to the street to protect 
against the widespread electoral fraud that had been perpetrated. 
This led to an impasse, with the PPP willing to admit to only 
minor irregularities and the PNA demanding fresh elections. Pakistan 
QC 
was then clearly heading for a major political upheaval. The 
PNA anger against Bhutto soon turned into public agitation. 
PNA supporters openly began to fight the police, beginning from 
Lahore. After nearly six weeks of agitation, Z.A. Bhutto imposed 
martial law on 21 April. Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad, three 
of the country's four largest cities were placed under military 
control. The opposition's movement against him forced Bhutto 
to invite the military back into the political arena. But the 
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army's appearance, did not damage the opposition. 
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Sensing the wild mood of the PNA/ Bhutto began to relent. 
He made a number of offers to the opposition who turned them 
down. Finally^ the Prime Minister called for a country-wide 
referendum to be held in m id-June to ask the electorate of the 
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country if he should continue in office. The opposition refused 
to oblige Bhutto. There was no place for a national referendum 
in the kind of constitutional system the opposition to Bhutto 
wanted Pakistan to follow. Victory at the referendum would have 
increased Bhutto's stature enormously. The opposition was not 
preparted to grant him this opportunity. the impasse continued 
till first week of July. All through the movement against Bhutto, 
his supporters had stayed in background. On 8 July, general 
Zia-ul-Haq staged a bloodless coup d'etat displacing Bhutto and 
the PPP from the centre of Pakistani politics, thus ending Pakistan's 
second experiment with civilian rule. 
But the army's come back into the centre of politics did 
not deter Bhutto from struggling to revive his political future. 
Surprisingly, politics continued to revolve around his personality 
till he was hanged to death on April 4, 1979. Says Burki: "Although 
out of power in July 1977, Bhutto continued to dominate Pakistan's 
politics for another 21 months. For most of this period Bhutto 
remained in prison. His first incaration vas in the nature of 
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protective custody ordered by General Zia-ul-Haq to save him 
from the people's wrath in a political climate which is distinctly 
hostile to the former Prime Minsiter. But the political climate 
began to improve; on 17 July less than two weeks after the coup 
d'etat/ Bhutto addressed a large meeting of his followers on 
the lawns of his imprisoned prison. The time for launching 
movements such as the one that had removed him ves over, he declared. 
The time had come for a revolution. Released from custody soon 
afterwards, he hesitated only for a moment before advising the 
supporters that he would participate vigorously in the elections 
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promised for October 1979 by the military regime. 
He now began to prepare vigorously to participate in the 
promised elections and started visiting important cities like 
Karachi and Lahore where he attracted large crowds. But socn 
he vas charged with the murder of his one time political colleague 
turned opponent, Ahmad Raza Kasuri. He was again arrested under 
criminal charges and was prosecuted at the Lahore High Court. 
The court found him guilty and announced its verdict - Bhutto's 
execution. 
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Bhutto now approached the Supreme Court and personally 
assisted lawyers to defend him. Legal efforts failed to save 
him and on 31 March 1979 the Supreme Court upheld the verdict 
of the Lahore High court. Finally, on April 4, 1979, Z.A. Bhutto 
was hanged at the Rawalpindi Jail. Thus came to an end the political 
career of the civilian leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who had promised 
to build a new and dynamic Pakistan. 
CPiAPTER I I I 
LEADE3^HIP CRISIS IN INDIA 
CHAPTER III 
LEADERSHIP CRISIS IN INDIA 
Leadership crisis is lesser felt in India than in 
any other South Asian country where leadership crisis has 
been a persistent and recurring phenomena. The reason why 
I.ndia did not have a serious crisis in political leadership 
is because the Indian National Congress provided a strong 
leadership platform and a forum for political apprenticeship 
during the independence movement. The leadership during 
the independence movement has always attracted attention 
much of which has been- directed toward identifying nationa-
list personalities/ heroes as well as leaders. After intro-
duction of the 1935 Indian government Act the Congress was 
a brief crisis period. The polilitical environment was radi-
cally changed and the power equations considerably altered 
by the introduction of Provincial Autonomy in-'April 1937 follow-
ing election to the provincial legislatures. Much power 
now rested with the provincial ministries and for many purposes 
they could ignore and act independently of the national lea-
dership. The national leadership's freedom of action was 
limited by the weight of feeling in provinces and by the 
fact that it was itself divided on ideological and tactical 
2 
lines. However, the position of the Congress leadership 
1. David Taylor, "The Crisis of Authority in the Indian 
National Congress", in B.N. Pandey, ed.. Leadership in 
South Asia (New Delhi : 1977), p.321. 
2. ibid, p.323. 
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before independence was stronger than after the independence 
because most Non-Muslims who were politically conscious had 
at some time felt the appeal of Congress, not as a party-
but as a movement with the primary aim of achieving indepe-
ndence for India. The movement needed an articulate and 
competent leadership to represent it in negotiation with 
imperial power and exert pressure upon that power to gain 
political concessions. 
There are two characteristic phenomena in the Indian 
leadership. They are : The self-sacrificing sufferer bound 
to a socio-political cause, and the self-seeking pursuer 
of power and public office, the former dominates the nationa-
list phase, the latter the independence era. The Gandhian 
politics of suffering had a deep appeal to the Indian people. 
Within a very short time Gandhi appeared on the Indian poli-
tical horizon and carved out his sphere of influence all 
4 
over India and gathered a ready following. 
The independence movement in India, however, saw many 
leaders of great importance like Nehru, Azad, Bose, Malaviya, 
Patel, J.P. Narayan and others. They were of the type of 
self-sacrificing sufferers bound to a collective cause that 
3. ibid, p.322. 
4. B.N. Pandey, no.l, p.XVII. 
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is the freedom of India from British colonial subjugation. 
Gandhi's return from South Africa was historically necessary 
for the unity of the leadership in the independence movement. 
Gandhi's leadership thus functions as a unifying force/ 
joining together under one charismatic authority on immense 
diversity of interests. For the first time, a huge umbrella 
covers almost all of the nationalist movement in the arena 
of political strategy, this meant, then, that Gandhi's ro,l$ 
as a leader can be described as essentially that of a media-
tor between various groups and forces....mediating - bet-
ween their diverse ideologies and aims. Yet, while the 
characterization of Gandhi's role as a mediator does illu-
minate one aspect of the inclusive style, leaves largely 
untouched another of its vital components. "This is the ideo-
logical facet of his style, the part of Hind Swaraj that 
was not left behind in South Africa, which Gandhi saw in 
5 
terms of a quest focsatya land a firm commitment to Ahinsa". 
In independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru emerged as 
the most important leader who led the nation steering the 
affairs of the post colonial state till his death in 1964. 
His emergence as national leader did 'not come suddenly. 
In fact, he emerged as national leader in 1929 when he succee-
ded in reviving the national movement which had sunk to its 
lower depth in 1926, and in setting new political objectives 
5. Dennis Dalton, "Gandhi's Styles of Leadership", in B.N, 
Pandey, no.l, pp.600-601. 
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and organisational priorities to it. He became Congress 
President in 1929 and developed a greater ideological and 
political hold over the party organisation, as well as the 
rank and file, a less precarious authority over the Congress 
caucus, and a more ardent following among the young congress-
men and party workers, than in 1935 when he was elevated 
to the presidency for the second time. In analysing the 
complexion and characteristics of Nehru's leadership as India's 
first Prime Minister, Bimal Prasad wrote : "The key to under-
standing the evolution of his mind is the part played by 
him during the years of struggle for independence under Gandhi's 
leadership. For, by the time India emerged as an independent 
country and Nehru assumed office as its first Prime Minister 
he had already acquired a certain political philosophy and 
also developed a certain style of leadership which continued 
to lead independent India for about seventeen years. A study 
of his leadership as Prime Minister indeed provides a classic 
example of continuity in leadership from the period of anti-
colonial struggle to the period of independence. It is this 
6. B.N. Pandey, "Jawaharlal Nehru : The Emergence of a Lea-
der in Leadership in South Asia", n.l, p.668. 
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continuity which primarily accounts for both the strong and 
weak points, the achievements and failures of Nehru's leader-
7 
ship as Prime Minister". 
Nehru endeared himself to the masses because he had 
a respectable emotional predisposition towards the masses. 
In his presidential address to the annual Congress session 
in 1929 he declared : "I must frankly confess that I am a 
socialist and republican, and no believer in kings and princes, 
or in the order which produces the modem kings of industry, 
v^o have greater power over the lives and fortunes of men 
than even the kings of old, and whose methods are as predatory 
Q 
as those of the old feudal aristocracy". Nehru maintained 
this political conviction in socialism almost throughout 
his political career. In an interview in 1960 just few years 
before his death, he said : "I have believed in socialism 
for the past fifty years and until somebody convinces me to 
the contrary, I shall continue to believe in and work for 
socialism. I am not at all embarrassed about being a socialist 
or our objectives being socialist. That should be the idea 
9 
of every sensible nation or society or individual". But 
7. Bimal Prasad, "Jawaharlal Nehru as Prime Minister", n.l, 
p.692. 
8. ibid, p.693. 
9. ibid, p.695. 
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inspite of Nehru's faith in democratic socialism he always 
remained determined to see that this did not become responsible 
for causing disunity in the Congress ranks. Before the inde-
pendence whenever he stressed the efficacy of socialism for 
solving India's ills, he at the same time stressed the histo-
rical importance of maintaining unity in Congress ranks and 
whenever his socialist convictions seemed to be leading to 
a crisis in the ranks of the Congress leadership, he decided 
to speak in a low key rather than do anything which might 
accentuate that crisis. For this reason, he became a link 
between two generations. of Congress leadership and acquired 
a unique position of importance equally indispensable to 
both the Gandhian old guard and the socialist radicals inside 
the Ccongress. Not only that but some times he provided 
a link between the congress leadership on one hand and 
peasant organisations, trade union and youth leadership on 
the other. Although, Nehru enjoyed a great deal of poli-
tical tolerance, towards the end of his life he ralised that 
unless some of the leaders, strongly opposed to socialism 
in their hearts but keeping silent to maintain themselves 
in office, were removed from key position in government it 
would be difficult to make a serious beginning in the direction 
of socialism. But he sought to achieve this by as painless 
an operation as possible. The result was the Kamaraj plan, 
10. ibid, p.697. 
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vrfiich undoubtedly helped in maintaining the progressive image 
of the congress in the eyes of the Indian people and weakened 
the position of some of the old leaders in the congress as 
well as in the government. This evaluation of Nehru's 
ideology however need not be accepted by all. There are 
people v^o think he was in his intellectual and political 
make-up more capitalist than socialist. Tariq Ali/ for example/ 
wrote in his book The Nehrus and the Gandhis that he 
(Nehru) had successfully transformed the country into a capi-
talist democracy, albeit one with special features. G.D. 
Birla's astute warning -to his fellow industrialists, as long 
ago as the 1930's not to antagonise Jawaharlal, since he 
would be the best possible leader for India that they could 
want, had turned out to be correct. If one were to make 
a comparative survey of the politics of our century and the 
leaders that have played a formative role both in preserving 
a certain continuity and even reinforcing it according to 
the specific conditions of their country, then the following 
names comes immediately to the fore. 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt (U.S.A.), Winston Churchill 
(Britain), Charles de Gaulle (France) and Jawaharlal Nehru 
(India). None of them were ordinary political personalities. 
11. ibid, p.701. 
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All of them helped to preserve the social and economic status 
quo at difficult times and critical junctures in the history 
of their countries : Depression/ War, Anti-Facist resistance 
and struggle against imperialism. None of them had memorable 
successors worthy of their predecessors. It is even true 
12 
of Lai Bahadur Shastri in India. 
Nehru's opponentsaccused him of aiming from the Kamaraj 
plan at preparing the atmosphere to elect Indira as his succ-
essor. But it was Shastri who succeeded him and not Indira. 
In fact Nehru resisted all attempts made by Indira's suppor-
ters to make her the Foreign Minister while he made Shastri 
de facto Deputy Prime Minister only four months after the 
allegation was made by a senior member of his own cabinet 
- Morarji Desai. Kamaraj organised a secret caucus of five 
regional leaders of the Congress Party, whose aim was to 
choose Nehru's successor and consequently campaign for poli-
tical support. They were known as the Syndicate. They were: 
Kamaraj, Atulya Ghosh, S.K. Patil, Sanjiva Reddy and S. Nija-
lingappa. Nehru knew about the formation and the consolidated 
campaign of the syndicate and knew also what they wanted. 
12. Tariq Ali, The Nehrus and the Gandhis (London : 1985), 
p.145. 
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People/ including senior congressmen in the party thought 
that Indira could not survive without her father and that 
her time was up in the world of politics/ only to be proved 
by the course of history that they were entirely wrong. 
But those people seriously underestimated the position she 
had carved out for herself and the protracted preparations 
13 
she had herself gone through during the last ten years. 
When Nehru died/ the President/ on^ the recommendation 
of an emergency Committee of the Cabinet appointed the most 
senior cabinate Minister/ Guljarilal Nanda as acting Prime 
Minister. But this was denounced by Krishna Menon/ a veteran 
of constitutional practice : "It was unconstitutional. That 
is the worst thing that could have been done. Even the Presi-
dent to exercise his emergency powers would have been more 
constitutional. They should have called an emergency meeting 
of parliamentary party or the party executive and there would 
have been no objection' 
Mr. Shastri v^o was subsequently elected Congress 
party leader inevitably became Prime Minister. it was said 
that he lacked decisiveness and the political drive which 
Nehru had come to symbolise. Mrs. Indira Gandhi in one of 
13. ibid, p.143. 
14. Quoted in Tariq Ali/ ibid/ p.146. 
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her interviews said, "In the beginning, Shastri appeared 
unsure of himself. Whether he was or not, I do not know, 
but he always said that after Panditji he was a small man. 
This gave people a feeling of insecurity. Whoever is lead-
ing must be sure that he is the leader. And yet, in the 
cabinet, he had declared firmly that although the opinioon 
of his colleagues were welcome, his word was final. He had 
said it in no uncertain terms, at the very first meeting. 
He'' was probably thinking of Patil and others who thought 
15 
they would sway him their way". Shastri died on 10 January, 
1966 after signing the Taskent agreement with Pakistan. 
Although, the Taskent agreement was unpopular in mdia not 
because of the fact that it was an agreement but because 
of the terms of it but the nation was plunged in grief at 
16 
the death of their well-meaning and honest Prime Minister. 
Shastri's death took everyone by surprise. The syndi-
cate was unprepared. Morarji Desai immediately made it 
known that he should get the job of this highest office in 
the country. The syndicate decided that Desai had to be 
at any rate stopped. "They finally settled on one name to 
confront Desai — Indira Gandhi the Minister for Information 
15. Indira Gandhi, My Truth (New Delhi : 1981), p.103. 
16. ibid, p.107. 
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and Broadcasting. They had, without being aware of it, signed 
17 their own death warrants as politicians". Describing Indira 
Gandhi's succession to the Prime Ministership, Tariq Ali wrote: 
"Indira herself made a symbolic visit early in 
the morning to the cremation sites of Nehru and 
Mahatma Gandhi, then to Teen Murti H ouse and fina-
lly to the meeting of the parliamentary party. 
She was greeted by large crowds which had assem-
bled outside parliament to wait the verdict. As 
they saw her alight from her car, they noticed 
that on her simple white sari was pinned a red 
rose in the style of Jawaharlal. The message was 
obvious. The crowds began to chant "Lai Ghulab 
Zindabad' ('Long live the red rose'). Five hundred 
and twenty six Congress MPs had gathered to deter-
mine the succession. What would it be? Monarchy 
or Puritanism? Outside the journalists were becom-
ing irritable', though the assembled masses were 
in good heart. When a government minister appeared 
on the balcony to announce the result, a wit shou-
ted : 'A boy or a girl' (Long live Jawaharlal Nehru). 
This was the noise that greeted India's new prime 
minister as she came out of the meeting. She smiled. 
In a letter she wrote to Rajiv after the event 
she confided that a line from a poen of Robert 
Frost 'How hard it is keep from being king, when 
it is in you and in the situation'. She had won 
by 355 votes to Desai's 169".-'•^  
With the victory of Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister, 
India got her second woman ruler in her whole history after 
Razia Sultana in 1236. 
LEADERSHIP OF INDIRA GANDHI 
Indira Gandhi's emergence to power and her rising in 
prominence as a world leader was not a sudden debut, but a 
17, Tariq Ali, n.l2, p.151. 
18. ibid, p.153-^. 
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process of gradual evolution and graduation into the highest 
political mould of leadership in a developing nation. Her 
political role and uncanny leadership are to be interpreted 
and analysed in terms of dynamic of the interaction between 
her personality and the political environment in which she 
operated as also those political conditions that made her 
leadership possible. But before one discusses the various 
political dimensions and signiHcant aspects of Indira Gandhi's 
leadership, it would be worth while to throw some light on 
the role she played before she became Prime Minister which 
helped her to reach the high position in a country like India 
with all its historical configurations and contradictory 
compulsions. 
Indira was bom in 1917 into an aristocratic family which 
had already occupied a respectable place in the hearts and 
minds of the Indian people. Motilal Nehru, her grandfather 
had become famous by his active role in the struggle 
for freedom. His fabulous earnings, princely ways and lavish 
spending were part of the popular folklore. Indira's father, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of modem India and India's 
first Prime Minister was also bom and brought up in an aristo-
cratic manner through his education at Harrow and Cambridge 
which few Indian boys can dream of getting. After his return 
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from abroad/ he was married to Kamala Kaul, the slender, tall/ 
fair and extremely beautiful bride from an orthodox Kashmiri 
family. Indian in her outlook/ she adjusted herself to the 
new environment and way of living in the Nehru household/ 
remaining as always, devoted and religious, kind and forgiving/ 
utterly selfless and brave and yet having a will of her own. 
Indira had amply inherited some of these qualities of her 
19 
mother which were reflected throughout her career. According 
to Indira Gandhi herself she was very fortunate to be sur-
rounded by great people like grand-father and her father but 
the role played by her mother was unique. She wrote/ 
Many people know the part played by my grand-
father and my father but in my opinoion a more 
important part was played by my mother. When 
my father wanted to join Gandhiji and to change 
the vdiole way of life, to change our luxurious 
living/ to give up his practice/ the whole family 
was against it- It was only my mother's courage 
and persistent support and encouragement which 
enabled him to take this big step which made such 
a difference not only to our family but to the 
history of modern India/ and I know that this 
situation must have taken place in many houses 
in India.20 
19. Nirmal Kumar Basu/ Indira of India ; Glimpses of Life 
and Work (Calcutta : 1972), p.2. 
20. Indira Gandhi/ n.l5, p.12. 
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All care was bestowed on Indira's upbringing by her 
parents. Adored and loved by all/ she was conscious of her-
self. The only child of her parents, Indira was also a very 
lonely child, her parents and other inmates of the house 
being so of ten away in jail or under detention. In the arms 
of her grandfather, at the age of three, she attended her 
first political meeting. At the age of four, she attended 
the Congress session at Gaya_. It was as if she was destined 
to partake in the political history of her country that 
was rapidly marching towards independence. 
Indira's education and training started very early 
in life, and in the compulsive social and cultural circum-
stances of the Nehru family. Jawaharlal Nehru knew no fear 
and he taught her to be uncompromisingly brave and ceaselessly 
fearless. He wrote to her, "Never do anything in secret 
or anything that you would wish to hide, for the desire to 
hide anything means that you are afraid, and fear is a bad 
21 thing and unwortny of you. Be brave and all the rest follows". ' 
21. ibid, p.4. 
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Indira had the rare advantage and the invaluable fortune 
of learning world history from the historic letters from 
the father to the daughter, written through years mostly 
from prison later published under the caption, "Glimpses 
22 
of World History". Into the intellectual make up of the 
young girl was instilled a sound sense of history. In 1926, 
Indira accompanied her parents on an extensive tour of Italy, 
Switzerland, England, Belgium, Germany and Russia. Thus 
at the early age of nine, she could begin her travels and 
contacts with foreign lands and their peoples, which started 
broadening her intellectual horizon while at the same time 
liberalising her attitude. At the age of ten, she commenced 
social work. Every Sunday she would cycle to Naini, a dist-
ance of six miles from Allahabad, to be able to work in 
a home for lepers there. At the age of twelve, she organised 
a children's section of Mahatma Gandhi's charkha Sangha or 
Association of Hand-spinners. At the age of fifteen, when 
she was in Poona, she worked in slum areas with a commitment 
that had grown from within the social milieu of the Nehru 
household. 
In 1932-33, she studied in Poona for matriculation. 
She learnt music and dancing and was sent to Shantiniketan 
22. Jawaharlal Nehru, Glimpses of World History (New York: 
1942) 
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where she continued her studies at Visva Bharati under Rabi-
ndra Nath Tagore. She got over her initial shyness at Santi-
niketan and fully participated in the life of this great 
institution that represented a most genuine experiment in 
innovative education. Tagore was impressed on her performance 
and activities in Shantiniketan and wrote to Nehru, "She 
is such an asset to our place. I have watched her very clo-
sely and have felt admiration for the way you have brought 
her up. The teachers all in one voice, praise her and I 
know she is extremely popular with students. She is a charming 
child . She has your strength of character as well as your 
ideas". 
In 1935 she went to Switzerland for studies at Bex. 
Circumstances beyond her control constantly interrupted her 
formal education - almost continuous incarceration of parents 
illness. In 1931, grandfather passed away. Her mother, 
Kamala, was brought to Switzerland for treatment, but as 
ill luck would have it, she could not recover and gave up 
her mortal coils on 28th February, 1936, leaving Indira and 
her father sad and forlorn. She went to England in 1936 
for studying history at Oxford. While in England, she evi-
nced keen interest in the work of the British Labour Party 
23. Quoted in Nirmal Kumar Basu, n.l9, p.6. 
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and the student movement there. She returned to India in 
1941 and in 1942 she married Feroze Gandhi, a Parsi gentle-
man who was to prove himself as a fine parliamentarian in 
the country. She looked lovely in a saree made of fine 
khadi woven by her father in jail. The newly married couple 
joined 'Quit India' movement and with the other Indian lead-
ers were taken into custody. 13 months later they were rele-
24 
ased. 
In 1947, when Nehru became the Prime Minister of India, 
her responsibility increased as she had to be with her father 
who was a widower and who needed someone intimate to look 
after him. Daughter Indira stepped into the shoes of house-
keeper. Feroze Gandhi did not particularly like this deci-
sion but he did not openly resist her decision. "Driven 
likewise by resentment over the excessive attention that, 
so they say, Feroze paid to the other woman, for seventeen 
years Indira spent more time with her father than with her 
husband. They called her "the first lady of India", "the 
daughter of the Nation". Together with her father she tra -
veiled, received heads of State, held rallies. In 1956, 
she joined the executive committee of the party. In 1958 
she became the head of the party and expelled the men she 
24. Uma Parasher, Indira Priyadarshini (New Delhi : 1966), 
p.34. 
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had admired as a child. On Nehru's death, in 1964, it seemed 
inevitable that she would inherit her father's political 
fortunes. 
Although Indira Gandhi did not succeed her father 
immediately after his death, the first step in that dire-
ction was taken by offering her the portfolio of information 
and broadcasting in Lai Bahadur Shastri's cabinet. She follo-
wed the habit of her father of receiving visitors. Regard-
less of their position and social standing, between eight 
and nine in the morning. She thought, like her father, that 
any citizen should have the right to see any responsible 
person including the Prime Minister. In her new residence 
she made .it clear that her house would remain open during 
the same hours. This was the first real indication that 
the Nehru mystique had not evaporated. 
When Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister of the country, 
there were serious and multifarious problems : unparalled 
drought, acute food shortage, inflation, official language 
controversy, demands for Punjabi Suba, problem of the Nagas, 
25. ibid, p.35. 
26. Oriana Fallaci, Interview with History (New York : 1976), 
p.155. 
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Sino-Indian dispute and diplomatic isolation. In her first 
appearance in the parliament, she promised to review the food 
policy and lifted the national emergency which had been in 
force since 1962. She proposed a new economic programme. 
The Rupee was devalued by 36%. Stocks were ordered to be 
rushed to Kerala and West Bengal. She toured the scarcity 
areas of Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra and persua-
ded state governments to take up external relief _^  works and 
food distribution arrangement. The Congress working commi-
ttee passed an unanimous resolution in favour of the creation 
of Punjabi Suba. Hindu • minority in the projected Punjabi 
Suba felt let down. Jan Sangh instigated comrrtunal riots. 
Further violence resulted into sad episodes, for example, 
three Congressmen were burnt alive in the town of Panipat 
near Delhi. Indira Gandhi was very upset v^en she said 
in a civic reception : 
There are no tears in my eyes; there is anger in 
my heart... Is it for all this that so many freedom 
fighters and martyrs have sacrified their lives? 
How would I hold my head high and say India is 
a great country and meet foreign dignitaries; when 
violence and discord have fouled the atmosphere... 
I have a great deal of patience and tolerance 
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but not a limit. All necessary parties who are indulging 
in violence are doing the country great harm. They are 
not true Indians. those amongst them who profess to under-
stand Hinduism know nothing about Hinduism.27 
The syndicate was in control of the congress party. Indira 
Gandhi found that she had very little say in the matter of the 
crucial task of deciding a list of candidates for the next election. 
She found that the only way she could disarm the men who were 
waiting,'knives sharpened and glistening, to stab her in the back, 
was by- improving her standing in the country as a whole. She 
made her plan clear by saying in a press interview 'there is 
a question of whom the party wants and whom the people want. 
My opposition among the people is uncontested' . That was a warning 
to the syndicate that if they waged war she would overwhelm and 
outflank them from below. She started her campaign which was 
intended to revive memories of her late father. She travelled 
1500 miles and spoke at 160 public meetings. People came to listen 
and local congress candidates took note of that. They were convin-
ced that no other leader was capable to draw such large 
crowds. Her popularity in the country had undoubtedly 
27. Tariq Ali, n. 12. 
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increased. In a short time this popularity created opposition 
to her from among the congress members and this rivalry conse-
quently weakened the congress. This was shown in the 1967 
election results which indicated that the long love affairs 
between the Congress and the Indian electorate was coming to 
an end. The Congress suffered a set back. Its strength was 
reduced from 361 to 283 out of a total of 520 seats. Congress 
MPs realised that in Indira Gandhi they had an effective vote 
winner and that, without her, the result would have been worse. 
The syndicate now realised that she was a wrong choice but 
it was too late to do anything about that. They were planning 
a coup but they were countered by a group of congress members 
who were known as 'Young Turks'. Indira Gandhi took some steps 
which made the gap between her and the syndicate more wide. 
She dismissed Morarji Desai as finance Minister, nationalised 
fourteen banks and supported V.V. Giri's candidature for pre-
sidency as against the Congress candidate Sanjiva Reddy. The 
mutuality between the two groups broke down, Indira claimed 
that she was fighting for democracy and socialism against reac-
tion. Her opponents argued that they were fighting for demo-
cracy against a comminist dictatorship. 
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On 12 November 1969 the syndicate expelled Indira 
Gandhi from the Indian Congress and called on the parliamenta-
ry party to elect a new leader. She was supported by Oarmnists, 
socialists and the DMK together with the independents. When 
the Emergency session of the AICC took place/ 446 out of 705 
delegates voted for her and the congress was split. Indira 
28 Gandhi emerged the undisputed leader of India. 
The twentieth century witnessed a galaxy of leaders 
in the world who contributed significantly in their own way 
for the progress and development of mankind. But the dedica-
tion, determination and tenacity with which Indira Gandhi 
guided the destiny of nearly 700 million people of India 
has few parallels. As the Prime Minister of India for nearly 
two decades, she steered the destiny of the country through 
one of the most difficult and critical phases of history. 
Right from her childhood she vas deeply entrenched in the 
values of Indian culture based on tolerance, goodwill and 
understanding. Inspired by the lofty ideas of Mahatma Gandhi, 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Rabindranath Tagore, she had launched 
a relentless campaign against the age old curse of poverty, 
illiteracy, religious bigotry and forces like parochialism, 
casteism, communalism and linguism which were eating into 
the vitals of the nations since independence. Indira Gandhi 
28. Indira Gandhi, n. 15, pp 115-18. 
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had displayed rare qualities of courage and leadership through-
out her life in fighting against these divisive forces and 
for upholding the unity and solidarity of the nation as also 
for restoring its position in the council of World Nations. 
Her unbounded love and affection for the people of India 
and particularly those of the vulnerable sections of the 
29 
society are redeeming aspects of her character and personality. 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi held the reigns of power in India 
for over ISyrars and her life left an indelible mark on every 
aspect of national life. If Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was 
the builder of modem India, Mrs. Gandhi was the person who 
consolidated and further enlarged the stature of the country 
and tried her best to make it self-reliant in every field 
and sphere of life. It was her faith in the technological 
development which has direct relationship with the economic 
development of the country, that received the much needed 
attention and administrative initiatives. It was during 
her life that India achieved sixress in indigenous rocketary 
and the first satellite 'Aryabhata' was launched . The atomic 
explosion at Pokharan was yet another significant achievement 
which established India's capability in the atomic field 
29. Tariq Ali, n. 12 pp. 159-68 
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not for producing implements of destruction but using it 
for peaceful purposes and ultimate good of humanity. It was 
during this period that India undertook rapid strides in 
all the fields of economic development and social progress. 
The Green revolutions made India self-sufficient in foodgrains 
to the extent that it is now in a position to export food-
30 
grains to other countries. The fiscal and economic policies 
adopted by Mrs. Gandhi kept the inflationary conditions well 
under controlt increased foreign exchange holdings had made 
India financially largely self-reliant to the extent that 
the country voluntarily'stopped to draw the last instalment 
from the I.M.F. 
INDIM GANDHI'S SOCIALISM 
Indira Gandhi was firmly and sincerely committed to 
a welfare state and state sponsored socialism. Society in 
her political framework, was an integral unit. It comprised 
of individuals bom with different social and economic back-
ground, different traits and characteristics, different ideas, 
cultural moors and faith. Historical forces and economic 
30. O.P. Ralhan, ed., Indira Gandhi : The Champion Secularism, 
New Delhi: 1985, p. 25, 
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compulsion ^^ j^ polarised the society into number of sects 
and sub-sects. Each one of these sects and sub-sects had 
got its cultural and ethnic identity. Socialism did not 
mean wiping out the basic differences which exist between 
men nor did it mean amalgamating all sections of the society 
into one indivisible whole. In its true sense it n^ ant provi-
ding equal opportunities and creating a climate conducive 
to equitable and harmonious evolution and growth of all sections 
of the society and particularly those who had been victims 
of social discrimination and economic exploitation. Mrs. 
Gandhi who was deeply entrenched in the traditions of socialism 
of her illustrious father/ had always the welfare and socio-
economic advancement of these vulnerable sections uppermost 
in her heart and mind. She was remarkable in her imaginative 
insight, perception and understanding of the peculiar problems/ 
traits/ characteristics and habitat of these unfortunate 
sections of the society who used to always look up to her 
as their greatest saviour. The 20 - Point programme announced 
by her on July 1/ 1975 and later on January 14/ 1982 is an 
article of faith and sincerity in pursuing economic programme 
for the social and economic emancipation of weaker sections. 
Much before that the 10 - Point programme announced in 1967 
also highlighted the socialistic attitude of Indira Gandhi's 
government. The outline of this 10- Point economic programme 
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may be noted here as follows: 
1. Social control of the Banking Institution 
2. Nationalisation of General insurance 
3. Commodity-wise progress in state trading in 
Import and Export 
4. State trading in Foodgrains 
5. Expansion of Cooperatives 
6. Regulated removal of Monoplies 
7. Provision of minimum needs to the community 
8. Unearned increments in Urban Land Values 
9. Rural works programmes, Land reforms, etc. 
10. Privileges of Ex-Rulers 
BANK NATIONALISATION 
The socialistic policies of Mrs. Gandhi ^^ ere further 
reflected in the nationalisation of 14 Banks in 1969. In 
consonance with the earlier programme of the social control 
of the banking institution, the government of Mrs. Gandhi 
by an ordinance nationalised 14 of the biggest cotmiercial 
banks incorporated in India. She said that more than 
a decade ago the parliament put before the country 
the goal of a socialist pattern of society. This did 
not imply ownership of all the means of production by the 
state, but "we did not visualise that there should be large 
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areas for the operation of private initiative and enterprise 
subject always to regulation in the public interest'. The 
socialist pattern of society did impose the obligation 
to bring the strategic areas of the country under state owner-
ship and control. "It also meant that the government had 
and has an obligation take remedial measures to ensure 
that our political democracy is not eroded by economic 
distortions". 
In every country, including the pre-dominantly capita-
list communities, it has been recognised that banks and other 
financial institutions occupy a vital position. "In an economy 
such as ours, which is a developing one and which is seeking 
to compress the process of development within the span of 
a ten five-year plans, the role of banks is even more important 
31 
than in the mature economies". 
While defending the Bill she said "Banks play a vital 
role in the functioning of any econom^ '. To those who have 
money to spare, banks are the custodians of their savings, 
on which a good return can be earned by wise and efficient 
31. See the Forward in K.K. Sharma, Indira Gandhi : Architect 
of Self-Reliant Strong India (Patiala: 1985). 
108 
management. To the millions of small farmers/ artisans and other 
self-employed persons/ it was perceived that a bank was a source 
of credit/ which is the very basis for any effort to improve their 
meagre economic lot. Even established trade and industry/ 
big or small/ she felt/ could not function or expand without adequ-
ate bank credit in reasonable terms. For growing number of educated 
young men and women banks could thus offer an opportunity for 
employment / which at the same time was an opportunity for service 
to society To those who did not have business of their own/ insti-
tutions" like the postal system or the railways provided a facility 
for daily life. 
An institution/ such as the banking system, which touches 
and should touch the lives of millions/ has necessarily 
to be inspired by a larger social purpose and has to subserve 
national priorities and objectives. That is why there has 
been widespread demand that major banks should be not only 
socially controlled but publicly owned. It is not an accident 
that this has;ben the practice even in some countries vtiich 
do not adhere to socialism. That is why we nationalised 
more than a decade ago/ the life insurance business and 
the State Bank, or the Imperial Bank as it was then called. 
That is also why we have set up/ directly under the aegis 
of the state/ a number of financial institutions to provide 
medium or long term credit to agriculture and industry. 
The step we have now taken is a continuation of 
the pnDcess vhich has Icng bean incfer \vBy. It is nry earnest hcpe tiret 
it will HBrk a ve^ and more vigccous phase in the implementation 
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of our avowed plans and policies. But it is not the 
beginning of a new era of Nationalisation.32 
INDIRA GANDHI'S BATTLE AGAINST POVERTY,PLANNING AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Indira Gandhi during her whole fifteen years of the 
leadership of the country, fought a relentless battle against 
poverty. She introduced'a number of economic measures including 
the 20 point economic programme for the upliftment of the 
poor and downtrodden people of India. Her faith in planning 
in a big way was as unshakable as ever. In her fourth 'Person 
to Person' broadcast to the Nation on 7th August, 1966 she 
said : 
The plan is the centre of our lives. We are immersed 
in poverty. It is a tremendous human problem, for it 
affects the life of millions and millions of people. 
The answer purely lies in development, and it is to 
ensure orderly and rapid growth that we, like others, 
have embarked on planning. India was passing through 
a most critical period because of the drought and 
32. See Text of Mrs. Gandhi's speech during debate in 
Rajya Sabha on the Banking companies (Acquisition 
and Transfer of Undertakings) Bill, 7 August, 1969, 
Published in The Years of Challenge: Selected Speeches 
of Indira Gandhi, January 1966 - August 1969 (New 
Delhi : 1971), 
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foreign exchange difficulties. These caused acute 
shortages and resulted in a rise in prices. The answer 
does not lie in taking a holiday from planning or 
having a smaller plan in order to live within our 
means. A small plan cannot fulfil the needs of the 
people. In a sense, it would mean a freeze on poverty 
for the poorest and the weakest. It is they v^o will 
be hurt by a small plan, not those who are well off. 
Though India must live within her means, yet in a 
developing economy there must be dynamic concept of 
means. The more the people worked, the more they 
developed their resources and created wealth, the 
more would they enlarge t-heir means and their ability 
to develop-sthe economy still faster without external 
assistance. 
SECULARISM AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION 
Indira Gandhi worked hard for the cause of national 
integration and secularism. Whenever there were communal 
tensions and cotmiunal clashes in the country, wherever they 
might have occured, Indira was among the first to rush to 
the scenes of occurences. She always had hard words to say 
to those who incited communal hatred or ignited the fire 
of communal violence. Her solicitude for the minorities 
was evinced by her initiative and endeavours in getting Dr. 
Zakir Hussain elected as President of India on May 6, 1967. 
This was undoubtedly one indisputable proof of Indira's since-
rety in her path of secularism. Indira Gandhi said, 
33. ibid, pp. 127-28, 
Ill 
A Nation is a mosaic - like a work of art, it takes many 
elements, many textures and many colours to give the total 
effect of strength and beauty. The Indian nation is such 
a rich mosaic of people, of dress and diet, of cultures, 
of intagible quality fo Indianness. Our heritage is the 
mingling of numerous strerams, great and small, which have 
joined the river of India's progress at different times. 
'Together, all these differing parts make up the whole. 
To deny or ignore any even the smallest or the most recent, 
would be to diminish India.-^  
While inaugurating the meeting of the national Integrtion 
Council- held in Srinagar on June, 20, 1968, she admitted that 
divisive forces and tendencies existed in all societies and at 
all times. These forces existed in India during the struggle 
for freedom, but the mainstream of nationalism was powerful enough 
to side-track them and to fight them. She declared, 
EXjring the twenty years since Independence, we have had 
constantly to combat these forces in one form or 
another. In fact, the struggle for national integ-
ration, the struggle for national solidarity, the 
struggle for safeguarding the ideals and aspirations 
embodied in our constitution, has to be waged cease-
lessly and tenaciously. I do not think a time 
can over come when these forces will not want to raise 
34. See the text of Indira Gandhi's 'Person to Person' Broadcast 
over all India Radio 7 August, 1966, n. 32, pp. 104-9. 
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their head. But it should be our endeavour to create 
an atmosphere and to create conditions in which this 
will not be possible and in which the whole society 
will react against them. 
INDIRA GANDHI AND THE CONGRESS SPLIT 
Although agitation, strikes and changes of Ministers 
contiunued as before, 1969 will go down in history as the 
year of great divide in the Ccngress party. It split into 
two: Those who supported Indira Gandhi (Cong-I) and those 
who did not (Cong-0) .• The latter group came to be known as 
the 'Syndicate' and was composed of such formidable political 
figures such as Morarji Desai, Kamaraj, S.K. Patil and Nijali-
ngappa. The confrontation came in theveke- of the death of 
president Zakir Hussain on May 3, 1969. In July 9, the all 
India Congress Ocmnittee met in Bangalore to choose his succe-
ssor. And although she had agreed to the nomination of 
Sanjiva Reddy, she realised soon that Reddy had been put 
up her adversaries in the congress to thwart her and force 
her quit . So she changed her mind and demanded that members 
of the party should be free to vote for any candidate they 
liked and lent her full support to V.V. Giri. 
35. Quoted in Nirmal Kumar Basu, n. 19, p. 73 
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Indira Gandhi sensed that a powerful section of the 
party was not cnly eager to oust her but also not aithusiastic 
about the socialist programmes that she was eagerly trying 
to implement. She fired a pre-emptive shot by announcing 
the nationalization of 14 major banks. She forced Morarji 
Desai to quite the cabinet by depriving him of his portfolio 
of Finance. In the bitterly contested internecine battle 
at the presidential polls, V.V. Giri gained a narrow win. 
It was a victory for Indira-led Congress. Thus, the 84-year 
old Ctngsress party was divided into two warring factions. 
Indira had to part company with many of her cabinet colleagues 
who moved over to the opposition benches. The Congress split 
became a major factor for the political instability in the 
Indian politics. As a result of which Congress lost its 
majority in some of the states of the Indian Union. Two 
wings of the Congress began to claim and compete for mass 
support in the country. All possible alliances, electoral 
arrangements were being attempted both at the centre and 
the state levels to capture power or dislodge those in power. 
The fear was whether in this mad pursuit of power for parties, 
the high national objectives and ideals could yet be retained 
and the country's interests kept in view. Indira Gandhi, 
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therefore/ had an India beset with formidable problems in 
the solution or otherwise of which would depend whether India 
would continue her march towards progress or stagnate and 
fall back. 
However, she handled the situation tactfully and due 
to her ability and efforts, the national elections of 1971 
returned Indira Gandhi's party to power in a landslide victory 
that surprised many. She was developing a reputation for 
political timing and for her uncanny ability to appraise 
the popular mood. 
Although the Congress party was returred to power 
in most state elections in 1972, from this time onward, the 
political fortunes of the Prime Minsiter and the Qngress 
took a downward turn, reflecting the worsening economic 
situation and the accompanying popular discontent and disillu-
sionment. Among the disgruntled were many in the administrative 
ranks who interpreted Mrs. Gandhi's call for civil servants 
to (i3imstrate greater commitment to policies as a command 
to prove their political loyalty to the Qxgr^ss party and 
to her personality. 
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EMERGENCY RULE AND THE FALL OF INDIRA GANDHI 
By 1975, inflation, a source of much disaffection 
and political discord, seemed to have been brought under 
control, and the country appeared to be moving towards econo-
mic recovery. Before this could be consolidated, however, 
a new series of events, climaxed by the Allahabad High Court 
judgement unseating Mrs. Gandhi and opposition efforts to 
bring about her resignation, overtook the Prime Minister 
and she reacted by declaring, through the President of India, 
National Emergency on 25 June 1975. This declaration of 
emergency was justified by Mrs. Gandhi's government on the 
basis of the threat to Indian security posed by an "internal 
disturbance" which was said to be undermining "internal sta-
bility" and adversely affecting '^  reduction and prospects 
of economic improvement" 
With the proclamation of Emergency, the Nehru era 
ended in Indian politics. All those years of protracted 
struggles followed by years of public service for Indians 
by that great man was finished at one stroke by his own daugh-
ter who till then, had herself been a competent leader and 
37 
successful Prime Minister of India. Immediately after 
36. n.32, p.79-80. 
37. Press Communique on the President's Proclamation (New 
Delhi : June 25, 1975). 
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the proclamation, almost all opposition leaders were arrested. 
Strict state censorship was imposed on the newspapers and 
the mass media. 
Many people were arrested and detained under the defe-
nce of India Rules (DIR) or the maintenance of Internal Secu-
rity Act (MISA). The excesses committed during the emergency 
made Indira's regime ruthless and authoritarian and gave 
a fatal blow to her in the 1977 general elections. Even 
those who admired her were shocked at her action. Among 
those is the famous Italian Journalist Oriana Fallci who 
wrote in her book 'Interview with History', "I admired her. 
And I refused to listen to those who warned me, saying, 'May 
be you should not trust her that much' , I judged them env-
ious of her talent and her success. Then, suddenly, this 
changed ", 
It was in the spring of 1975, when she gave up democracy 
and became a dictator. It was when she forgot what her father 
had done. All happened with the quickness of a blow, in 
few days, a few hours. We know the story, as it is so recent. 
She had been tried and convicted, may be wrongly, may be 
excessively, for illicit behaviour in the electoral campaign 
(some minor fault that all politicians commit in her country 
and in the world) and she had been put in the situation of 
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having to consider resigning her power, like Nixon had done. 
Resignation was imperative. Yet she would not resign. She 
refused to do what even Nixon had done. And with a coup 
to be compared to the coups of the most ruthless tyrants, 
she gave up being Prime Minister Indira to become Dictator 
Indira. Overnight she had all the opposition arrested, the 
constitution violated, and freedom assasinated. In the name 
of Democracy, of course, and of law and order. 
It always takes place that way, I said this in 
a report that, I will not summarise . People know 
it. But it. is worth recalling that because of 
the coup, I rejected her and my admiration for 
her. I did not hide my regret and shame at having 
portrayed.,jher in the past as a woman to love and 
respect. 
The justification which Indira Gandhi used for decla-
ring emergency was that "Democracy is not abandoned, only 
derailed". But she added that "The nation was more important 
39 
than democracy". 
Indeed Indira Gandhi was under pressure due to so 
many problems arising as early as the beginning of 1974. 
So, if she had to think in terms of such drastic action, 
she should have done it at least one year earlier when three 
factors were working at the high pitch - the threat of the 
railway strike, the threat of Jayarakash Narayan's movement, 
38. Oriana Fallaci, n.26, p.152-53. 
39. C.S. Pandit, End of an Era : The Rise and Fall of Indira 
Gandhi (New Delhi : 1977), p.180. 
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and IMF persuasions, about the economy which could have been 
interpreted as a threat. But even then those would not have 
constituted as a threat to her personal position. Therefore, 
40 
she remained normal. But an ordinary Judge from 
Allahabad high court gave verdict against Indira Gandhi on 
charges of corrupt practices during election. When Bhushan, 
the senior counsel in the case, was asked by the journalists, 
"whether he thought Mrs. Gandhi could continue as Prime Mini-
ster", he said that legally perhaps she could, but morally 
he had no doubt that she was under an obligation to resign. 
Apart from holding her guilty of corrupt practices the judge 
had also held guilty of giving false evidence. Consider 
what would happen if she went to an international conference 
and the Pakistan delegate got up and said, "Why are you list-
ening to her? Her word has not been believed even in her 
41 
own court, that would be very embarrassing for the country". 
The opposition leaders were overjoyed by the news of the 
j udgement. For them it was a god-sent opportunity to remove 
Mrs. Gandhi. The reactions of almost all opposition leaders 
were similar : high praise for justice Sinha and a demand 
40. Uma Vasuden, Two Faces of Indira Gandhi (New Delhi 
1977), p.151-2. 
41. ibid, p.77. 
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for Mrs. Gandhi's resignation. They said that person against 
whom the court had recorded finding of corrupt practices 
had no right to remain Prime Minister. The Ganatantra Party 
leader, Piloo Mody went further. He said that as of 10.00 
a.m. that day, India had ceased to have a lawful Prime Mini-
42 
ster. "Now we have to see how to deal with this imposter". 
By and large the press was critical to Mrs. Gandhi and had 
indicated that the judgement would undermine her moral autho-
rity. Most of the newspapers urged her to resign. The World 
Press was surprised by the decision. Due to the supersession 
of the Supreme Court Judges in 1973, the prestige of the 
Indian Judiciary had been devalued, and such a bold decision 
was not expected but no doubt this was an indication of healthy 
democracy. 
Mrs. Gandhi became hysterical and critical of the 
opposition. "All her speeches had the_ same theme - lashing 
out at the opposition. She said that the opposition was 
out to destroy the country, "They have the single point pro-
gramme 'Indira Hatao'. They are not bothered with 'desh 
Bachao'.. .She made it clear that she would not resign and 
44 
that she intended to fight it out with the opposition". 
42. Prashant Bhushan, The Case that Shook India, (New Delhi: 
1978), p.107. 
43. ibid, p.108. 
44. ibid, p.110. 
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After Jayaprakash Narayan called on police and army officers 
not to obey 'unlawful' orders and his announcement that he 
was organising a week long protest outside the Prime Minister's 
residence which would be part of a series of actions designed 
to reawaken to declare the 'Emergency' and ordered a mass 
arrest of opposition leaders including Jayaprakash Narayan/ 
Morarji Desai, Charan Singh/ Raj Narain/ Piloo Mody/ Ashok 
Mehta and many others. She also ordered press censorship 
ban on demonstration and strike. The censorship was at one 
stage-/ so severe that even the writings of Mahatma Gandhi 
and Jawaharlal Nehru concerning the struggle for democratic 
45 
rights and press freedom under the British were banned. 
Two and half years of Emergency rule made Indira Gandhi 
think that stability had been restored to the country and 
it was time to call for election which was due long back. 
She had no doubt that her Congress Party would win the ele-
ction ,may be not with big majority as in 1971 but getting 
through was sure. According to her, her return was as sure, 
SO/ in the early days of 1977 she dissolved the Lok Sabha 
45 
and announced that the election would be held in March. 
45. ibid, p.111. 
46. Tariq Ali, n.l2, p.185. 
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Soon after the opposition leaders formed the Janata Party 
with blessing of Jayaprakash Narayan. The most crucial pro-
blem which faced the new party was the choice of the new 
Prime Minister. Morarji Desai, Jagjivan Ram and Charan Singh 
were on the top of the list of aspirants for the job. The 
understanding was that the Janata Parliamentary party would 
elect its leader and Prime Minister but the three old men 
met and agreed to authorise jp to decide who would be the 
future Prime Minister. JP's choice was the 81 year old Morarji 
Desai with his long experience and the fact that he had been 
47 
trying for the job since'Nehru's demise in 1964. 
The night of 20 March, fateful for Mrs. Gandhi as 
at last she came to know the bitter fact of her defeat. 
She immediately summoned a cabinet meeting and told the Mini-
sters that the emergency must be revoked before it was too 
late. She feared that it might be used against her. She 
did not bother about the cabinet when she clamped the emer-
gency but now the withdrawal . of emergency should be in the 
proper way so that nobody would question the validity of 
48 
the withdrawal. 
47. Indira Gandhi, n.l5, p.166. 
48. Tariq Ali, n.l2, p.199. 
122 
After her defeat/ Indira Gandhi seemed confused and 
unsure of her conduct in the present circumstances and crisis 
period. But after her colleagues assured her of their alle-
giance and that she is the only one who could save the party 
and that her outstanding services to the country and the 
nation could not be forgotten, she regained her self-confi-
dence and declared that "the collective judgement of the 
people must be respected. My colleagues and I accept their 
verdict unresevedly". In a spirit of humility and like a 
true democrat she went to offer to the new government her 
'constructive cooperation'. A.N. Dar wrote in Indian Express 
The stout-hearted heroine of many a political 
upheaval in India's modem history vtio succummed 
in the lost battle of the ballot she fought was 
severe and dignified as she went through the 
motions of winding up the last vestiges of her 
eleven.fO^ ears historic and deeply controversial 
rule. 
Some of the party leaders including the party president 
demanded organisational elections to democratise the party 
functioning. This led to the congress working committee's 
three days debate on the debacle which angered Mrs. Gandhi 
and made some of her faithfuls demand the resignation of 
all the Congress working committee members including the 
President. These demands were just to defend Sanjay Gandhi, 
49. Janardan Thakur, Indira Gandhi and her Power Game (New 
Delhi : 1979), p. 3-4. 
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Bansi Lai amd may be Mrs. Gandhi herself. The new leaders 
had already declared that they would prove the Maruti scandal. 
Sanjay Gandhi and Bansi Lai were considered as the causes 
for the C ongress debacle but Mrs. Gandhi would not let them 
down. She told interviewers that 
It was over simplification to blame Sanjay Gandhi 
or Bansi Lai for the party's election debacle. 
Bansi Lai may have done something in Haryana, but 
he certainly wasn't responsible for anything else... 
And so far as I know, Sanjay Gandhi stuck just 
to his five points... the defeat she said bluntly, 
was only due to a massive propaganda and a campaign. 
In a letter addressed to the Congress president Barooah, 
she wrote 
I should like to make it clear that as one who led 
the government, I unreservedly own full responsibi-
lity for this defeat. I am not interested in finding 
alibii or excuses for myself, nor am I interested 
in shielding anyone. I have no caucus to defend 
or group to fight i, I have never functioned as a 
faction leader... ^ ^ 
Many people from the Congress members were convinced 
that she was responsible for the Congress defeat and were 
thinking of asking for her expulsion from the party or demand 
that she be reprimanded. K.P. Unnikrishnan an articulate 
M.P. from Kerala was one of her supporters who thought that 
the party had blundered when it rushed to reaffirm its faith 
on her leadership. He claimed to be the first to demand 
that the party were to survive it must change its ways. 
50. Indian Express, 23 March 1977. 
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It must find out why it had suffered an ignominious defeat. 
Never mind whether Mrs. Gandhi liked it or not. Her leadership 
was exhausted, she had nothing worthwhile to offer. Nobody 
ever had a chance like her's/ not even Nehru. When he began 
in 1947, Nehru was beset with gigantic problems of national 
building. He had inherited a ramshakle economy, chronic 
food deficits, a depleted array. But Mrs. Gandhi had become 
a national heroine almost overnight. Suddenly in 1969 she 
was the symbol of a national resurgence. In 1971 she got 
an absolute mandate... "We had all contributed ;our share 
to the development of the personality cult" she said. Said 
Dharambir Sinha, who was also one of Mrs. Gandhi supporters. 
but I had always thought that a leadership which 
was kept accountable would not deteriorate into 
a personality cult. In those days she had seemed 
to us a rejuvenator. The decay in her leader-
ship qualities was a mysterious process, still 
an enigma to many of us. 51 
"The outcome of the 1977 election represented a water-
shed in modem Indian politics" wrote Tariq Ali. He added. 
The result was a political earthquake which shook 
India and whose tremors were felt in neighbouring 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The Empress had fallen, 
the impact in other parts of the world was consid-
erable : it produced gloom and despondency in Moscow 
: ill-suppressed, albeit short-sighted jubilation 
51. Janardan Thakur, n.49, pp.9-12. 
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in Washington in Peking it was greeted as blow 
against Soviet social imperialism... The election 
was about the emergency and as such it was more 
of a referendum than an election. The emergency 
was identified with Congress rule so the people 
decided to reject the Congress rule The Congress 
was displaced as the major ruling party, and the 
political tradition established in 1937 crumbled 
in 1977...of 49 ministers contesting the election, 
only 15 were successful Indira Gandhi herself 
was defeated by a comic figure from the opposition, 
Raj Narain.. .This is the only occasion in the annuls 
of representative democracy when a sitting Prime 
Minister has been humiliated in such a fashion. 
It constitutes a remarkable tribute to the resilience 
of Indian political institution. Indira's personal 
defeat (together with that of her son San jay in 
a neighbouring constituen-xry) marked the^ lowest 
point in the history of the Nehru dynasty. 
Although Mrs. Gandhi announced that she was 'out of 
politics' but there was no single day when she was not doing 
politics including the day she made the statement. She mana-
ged to get one of her henchmen — Brahmanand Reddy as the 
Congress President who had dutifully put her on the Congress 
working Committee and the party's central election board. 
Many of her supporters had been inducted to the working 
53 
committee. Inspite of all the efforts Mrs. Gandhi made 
to rehabilitate herself in politics but many people thought 
that Mrs. Gandhi is dead politically after the serious defeat 
she suffered in March, 1977. But thanks to the shortsighted-
52, Tariq Ali, n.l2, pp.193-95. 
53. Janardan Thakur, n.49, p.13. 
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ness and political blunders of Janata governinent leaders. 
The one man commission to inquire into the "excesses" of 
the emergency which was appointed by the Janata cabinet and 
which was known as Shah Commission, the threat of a Nuremburg-
type trial and the accusation made against her in Lok Sabha 
by Home Minister Charan Singh that there was a thinking on 
the part of previous government to shoot the political leaders 
in detention painted her as a victim in the eyes of the people. 
He wanted to arrest Mrs. Gandhi on 2 October, 1977, the birth 
anniversary of Gandhi but Morarji Desai did not agree. He 
had sensed that the case was not perfect but he could not 
stop it for ever. So, the arrest took place on 3 October, 
1977. The publicity given to the incident the next day made 
it clear that nobody can stop Mrs. Gandhi from coming to 
T v,4- . 5 4 light once again. 
The performance of Janata government was not in a 
good shape. Lawlessness was increasing, prices were spiralling 
and problems were mounting affecting different sections 
of the Indian people. At the same time, scandals were coming 
out against the government leaders. Morarji DEsai's son 
was engaged in some scandalous deals with businessmen. Jag-
jivan Ram's son was engaged in moral scandals and Raj Narain's 
acts were looking utterly ridiculous. Charan Singh addressed 
54. ibid,p.20. 
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a public letter to the Prime Minister about his son's corrupt 
dealing and demanding investigation without delay. Morarji's 
answer came in public that "I have had a number of letters 
making allegations about you/ your sons-in-law and painful 
to state, even your wife". The accusations and counter accu-
sations between Janata leaders led to the resignation of 
Prime Minister and formation of Charan Singh Ministry which 
did not last long and which consequently led to the disso-
55 lution of parliament by the president. 
Analysing the disintegration of the Janata party and 
rehabilitation of Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her Congress party, 
Tariq Ali wrote that Janata had come to power because of 
a popular reaction against the emergency. It had promised 
a return to decent political norm, a strengthening of the 
basic fabric :of democracy, an end to arbitrary and authorita-
rian terror and the perennial promise of better conditions 
for the poor, the economic and political situation had dete-
riorated within two years. In addition to the caste and 
communal violence associated with the incompetence of Janata, 
the RSS/Jan Sangh, there was the intolerabale puritanism 
of Morarji Desai, the intemperance of Charan Singh the political 
55. For details, see ibid, pp.38-53. 
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promiscuity of Jagajivan Ram, the unforgivable impotence 
of George Femandes, the uncontrollable avarice of countless 
hangers on, the endless intrigue and manoeuvers and scandals; 
all this had made Janata not so much an object of hatred, 
but of contempt and indifference. 
The choice at the 1980 elections was simple — govern-
ment or no government. As the campaign progressed it became 
clear yet again that only one leader had a national appeal 
— Indira Gandhi. She travelled 40,000 miles, spoke at 22 
public meetings a day and addressed a total of one hundred 
million people. Occasionally she would apologise for the 
excesses of the emergency, but she would then tell them that 
they had punished her effectively and asked if they were 
pleased with Janata rule. She would talk of the price of 
kerosene and essential commodities and how high the level 
of inflation ^ was in contrast to when Congress had been in 
power. She lifted her outstretched palm and told them that 
this was the new symbol of the party. That is where they 
must make the mark if they wanted her back. 
On 3 January 1980, Indians went to the polls again. 
There had been widespread fears of trouble and violence, 
but none of this materialised. Indira Gandhi became Prime 
Minister of India for the third time; both Janata and the 
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emergency were consigned to history. Indira Gandhi's own 
comment on this phase of Indian politics was brief and to 
the point. "They had their chance and vtiat did they do? 
They made a big mess. The people voted us back into power 
56 
with a big majority". As a statement of fact this was 
indisputable. 
INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER INDIRA GANDHI 
When India became independent in 1947, the Indian 
National Congress came into power with Jawaharlal Nehru as 
the first Prime Minister of India. Nehru was the chief archi-
tect of India's foreign policy and his influence was over-
whelming in the formulation of policy objectives. He had 
.^nundeniably powerful hold over Indian foreign policy-making. 
The governing consideration in Nehru's foreign policy were 
peace, non-alignment, independence and development. India's 
foreign policy has been shared (on the principles laid down 
by Nehru) by Nehru's successors, Lai Bahadur Shastri and 
after he passed away, on 10 January 1966, by Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi. Mrs. Gandhi had gained a unique familiarity with 
55. Tariq Ali, n.l2, pp.203-7. 
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the world of Indian diplomacy. She placed her in a situation 
of dominance over foreign policy soon after she took over 
as the Prime Minister. In her statement on foreign policy 
on 26 January 1966, she categorically said that Nehru's 
principles would continue to guide her. She said 
The fundamental principles laid down by my father, 
to which he and Shastri dedicated their lives, 
will continue to guide us. It will be my sincere 
endeavour to work for the strengthening of peace 
and international cooperation so that people in 
all lands live in equality, free of domination 
and fear. 
Indira Gandhi decided to seek friendship and develop 
India's relations with all countries irrespective of ideology 
or their political systems. To her, non-alignment continued 
to be the fundamental basis of India's approach to world 
problems. She made efforts that India should be self-reliant 
and strengthen its independence so that it can not be pressu-
rised by anybody. 
Indira Gandhi's dynamic leadership in international 
relations had inspired many people in India and abroad to 
examine the achievements of India's foreign policy. She 
had a broader vision and envisaged a great role for India 
57. n.32, p.6. 
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in world affairs. India was trying hard under her leadership 
to achieve its goal for establishing international peace 
and security. She had succeeded in achieving a long term 
objective of reconstructing India and the Indian sub-conti-
nent. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was the key person in shaping 
India's foreign policy and protecting her national interests 
and security. 
INDIRA GANDHI AND NON-ALIGNMENT 
Though the roots of non-alignment are found in India's 
freedom movements/ it was given a concrete shape at the time 
of the achievement of her independence. Jawaharlal Nehru, 
one of the founder members of the nonalignedmovement, cham-
pioned the cause of India's policy based on world peace and 
development. The values which India sought to promote in 
the early years of its independence revolved around the furth-
erance of national interest in an international order based 
on peace and justice. 
A distinctive feature of Nehru's non-alignment was 
the country's independence of thought and action in inter-
national affairs. He wanted India to judge events on the 
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merits of each case rather than ideological grounds. Through 
the instrument of non-alignment, India under Nehru attempted 
for a general and complete disarmament, total decolonisation, 
dismantling of racism and all forms of political domination 
and economic exploitation. 
Indira Gandhi inherited the ideals which her father 
stood for in the furtherance of non-alignment, her belief 
in the principles of a foreign policy based on peace. ' 'This 
reflected in her first radio broadcast after taking over as 
Prime Minister. Delivering it on 26 January 1955, she said: 
In keeping with our heritage, we have followed 
a policy of peace and friendship with all nations, 
yet reserved to ourselves the right of indepen-
dent opinion. The principles which have guided 
our foreign policy are in keeping with the best 
traditions .of our country, and are wholly con-
sistent with our national interest, honcjur and 
dignity. They continue to remain valid. 
Indira Gandhi's approach towards the basic tenets 
of non-alignment was in harmony with what had been laid down 
by her father and by other founding members of the movement. 
To begin with, she was unambiguously clear that non-alignment 
was of a non-bloc character. 
No bloc either Western or Eastern, should take India 
for granted, was her position. In one of her speeches she 
posed questions such as : 
58. ibid, p.6. 
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Are we to join the Western Bloc? Are we to 
join its military alliances? Or, do we join 
the Eastern bloc and its military alliances? 
It is evident that anybody who looks clearly 
at this question will immediately come to the 
conclusion that it would not be in our interest 
to join either bloc. We come back/ therefore, 
to the third position which is outside all blocs. 
I do not think it is an idealistic position. 
I think it is the only hard-headed, practical 
path that is open to any couQtry which wants 
to keep itself independent." 
She was of the view that the non-bloc character of 
non-alignment did not mean equidistance from blocs. Such a 
mechanical position could not constructively respond to the 
plurality amongst the meittoers of the movement, which had been 
laid down in the early 1960's. Each member of the movement 
had a fair degree of autonomy in determining its distance 
from a bloc. In doing so, it is bound to take into account 
the imperatives of its national interests. Indira Gandhi 
was sensitive to the criticism that non-alignment during her 
stewardship, was tilted in favour of the Soviet Union. This 
was being said on account of the friendly relations which 
grew between the two countries when she was Prime Minister. 
However, she rejected this allegation of tilting towards Soviet 
Union and explained : 
59. See the text of her address to all India Congress Committee 
Seminar on 31 August, 1970 in Indira Gandhi, Peoples 
and Problems (London : 1982), p.41. 
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"Many of those who have been against non-align-
ment all these years, who criticised my father 
and myself for trying to pursuade this path, 
do not attack non-alignment as such today, but 
say that we are not truly non-aligned. The great 
attack today, the greatest weapon which is used 
against our foreign policy, is the change that 
we are, in effect, following the Soviet line 
Let us understand that, regardless of what our 
big newspapers say here, the image of India is 
very clear outside. it is not an image of a 
country which follows any groups or country, 
it is an image of a country standinoy or trying 
to stand, squarely on its own feet." 
' In this very address she pointed out that the real 
situation was that the Soviet Union was supporting the posi-
tions taken by the non-aligned countries at the United Nations 
and elsewhere and not vice-versa. "Would it not be more 
true to say", she asked "that the Soviet Union had supported 
the stand taken by the developing countries, by the African 
and Asian countries, and not that we had gone out of our way 
to support the Soviet Union?" ' Inspite of domestic and 
international problems which Indira Gandhi was facing, she 
did not allow the country's foreign policy to be put on a 
slow burner. With a view to following the tradition of active 
foreign policy and to strengthen and revitalise non-alignment 
60. ibid. 
61. ibid, p.42. 
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within months after taking over/ she undertook the visit to 
the two other founding members of the non-aligned movement. 
In July 1966, she visited President Nasser in Cairo and Pre-
sident Tito in Brioni/ Yugoslavia. As a result of the discu-
ssions, it was decided to hold a tripartite meeting at the 
summit level in New Delhi and it was held in November 1966. 
This summit meeting of the leaders of the three countries 
who pioneered the non-aligned movement comes significant in 
many ways. In general terms it strengthened the movement 
and redefined its role in the altered global situation. More 
specifically, it deliberated upon the major problems which 
the members of the movement were facing. The Delhi meeting 
was able to mobilise world opinion on various political and 
economic problems of the developing countries. 
Besides these, this was an important opportunity for 
the three leaders to familiarise themselves with each others 
problems on the one hand and international issues on the other. 
Indira Gandhi had a unique chance of taking initial steps 
towards achieving the status of world class leader in the 
years to come. What India achieved out of this conference 
was well summed up by Rangaswami. He wrote in The Hindu; 
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The real gain to India from the tripartite meeting 
is that it has been able to shake off the feeling 
of despondency and isolation caused by the deve-
lopments of the last few crucial years which 
witnessed two wars and the death of two Prime 
Ministers. Besides crushing economic problems/ 
the Delhi conference may be said to mark the 
beginning of a new initiative on the part of 
India and this initiative may be reflected in 
the measures to be taken in strengthening the 
bonds of friendship with otJl^ er countries bila-
terally and multilaterally. 
The tripartite meeting had advanced the cause of non-
alignment, promoted India's interests, and heralded the arrival 
of Indira Gandhi on the international scene. Notwithstanding 
the various criticisms and pressures against her and to the 
Joint Communique issued at the end, she demonstrated that 
she would not compromise on principles and was ready to take 
risks along with its consequences. Indeed, this unfolded 
the character of her leadership. 
In the context of non-alignment, the finest hour of 
her leadership came in the last phase of her life. It may 
be recalled that India, on account of variety of reasons, 
had never been over- enthusiastic about Summitry. As a part 
of this overall outlook/ she never showed interest in hosting 
a Summit. M.S. Rajan writes : 
62. See for details, K. Rangaswami, "Non-Aligned Leaders 
Take Stock", The Hindu, 1 November 1966. 
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It is a curious fact that although India has been 
the pioneer of the policy of non-aligninent - and 
additionally, has been practising the policy for 
the longest period among the present 101 members 
states of the Non-Aligned Movement - it is only 
twentytwo years after the establishment of the 
NAM that the first summit meeting of the move-
ment was held en Indian soil in 1983, perhaps this 
fits in well with one of the characteristic features 
of India's foreign policy and posture in interna-
tional relations - of not seeking or pursuing, 
a leadership role,- and leaving it to other nations 
to recognise India's potential and wait until 
other nations ask for its cooperation or assi-
stance. 63 
The Seventh Non-Aligned summit held in New Delhi in 
March 1983 brought to Indira Gandhi, the chairmanship of the 
Non-Aligned Movement. This responsibility came to her at 
a time which was far from easy in international relations. 
As a seasoned leader, she was cognizant of this. In her closing 
address to the Summit Conference, she cautioned the assembled 
leaders in Delhi against undue expectations. She pointed 
out that "The resolution of the two dominating issues of our 
day, disarmament and development can not be dramatic". She 
further said that "We have only established the base camp 
and have had a long climb to the movement from March 1983 
to October 1984. Her statemanship and dynamism gave a strong 
63. See M.S. Rajan, "The Seventh Ncn-Aligned Summit", in 
Satish Kumar, ed Year Book of India's Foreign Policy, 
1982-83 (New Delhi : 1985), p.53. 
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thrust to the work of the movement. She was a strong and 
fearless leader and the countries of the movement knew that 
in her they had a unique champion for the causes of the poor 
masses of the world. Though the cruel hands of destiny cut 
short her chairmanship to less than half of the full term, 
its imprint was seen and felt even after her assassination 
in October 1984. 
INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE SUPER POWERS UNDER INDIRA GANDHI'S 
LEADERSHIP 
India's policy towards her relations with the super 
powers did not start from a new state during Indira Gandhi's 
tenure as Prime Minister. The parameters of these relation-
ships had already been fairly determined by the preceding 
events and by the general framework of India's foreign policy 
of non-alignment. India's advocacy of the policy of non-align-
ment was in contrast to its major rival in the region - Pakistan-
which was in favour of alignment with external powers and 
balance of power policies. While in 1947 India had a small 
but very effective political elite group with reasonably well 
defined views on foreign policy issues and same capacity to 
deal with an intrusive outside world, Pakistan lacked this 
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kind of expertise. India's primary objective since inde-
pendence had been to exclude the major foreign powers from 
interfering in the sub-continent. And because this has not 
been always possible for many reasons, India has instead 
sought to manipulate and limit the involvement of those powers 
to the extent that it serve its interest. But when some major 
powers would not cooperate with India in this regard it would 
invite-the involvement of another .power to counter the other, 
in other words, it has used balance of power politics despite 
its rhetorical aversion to the principle. So, for this reason, 
the other states in South Asia perceived the external powers 
in terms of their relationship with India. The concept of 
an equal relationship with India is one that has seemed unrea-
listic. Indeed Utopian, and it has been the general assumpt-
ion that India would .never be satisfied with anything less 
than a hegemonic status in the region. 
INDIA'S RELATION WITH U.S.A. 
After having been elected in her own right as Prime 
Minister, Mrs. Gandhi undertook the first trip abroad as Prime 
Minister to the United States in March 1966. Seeking more 
64. Leo E. Rose, "South Asia and the Outside World", in A. 
Jayaratnam, J. Wilson and Dennis Dalton, ed.. The States 
of South Asia (London : 1982), p.317. 
65. ibid, p.320. 
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assistance and a much better political relationship/ she had 
gone there with the themes of joint commitment to democracy. 
India's developmental efforts within a free political system 
and the danger of the Chinese drive towards hegemony in Asia. 
At the time/ however/ India needed to import on a large scale 
food, fertilizer/ edible oil and many other essential items 
coming mostly from U.S.A. and other western countries. 
PL-480 became the symbol of India's dependence. By 1966 India 
had imported six million tons of fertilizers. When Mrs. Gandhi 
became Prime Minister, U.S.A. was also the largest economic 
donor to India; contributing some 1502.5 crores. Of this 
amount 648.8 crores had come in the form of grants, 829.4 
crores as loan repayable in Dollers and Rs.124.3 crores on 
local currency repayment basis. Thus only 32 percent of 
American aid involved repayment in foreign exchange and the 
bulk of this amount carried low rates of interest and repayable 
over a period of 40 years. Nearly a quarter of U.S. agri-
cultural exports were comprised of PL-480 exports and India 
took 50 (fifty) percent of these. In fact PL-480 aid came 
66. For the text of Mrs. Gandhi's speeches in U.S.A./ see 
Foreign Affairs Record/ March and April/ 1966. 
67. Asian Recorder/ 9-15 September/ 1964, pp.6028-29. 
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to constitute some 60 (sixty) percent of the total U.S. aid 
made available to India by 1969. By which time India was 
taking rapid strides in expanding agricultural production. 
For much of the period in the early sixties India leaned 
somewhat towards the United States but despite the trauma 
of the Sino-Indian conflict and the efforts of the Indian 
leaders, and particularly Mrs. Gandhi initially to reach a 
new level of relationship, India and the United States could 
not overcome their differences to keep them from souring their 
relations. Indo-U.S. relations were caught up in a declining 
curve on U.S. arms supply to Pakistan, the West Asia conflict 
and the war in Vietnam. In the War (or wars) in West Asia, 
India was on the side of Arabs while Washington lined up behind 
Israel. In the case of Vietnam, India regarded the struggle 
basically as a national struggle, v^ile the U.S. was critical 
about anya expression of sympathy with Vietnam. When Shastri 
denounced the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, his planned visit 
to Washington was cancelled by the State Department. But 
when Indira Gandhi took over as Prime Minister she paid her 
first visit abroad to Washington when she refused to dance 
with Johnson saying that "My countrymen would not approve 
if they heard I had been dancing". But that was not the reason. 
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The reason was that she was compelled to make some concessions 
including avoiding making any critical reference to U.S. 
policy in Vietnam. The attitude which was taken by Indira 
Gandhi during her visit to U.S.A. antagonised many people 
in India including some of the leaders of the Congress party. 
Krishna Menon, a close friend of Nehru/ attacked Indira's 
foreign policy. He demanded an explanation for the government's 
silence on Vietnam describing it as "Shameful" and disgraceful 
breach in the country's anti-imperialistic policies. He deno-
unced the Indo-American Education Foundation as "An intrusion 
into the cultural and intellectual life of the Indian people'. 
Indira was very much disturbed by the attack and her reply 
was not convincing for the Americans. 
When Nixon became the President in 1969, there 
were some hopes of improvement in indo-U.S. relation. 
Nixon was believed to have held the view that any failure 
70 
of the Indian democracy would be "a disaster for the world". 
But he had embarked upon a policy of creating a new equati on 
68. Tariq Ali, An Indian Dynasty (New York : 1985), p.156, 
69. ibid, p.157. 
70. Asian Record, 9-15 September 1968, p.8660. 
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partly with the help of Pakistan v^ich led to the famous 
Indo-Soviet treaty of 1969. However, the American attitude 
towards establishing good relation with China was not on the 
expenses of American relations with India. This can be seen 
from the position taken by Washington in 1970 when Pakistan 
was given to understand that the American presence in the 
Bay of Bengal was to assist them against India. This event 
made it clear that it was a mistake to place any reliance 
71 
on the Americans in any crisis. Inspite of the tendency 
in Washington to place low priority on South Asia "India has 
probably been the primary beneficiary of the low profile policy 
adopted by the United States in South Asia since the m.id-1960's 
but there have been few expressions of appreciation even 
from this quarter. Indeed New Delhi would probably prefer 
a greater degree of continuity in the substance and objectives 
of U.S. policy in the region. Since it is the unpredictabi-
lity of the American response in crisis situations that seri-
72 
ously complicates decision making in India." The decla-
71. Leo E. Rose, n.64, p.324. 
72. ibid, p.325. 
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ration of Emergency in India brought forth a hostile 
and critical response from the U.S.A. In a press conference 
President Gerald Ford said that "It was very sad that 600 
73 
million people have lost what they had since m.id-1940's" 
The government of India reacted sharply against what is called 
official comment on the internal affairs of a friendly country 
and Mrs. Gandhi herself came down heavily on the West in her 
speech at the Indian National Congress session towards the 
end of 1975/ accusing it of rank h'/procracy in its concern 
for the future of democracy in India after having played the 
ball with every dictatorship in Asia. She had the impression 
that the West never displayed much friendliness towards India 
and that it was not particularly pleased with India's inde-
74 
pendent stand in world affairs and her growing strength. 
RELATION WITH USSR 
Ever since the Soviets first extended support to India 
on the Kashmir issue and the visits of Soviet Leaders in India, 
the Soviet Union had been quite responsive to India's wishes 
and had usually defined its role in the sub-continent in ways 
73. Indian Express/ 18 September 1975. 
74. The Hindustan Times, 1 January 1976, 
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that either served India's interest or at least were not stro-
ngly opposed to them. There were some exceptions to this 
rule for example the Soviet stand in the Indo-Chinese border 
dispute in the early sixties/ the programme of the Soviets 
to arm Pakistan in the later part of that decade; and the 
quiet but rather serious competition between India and the 
Soviet Union for the role of the most influential foreign 
power in Bangladesh during the reign of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman. 
But the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in the late 1970's 
had caused the greatest dilemma for New Delhi, since 
75 
this violates all the basic principles of Indian foreign policy. 
The Indian government generally looked upon the Soviet Union 
as a positive factor in South Asia although many Indian offi-
cials did not understand that this is necessarily external 
especially when they take the Soviet Union intervention in 
Afghanistan into consideration. It was also evident that 
New Delhi was fully aware that a major change in the nature 
of the Soviet role in South Asia was occuring and this could 
eventually require painful but unavoidable modifications in 
Indian policy or even more painful redefinition of India's 
7fi 
regional status as the dominant power. 
75. Leo E. Rose, n.64, p.321 
76. ibid, p.322. 
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While the declaration of Emergency in India created 
sharp reaction and strong critisism in the West specially 
in the U.S.A., it was welcomed by the Soviet Union as it believed 
that the reactionary forces were trying to utilise every method 
to overthrow Mrs. Gandhi's government and to establish a right 
wing order. Pravda noted the 20 -Point economic programme 
announced by Mrs. Gandhi to help the poorer section of the 
society and reaffirmed Moscow's policy of supporting Mrs. 
Gandhi' s government in its bid to fail the right - wing 
offensive. 
India's national interest with the Soviet Union appeared 
to be a continuing phenomenon. After the defeat of Mrs. Gandhi 
in the election of 1977/ the Janata government had talked 
of "genuine ncn-elignnraTt" and gave the impression that it 
intended to distance India from the Soviet Union, but in effect 
Morarji Desai signed significant economic agreements with 
Moscow which were not exactly an indication of moving away. 
77. Pravda, 3 and 7 July, 1975 
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RELATION WITH CHINA 
China became an important factor in India's foreign 
policy since the days of Nehru. He believed that India and 
China could collectively refashion the events in Asia and 
the world. India promptly recognised the People's Republic 
of China and championed the cause of its entry into the United 
Nations. During the 1950's; there-were substantial cooperations 
between the two countries. But this was disturbed by the 
out break of the border dispute in 1959 and the brief border 
hostilities between the two countries in 1962. Since then 
the basic principle of chirB's policy in South Asia was directed 
at organising the other states in the region against India 
or at least in doing everything possible to complete India's 
relation with China. Not only that but China also sought 
to support the internal dissident forces in India especially 
in the North Eastern Areas. Thoughts of Chairman Mao were 
d-HToicned with almost as little comprehension in Calcutta 
as in Shanghai. The developing crisis in Pakistan in 1971 
and the secret visit made by the Secretary of states of U.S. 
to China through Pakistan forced India to enter into a treaty 
of peace, friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union 
78. The Hindustan Times, 8 October, 1971, 
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in August 1971. The Chinese reaction was instant and it accused 
India of collusion with the Soviet Union with the diabolical 
design to dismember Pakistan. However/ the Chinese still 
hoped that an understanding would be reached between India 
79 
and China and it refrained from further criticism of the treaty. 
The Chinese welcomed the Simla agreement as it felt that India 
and Pakistan should solve their problems bilaterally. Sardar 
SvaranSingh, the then External Affairs Minster expressed India's 
keen desire to improve relations with China. He said "India 
had expressed its willingness on several occasions. It was 
even prepared to have economic relaticns with China without 
81 bringing any political differences. 
In any case, since 1975 Chinese policy in South Asia 
had been less anti-Indian than any time since the late 1950's. 
These changes were due mainly to the Indian politics which 
enjoyed the approval of China. It is also reported that China 
no longer supported the dissident forces in India. And in 
return India had moderated its support of Tibetan rebel groups 
based south of the Himalayas and had encouraged the Dalai 
Lama to come to terms with Peking particularly if these resulted 
79. The Hindustan Times, 26 August, 1972 
80. The Statesman, 17 August, 1972 
81. ibid, p. 323 
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in a Tibetan provincial goveminent with limited autonomy. 
The main reason for the improvement in the Indo-Chinese relation 
was due to the presence of Soviet Union in Afghanistan as 
both the countries treated this development as a serious threat 
to their respective interests and considered it essential 
that Soviet mi litarv forces be necessarily withdrawn from 
82 
Afghanistan. 
RELATION WITH NEIGHBOURS 
According to Leo E. Rose/ the other South Asian states 
have perceived the external powers in terms of their own rela-
tionship with India. And thus in very different ways from 
the manners in which New Delhi assessed them. The concept 
of an equal relationship with India was always one that had 
seemed unrealistic, indeed Utopian and it had been the general 
assorpticn that New Delhi could never be satisfied with anything 
less than a hegemonic status in the region. Even a regional 
system in which all the South Asian states could be involved 
was not attractive, because such a system could inevitably 
be dominated by India. Only recently have some of the elite 
in the smaller states seen possible advantages in dealing 
82. Leo E. Rose, n. 64, pp. 320-21 
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with India on political/ economic and security issues through 
a multilateral system rather than on the present bilateral 
basis, But the advantages and disadvantages of both were as 
of course carefully weighed before anything substantive was 
proposed. 
The other South Asian states have usually actively 
sought to involve external powers in South Asia on terms that 
improved their bargaining position with New Delhi and antrlbjted 
to their security in other ways as well. Moreover, while 
the major external powers' have been prepared at times to serve 
as a counter to India when this served their policy and stratsgic 
interests, more often then not they have been unenthusiastic 
about assuming such role. When they have agreed to an involvarBTt 
in the subcontinent, they have demanded a price - and on occasicn 
a high price - for their cooperation with regional state poli-
cies. This was most evident in Pakistan's relationship with 
United States in the 1950's and 1960's and Nepal's with China 
in the 1960's and 1970's; but it was also integral to the 
relationship with Soviet Union in the 1960's when Moscow made 
some expensive demands upon New Delhi which the government 
83 
of India was "not always able to reject. 
83. Leo E. Rose, n. 64, pp. 320-21, 
151 
After the partition of India into two states - India 
and Pakistan/ the relation between the two countries was never 
good. They fought 3 wars in the first 18 years and maintained 
a competitive and hostile attitude to each other. The discontent 
of the Bengalis in East-Pakistan encouraged India to exploit 
the situation and weaken its enemy. In a seminar held in 
New Delhi/ K. Subrahmaniyam, the Director of India Institute 
of Defence studies said 'What must be realised is the fact 
that the break-up of Pakistan is in our interest/ and opportunity 
84 the like of v^ich will never come again". The Indian Prime 
Minister declared in the parliament: 
We are deeply conscious of the historic importance 
of this movement (Bengali - Movement) I would like 
to assure the honourable merbers who asked whether 
decisions would be taken on time/ that obviously is 
the most important thing to do. There is no point 
in taking a decision when the time for it is over. 
We are interested in the matter for many reasons. 
Firstly as one mentoer has said/ Sri Mujibur Rahman 
has stood for the values which we ourselves cherish. 
She introduced a resolution in the parliament which was adopted 
by it pledging full support to the rebel group. 
84. The Hindustan Times, 1 April, 19 1. 
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This house expresses its profound sympathy for and 
solidarity with the people of cast Bengal in their 
struggle... This house records its profound conviction 
that the historic upsurge of the 75 million people 
of East Bengal will triumph. The house wishes to 
assure them that their struggle and sacrifices will 
receive the whole-hearted sympathy and support of the 
people of India. 
The question of large scale influx of refugees to India 
due to the assault made by the Pakistan army on the Bengalis 
created sympathy in India with Bengali of east Pakistan. 
Awami League was to set up a government in-exile in Calcutta. 
Indira Gandhi travelled to the West where she mobilized the 
public opinion against Pakistan and compared its action in 
east Pakistan with that of Zazio conquest in Europe. She 
also visited USSR and signed a treaty with Moscow \^ i^ch shocked 
the West. Kissinger rushed to Delhi. Indira Gandhi told 
him that her actions were geared, "to get Mujibur Rahman t^ leased 
from prison and push for a political settlement". She continued 
to argue that the best solution would be a unilateral retreat 
by Pakistan army, the unconditional release of Mujib and the 
right of Bengali people to determine their relation with Pakis-
tan. This was an unlikely prospect and the Indian High Conrrand 
8c 
was told to prepare an offensive in strict secrecy. 
85. Quoted in G.K". Cnoudhur\', The Last Days of United Pakistan 
(London: 1974), pp. 211-12': '' 
86. Tariq Ali, n. 66, p. 1 i. 
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The military ruler in Pakistan found that the position 
of the army in the eastern wing was not favourable. So, they 
decided to launch a pre-emptive strike against Indian Airfield. 
Indira Gandhi called for emergency cabinet meeting vdnich agreed 
to declare war which ended on December 16 when the Pakistan 
army surrendered to Indian troops and Indira Gandhi became 
87 
the "liberator of Bangladesh". Bhutto had to visit India 
and sign the Simla agreement which led to the release of 
Pakistan POW's and the recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan. 
Simla agreement was a turning point m the Indo-Pakistan 
relation especially regarding the Kashmir issue which till 
then was the most important factor in the relation between 
the two countries and vrfiich was the real cause of all the 
irreconciliable antagonisms between them. Asghar Khan wrote 
in his boom General in Politics" : 
The Simla agreement reflected fairly accurately, the 
negotiating strength of the two sides. Pakistan gave 
up some important strategic territory m Azad Jaimrj 
and Kashmir and agreed not to raise the Kashmir issue 
m the United Nations or ether international forays. 
The issue was instead to be discussed bilaterally after 
c ibid, p. 174. 
3. ibid, D. 1^€. 
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some of the less difficult disputes had been settled 
between the two countries apart from what was given 
out in the final communique at the end of the talks 
on 2 July, 1972. It was believed that some other matters 
had been agreed to at Simla. Those matters have been 
referred to as the 'Secret Clause" of the Simla agreenent 
and have been the subject of discussion from t j ^ to 
time by different statesmen in the two countries. 
Although Bangladesh owed its existence to India, the 
relations between the two countries were not always cordial. 
The problems started during the independence movement when 
Indian devebped deep understanding with Awami league and 
tried to keep the armed struggle under their control. The 
Indian confined their support and dealings to Awami leaguers 
and relied on them. This attitude raised bitter critisism 
amongst other nationalist forces who thought that an independence 
war would not be kept confined under one political party. 
The Bengali freedom fighters were acaising Awami league leader-
ship of not taking part in the war and the Indian government 
for too much interference and highhandedness. This was deepened 
by raising the cadre of another front of freedom fighters 
90 
called Mu]ib Bahrni. 
89. Mohamrrad Asghar Khan, Generals in Pclitics -Delni 
1933), pp. 5~-58. 
90. Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh (Dhaka: 1983), p. 183. 
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The Pakistan army surrendered to the Indian army who 
remained for few months only and due to a bargain by Mujib 
the withdrawal of Indian army was possible. A treaty of frie-
ndship/ co-operation and peace for a period of 25 years with 
provision for renewal was signed by Shaikh Mujibur Rahman 
and Mrs. Indira Gandhi when she came to Dhaka on her visit 
91 
to the ne^ ' bom Nation. 
In spite of signing friendship treaty between the two 
countries; the conflicting interests between the two countries 
continued to deepen. Hiere were differences over land bounda-
ries, and the most important problem was that of sharing 
the water from numerous rivers that flowed through the heart 
of the rew country. The construction of Farakka Barrage caused, 
according to Bangladesh, an irreparable damage to the life 
and economy of Bangladesh. The dispute over these issues 
92 
went on haunting the relationship of the two countries. 
In 1947, Nepal regretted the British withdrawal from 
the sub-continent but quickly adjusted to the new situation. 
Kathmandu maintained the same policy which was prevailing 
during British rule with Indians - that is to exchange acceptance 
91. ibid, p. 186. 
92. ibid, p. 191 . 
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of India's guidance of Nepa]'r inteinaticral relations and 
on security i.ssu^  in exchange for complete art:onomy in internal 
matters. This was the basis of the treaty signed by India 
and Nepil in 1950. But the Chinese invasion of Tibet and 
internal disorder in Nepal chemged the equations drastically. 
It look nearly a decade before Nepal foreign policy making 
was again based on perceptions of the country's interest and 
role in the Himalayan region. Despite the advantage that 
India enjoyed in economic political/ social/ intellectual 
and psychological relations with Nepal/ there had been a tendency 
in India to denounce every Sino-Nepali interaction as evidence 
93 that Nepal was a Chinese puppet. 
Itie Indian relation with Sri Lanka had always been strained 
by the problem of stateless Tamils of Indian descent v^o 
had made their way as imported labour force at the behest 
of the British. The Sirimavo Shastri pact in 1964 was a 
breakthrough in this regard. The pact was a land mark in 
the relation between the two countries as it was the beginning 
94 
of the end of this problem. Although the implementation of 
the pact was not satisfactory especially during UNP governiTient. 
93. Leo E. Rose, n. 64, pp. 317-18. 
94. Lalit Kumar/ India and Sri Lanka, (Delhi: 1977)^ 
p.8. 
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But "this exploded the tnyth about India that "There was 
hardly a single neighbour on any of her frontier with whom 
she had been able to settle any question by peaceful negotiation'.' 95 
THE END OF INDIRA GANDHI 
We have seen in the previous pages how Mrs. Gandhi's 
excesses gave birth to the Janata party and how every body 
thought that she was politically dead. But when Oiar^ Singh, 
the Home Minister ordered her arrest. Congressmen all over 
the country felt insecure and the CWC called upon the Cong-
ressmen to meet the challenge of the arrest by organizing 
an effective protest throughout the country- But that single 
action the process of polarization in the congress had been 
halted at least t«nporarily.96 That was not the only reason 
which helped Mrs. Indira Gandhi to come back. A variety of 
factors brought about the fall of the Janata government. 
The overv^elming ambition of ChadTjry Charan Singh to become 
the Prime Minister, the destructive culture of the Lohiaites, 
95. ibid., p. 93. 
96. Janardan Thakur, n. 49, p. 41. 
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the fears and anxieties of the industrialists and business 
houses/ the subtle machinations of the Russion lobby in India/ 
the desperate iricincouvers of Mrs. Gcuidhi and her son to escape 
the consequences of the Emergency/ and last but not least 
the utter failure of the Jcinata govemnient to come to grips 
with the task of gcvoning the country and provide a stable 
government. 
The Indians went to polls on 3 January 1980. The turnout 
was lower than in the previous election but the Ccngress won 
351 out of the total of 542 seats in the Parliament. Indira 
Gandhi became Prime Minister for the third time auid the emerge-
ncy and the Janata government became something of the past. 
According to Tariq Ali/ the election campaign itself had been 
a lacklustre affair. There was none of the magic or sparkle 
of the old "tHiDve poverty" days. This time it was the Janata's 
manifest failures that formed the substance of Mrs. Gemdhi's 
speeches. That and of course/ rising prices - in particular 
the scancMoLB increase in prices of onions • She pledged 
that the Congress would keep the price of onion stabilised. 
She won/ however / not because of onions, but because the 
Janata had destroyed itself beyond repair. It was an interesting 
97. ibid, p. 110. 
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and a rapid reversal. In 1977 she had lost because of the 
emergency/ so her rivals had won the vote for largely negative 
reasons; the failure of the opposition was responsible for 
Congress victory of 1980. For obvious reasons, she was not 
permitted breathing space. The problems that continued to 
plague her frcxn the first month after returning to 1 Safdarjung 
Road stayed with her right till the end. 
Indira Gandhi faced many problans after her return 
to power. The biggest external problem was the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistcin and the biggest internal one was the economic 
problem. There were other difficulties like political mis-
management and deteriorating relations between centre and 
states vdnich were ruled by the opposition beside the increase 
of camunalism and comtiunal forces in the country. Itie death 
of her son Sanjay was a sudden blow to her because she was 
preparing him to succeed her and his death shattered that 
dream. Rajiv was ccmpelled to take the place of Sanjay but 
this angered his wife Menaka who was hoping to replace her 
husband. When she was denied this opportunity she declared 
war on her mother-in-law and left the family house with her 
son Varun. 
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Punjab problem was the most serious cne that faced 
Indira Gandhi in her political life. In order to strengthen 
the Congress party in the Punjab she tried to weaken Akali 
Dal by helping its opponents. This led to the rise of extre-
mists like Bhindranwale vrfio grew b-ayond control and who took 
refuge in the Golden Temple . The go;?emment did not take 
immediate action against him on the assumption that his stay in 
the temple would weakened the Akalis thereby strengthening 
the Congress party in the border state. That in fact made 
Bhindranwale a hero among Sikhs and gathered a huge support 
for him. When the government decided to take action it was 
too late and therefore the casualities were heavy. 800 to 
1000 of Bhindranwale supporters and 200 to 3 X soldiers lost 
their lives in the Operation Blue Star . The death of Bhindran-
wale turned him into a saint and a martyr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, 
a leader of vrtiat is called Khalistan, declared in London that 
the days of Indira Gandhi were numbered. She did not only 
ignore that threat but she also ignored her intelligence chief's 
order to transfer her sikh body guard saying "how can we punish 
a vrfiole ccxnmunity for what some minority has done?" On 31 
October 1984 the two Sikh body guards of Indira Gandhi sprayed 
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her with bullets. She died shortly afterwards and while her 
body was burnt on the funeral pyre, the city was also on fire 
as Hindus intent on revenge began to attack Sikh families 
and bum their houses, shops and businesses. The city was 
98 
red with blood, v^ile the policevatdied impassively. 
98. For details of the last years of Indira Gandhi, See 
Tariq Ali, n. 68, pp. 213-57. 
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LEADERSHIP CRISIS IN BANGLADESH 
Bangladesh/ like her other South Asian neighbours/ 
has a leadership crisis v^ nich is aggravated day by day to 
the extent that now it is the most acute one in the region. 
Bangladesh inherited this crisis partly frotn the days of Paki-
stan and partly it was the creation of the country's political 
leadership. This was unfortunate because the Bengalis had 
been known for their massive support to a single political 
organisation once they believed it deserved their confidence. 
This was shown in 1946 when they threw all their weight behind 
all India Muslim League v^ich ensured the landslide victory 
obtained by that party. It is also clear from the massive 
mandate received by Awami League under the charismatic leader-
ship of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman in the election of 1970. 
Another evidence can b<5 seen in the landslide victory 
won by the United Front in 1954 election when the ruling Mus-
lim League suffered the first defeat since independence by 
the Bengalis who were the main factor in the creation of Pakistan 
1. Mohammad Asghar Kham, Generals in Politics (New Delhi: 
1983), p.24. 
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jnder the leadership of Muslim League. This happened inspite 
of the efforts made by the party high commands to awake" the 
religious feeling of Bengalis. Miss Fatima Jinnah, the sister 
of the Ouaide- Azcim Mohammad Ali Jinnah; warned the Muslim 
voters against the communist and the Hindus whom she accused 
2 
of conspiring against the existence of Pakistan. Nurul Amin/ 
the Chief Minister of East Pakistan, went to the extent of 
describing the elections to be sort of referendum to decide 
the issue of whether East Pakistan would remain in existence 
or it would become a part of Bharat (India). -^  
This fear expressed by the high commands was not without 
foundation. A.K. Fazlul Haq who formed the Ministry of United 
Front in 1954 was accused of making utterances prejudiciary 
to the integrity of Pakistan. He reportedly said, 
I do not believe in the political division of the 
country. I am in fact not familiar with the two 
new words - Pakistan and Hindustan. When I speak 
of India, I mean both countries. Even today if 
people in the two countries realise how much they 
are to each other and work together ^^  no power in 
the world will be able to divide them. 
2. Dawn, 1 March, 1954. 
3. ibid, 2 March, 1954. 
4. Morning News, 6 May, 1954, 
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Mr. Fazlul Huq in refuting these allegations against him said 
that 
Althoi^ gh I may be a Pakistani/ there is nothing 
to prevent me from bringing about the best relations 
between the people across the border to encourage 
free intercourse between comntunities and to help 
each other as if political division had not taken 
place. This does not mean disloyality to Pakistan. 
It is very important to note that in Bangladesh as 
in Pakistan/ politics centred around personalities, the impo-
rtance of an office increased or decreased with the importance 
of the person vrtio held it. In Pakistan/ the office of Prime 
Minister, was supposed to be more important than the office 
of Governor General but because Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was 
the most important person in Pakistan, the office of Governor 
General became the most important in the country. But after 
the death of Jinnah, the natural thing happened and Liaqat 
Ali JChan, the Prime Minister, became inportant. 
Muslim political leaders in Bengal in the decade before 
the partition of the sub-continent and after the creation 
of Pakistan, centred around three personalities namely Mr. 
A.K. Fazlul Huq, Sir Khawja Nazimuddin and Mr. Hussain Shaheed 
5. Dawn, 8 May, 1954. 
6. A.F. Salahuddin Ahmed, "The Emergence of Bengladesh" in 
S.R. Chakravarty and Virendra Narain, ed., Bangladesh-
History and Culture, (New Delhi : 1986), p.142. 
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Suhrawardy. While the first was considered more or less a 
Bengali nationalist leader, the other two were considered 
all India Muslim leaders. Both of them were connected with 
Muslim League while A.K. Fazlul Huq was the leader of Krishak 
Praja Party or K.S.P. 
Fazlul Huq was bom in 1873 in a middle class family 
of Barisal and became famous as a benevolent lawyer in the 
Muslim society of Bengal where he used to offer free legal 
advices to the px)r Muslims in Bengal. He became popular 
and known as 'pro-peascint and Bengali nationalist' as well 
as a secular leader of India by acting "as an ardent advo-
cate of agreement for the settlement of Hindu - Muslim diffe-
7 
rences". Fazlul Huq became the first Muslim Mayor of the 
Calcutta Corporation. This was a significant event in the 
history of Muslim politics in Bengal. Later on he became 
the first Prime Minister of undivided Bengal and appeared 
on the political scene with a great mass appeal. Besides 
7. The Times, 28 April, 1962, 
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those three leaders mentioned above, there were other leaders 
who played significant roles in the Muslim politics in Bengal. 
Notable among them were Sir Abdur Rahim, Mojlana Akram Khfa, 
Nawab Khawaja Habibullah, Nowab Musharraf Hossain, Syed Nau-
sher Ali, Sharosuddin Ahmed, Sir Azizul Haq and Abdul Hashem. 
Sir Khawaja Nazimuddin who belonged to the Nawab family of 
Dhaka and who received higher education at Aligarh and Cambridge 
and became Prime Minister after resignation of Fazlul Huq 
in 1943. He was a strong sjpporter of Mohammad Ali Jinnah 
cind became the first Prime Minister of Pakistan from East 
Pakistan. But due to rivalry among Muslim leadership on one 
hcind and with the Congress on the other, Khawaja Nazimuddin 
was defeated by 18 menbers of his party deserting to the oppo-
Q 
sition in a snap vote en the 28 March, 1945. Hussain 
Shaheed Suhrawardy, leader of the BPML, was asked by Governor, 
Sir Frederick Burrous on 2 April 1946 to form a cabinet, which 
he did on 23 April consisting of 7 Muslim Leaders and 1 sche-
duled caste candidate. 
Muslim leaders in Bengal were divided on the question 
of one or more than one Pakistan. On 23 March 1940, at the 
Lahore session of the AIML, Mr. Fazlul Huq was called upon 
i. The War Cabinet Paper of Bengal, 5 April 1945, no.74, 
voi.V, p.784. 
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by Mr. Jinnah to move the significant resolution which formecl 
the basis of the establishment of Pakistan. The resolution 
envisaged Muslim majority independent states, in which consti-
9 
tuent units would be autonomous and sovereign. However, 
Lahore resolution was amended in a connection of all Muslim 
League members of the legislatures - central and provincial, 
at I>3lhi on 9 April 1946. This amendment was not accepted 
by many leaders especially from Bengal. Mr. Abul Hashim, 
General Secretary of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League 
raised voice of protest against the amendment of Lahore reso-
lution in the Convention. He challenged the Muslim League 
high command and said : "Was the connection a superior body 
to the all India Muslim League Council?" It was in the annual 
conference of the AIML on 23 March 1^40 that the original 
Lahore resolution was adopted. If there could be any amendment 
it should be made by the same body. Inspite of the oppo-
sition put forward by Fazlul Huq, Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim 
against one Pakistan, Jinnah with the help of other Bengali 
leaders like Khawaja Nazimuddin and Akram Khan succeeded 
in establishing Pakistan. C.H. Philips a prominent British 
political scientist wrote : 
9. For the full text of resoluriop., See Jamiluddin Ahmed, 
ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, (Lahore : 1960), 
vol.1, p.339. 
10. Bangalal Sen, "Elite Conflict and Muslim Politics in Bengal',! 
n.6, p.106. 
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Without Jinnah's leadership it seems likely that 
regionalism much as the proposal for a united and 
independent Bengal/ would have competed seriously 
with Muslim rationalism as the political aim of 
the province. Mr. Fazlul Haq, for exaiiple/ was,, 
never really reconciled to the partition of Bengal. 
The new state was run by the Indian Independence Act; 
1946 cind the Government of India Act/ 1935 which became the 
Interim Constitution of Pakistan. These two acts provided 
for a centralised system winich was not suitable for Pakistan 
as there were many differences between the two wings of the 
country and only a loose federation would have been suitable. 
The first serious problem v^ich faced the new state was 
the problem of the state Icinguage. This problen started even 
before the creation of Pakistan. When Dr. Ziauddin Ahmed/ 
a former Vice-Chancellor of the Aligarh University suggested 
that Urdu should be made the official language of Pakistan/ 
an angry and quick reaction came from a Bengali linguist of 
Dhaka University/ Mr. Shahidullah who wrote that if Urdu or 
Hindi instead of Bengali is used in our law courts and Univer-
12 
sities that would be tantamount to political slavery. The 
language mo/anent which started immediately after the birth 
of Pakistan was the seeds of Bangladesh. The movement reached 
11. ibid, p.110. 
12. Mohammad Shahidul lah / Amader Bhasha Sairassya ''Dhaka : 
1947) , p . 3 4 - 3 5 . 
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its zenith on 21 . February 1952 when few people were killed 
in the police firing and this led to a strong opposition against 
ruling Muslim League and in the election of 1954, the United 
Front obtained a landslide victory and formed the government 
in East Pakistan. This victory • aided Bengali nationa-
lism and the 1956 constitution of Pakistan recognised Bengali 
13 
as one of the state languages of Pakistan. Unlike the 
Pakistan movement in v^ich religion was the rallying syiitxDl 
for Muslims of the sub-continent, the Bangladesh movement 
was based on language to a large extent. This was stimulated 
partly by Indian design to undermine Pakistan and partly by 
the wrong policy adopted by the central leadership of Paki-
stan toward Bengali language. But the main reason for both 
the movements was the quest for liberty. Mokhdume-e-Mulk 
Mushrafi wrote, 
In fact the central question has always been liberty 
around v^ich people mobilised themselves and in 
doing so they used readily available - unifying 
ideas which varied according to prospective. 
It became religious sometimes, it became languages 
at other times and it could h.-ive b-aen any idea 
that had unifying potential, commensurate with 
the time in question, for the common material 
cause of a populace. Those were instrumental 
to the attainment of liberty and liberty always 
stands against material subjugation.^^ 
13. Rafiq-jl Islam, "The Language Movement", n.6, pp.152-155. 
14. Mokhd-jm-e-Mulk Mushrafi, "Problems of Consensus on National 
Identity in Bangladesh : Religion and Language", n.5, 
pp.218-219. 
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General Ayub Khan tried to make some reform in diff-
erent field especially in the field of language but all efforts 
ended in a fiasco/ due to the mass anti Ayub political upsurge 
in 1969 which brought his downfall. Zillur R. Khan wrote 
in his book — Leadership Crisis in Bangladesh that, 
For a time it seaned that the Ayub regime was try -
ing earnestly to do justice to the Bengalis in 
East Pakistan. In particular, his basic Darocracy 
Act of 1959 attempted to maintain a balance between 
East and West v^ iile at the same time trying to 
establish a political infrastructure at the grass-
root level. 
But unfortunately Ayub could not deliver the goods. 
He could not preserve a.nd protect the constitution which he 
gave to the nation and vrfiich have been appreciated by many. 
According to Asghar Khan, a Pakistani General turned politi-
cian. 
Ayub Khan had ruled the country for nearly a decade 
v^en towards the end of 1967 he was taken seriously 
ill. The President was unable to discharge his 
responsibilities and was unconcious for a few 
days. The constitution of the country wfiose ar-
chitect he himself was, laid down clearly that 
in such an event the Speaker of the National Asse-
mbly, Abdul Jabbar Khan - vrtio happended to be 
from East Pakistan - would act as President. 
When this did not happen, I impressed en those 
near the seat of power that such a violation would 
make a mockery of the constitution and push East 
15. Zillur R. Khan, Leadership Crisis in Bangladesh (Dr-.a.K.£; 
1984), p.7. ^ 
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and West Pakistan further apart. My advice fell 
on deaf ears. The Power game which had begun some 
years earli^, was to be played according to its 
own rules. 
This event, alongwith many others like the failure of the 
central government to introduce Bengali as a national language/ 
the unjust allocation of national resources to East Pakistan 
and the low representation of Bengalis in the central services 
particularly in higher appointments/ were matters which were 
deeply resented in East Pakistan. The East Pakistanis found 
good platform in Awami League under the charismatic leadership 
of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman. 
MUJIB LEADERSHIP , 
A close examination of Mujib leadership indicates that 
his leadership role was extranely complex and it seems worth-
while to study this complexity. Itie roost significant factor 
cibout the timing of Mujib's emergency as the main leader of 
East Pakistan is the fact that the Bengalis had been known 
for their massive support to a single political organisation 
once they believed it deserved their confidence. 
16. Asghar Khan, Generals in Politics (Delhi : 1983), p.12, 
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At the time of the Presidential election under 
Ayub Khcin's basic democracy system in 1964 Mujib 
was only one of the leaders of the Bengalis. By 
the time he launched the six-point programme in 
1966/ he was the foremost leader of Bengalis but 
still his leadership was not unchallenged. Oi 
24 February 1969/ Mujib became the symbol of Bengali 
hopes and aspirations. 
According to Newsweek/ 
He (Mujib) is a poet of politics/ not an engineer/ 
but the Bengalis tend to be more artistic than 
technical/ anyhow/ and so his style may be just 
what was needed ^ tp unite all classes and ideologies 
of the region. 
Kamal Hussain who was the Shaikh's constitutional adviser 
and later on his foreign minister says that/ 
It was Shaikh's unique advantage that he retained 
credibility with the young militants/ who respected 
him and overall for his political courage and for 
not being a 'Cc«nprc«niser' v^ile the elite groups 
began to S3e him as their 'last hcpe' as one who 
despite his full-blooded rhetoric which made him 
the champion of the Bengali masses/ was a 'Mandate' 
and would work within the framework of parliamentary 
democracy and contain the^  pressures for violent 
change of social structure. 
17. Al Khatib/ Who Killed Mujib? (New Delhi : 1981), p.140. 
18. Newsweek, 5 April, 1971. 
19. Quoted in Al Khatib, n.l7, p.142. 
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What was the philosophy of Mujib? Was he a communist/ 
a socialist or a capitalist? Mujib was a nationalist who 
belonged to Bangladesh. It was difficult even to imagine 
him as the Prime Minister of Pakistan sitting in Islamabad. 
Mujib was not a socialist in the beginning and certainly 
not a marxist / but he had a burning faith in Bangladesh and 
any cheinge in Bangladesh had to come through him. Once he 
had an argument about socialism with a journalist in Jail. 
"Do you know the meaning of socialism?" the journalist aisked. 
Mujib replied/ "If anyone brings socialism to this ccaintry 
20 it will be Shaikh Mujibur Rahman and not your Communist Party" . 
Complexity and contradiction were the main characteristics 
of his leadership. His failure was almost as great as his 
achievement. His leadership can be divided into two parts. 
The first part includes from the beginning of his career as 
a student leader till his freedom frcOT Pakistani pris<xi and 
his return to Bangladesh as the father of the new bom nation. 
The second part starts with his assumption of power as the 
head of the New Republic. Moudud Ahmed/ the present Prime 
Minister of Bangladesh has made a thorough and critical study 
of Shaikh Mujib regime in his book Era of Shaikh Mjijibur 
Rahman . He described him as the greatest p>henomenon of 
20. Al Khatib, n.l7, pp.145-146. 
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Bangladesh's history. He would continue to remain as a legend 
in the political life of Bangladesh. Be:igalis might have 
had leaders in their history more intelligent, more capable 
and more dynamic than Shaikh Mujibur Rahman but did not give 
so much to the Bengalis' political independence and national 
identity. It is Mujib VN^ IO in the end was able to identify 
himself not only with the cause of Bengalis but with their 
dreams. He became the symbol of Bengali nationalism which 
gave birth to a movement leading to an independent and sove-
reign identity. In vdiatever form, he maintained, Bangladesh 
exists. Whether or not socialism or capitalism or neo-tradi-
tionalism takes its root in the socio-economic structure 
of the country or whether there is a reactionary or revolu-
tionary Government, the fact that there is a country called 
Bangladesh is a sufficient testimony to Mujib's status as 
a legend of our age. 
Mujib as a human being had weaknesses and shortcomings. 
According to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, his main rival during the 
last days of United Pakistan and the one who freed him from 
Pakistani prison, Mujib was incapable, conceited, lacking 
in culture and common sense. He was in no position to resolve 
21, Mojd-jd Ahmed, Era of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman (Dhaka : 1952), 
p.253. 
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any problan either politically or socially or economically 
or internationally. He only knew how to shout Bhutto said 
that he never took him seriously; as there was no depth in 
him, no preparation. He was an agitator breathing a lot of 
fire and with cui absolute lack of ideas except that only idea 
22 
he ever had. Bhutto perhaps, was too extreme m his attack 
against Mujib because it seemed that Mujib had promised him 
to keep some relations with Peikistan which he did not keep. 
When an interviewer expressed her surprise at his mentioning 
the name of Bangladesh immediately after the secession of 
East Pakistan, Bhutto said : 
Obviously I say it with anger and scorn. Obviously 
for me it's still East Pakistan. But rightly or 
wrongly, cind even though, it's the result of a mili-
tary action by the Indians, fifty countries, have 
recognised . it. I must accept it. I am even ready 
to recognise it, if India gives us back our prisoners, 
if the massacre of the Beharis ends, if the federa-
lists aren't persecuted. If we are to reunite our-
selves in a federation, we must first establish 
diplOTTiatic ^relations. And I think that within 
ten or fifteen years, Pakistan and Bangladesh can 
abe reunited in a federation. Can and should, other-
wise v^o will fill the vacuum? West Bengal, which 
wants to separate frcOT India? There is nothing 
in ccamon between the East Bengalis and the West 
Bengalis. Between us and the East Bengalis/ on 
the other hand, there is religion in common. 
22. Oriana Fallaci, Interview with History (New York : 1977), 
pp.194-195. 
23. ibid, p.198. 
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So Bhutto was hoping for some kind of link between 
Pakistan and Bangladesh but Mujib did not show any sign 
of readiness to accept anything less than complete indepe-
ndence. Itie press conference which he held in London/ he 
concluded his statement by saying "I reassert that the existe-
nce of Bangladesh is an unchallengeable reality, and that 
our future relations with any other country will be based 
24 
on this fundamental reality." BhuttO/ in fact, had different 
opinion of Shaikh Mujib. It is less aggressive and more obje-
ctive. In his book "The Great Tragedy" which he wrote about 
one year earlier, he observed that, Mujib's character and 
personality would have to be studied closely. His airfcitions 
and prejudices required minute scrutiny. His background, 
his family life and his habits had to be examined, as also 
his abilities as a political leader. His strategy and tactics 
also required to bs noted carefully, he proclaimpd. For a 
25 
complex person, the study would be equally complex. In 
order to understemd the leadership of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman, 
one has to make a thorough study of his personality and career", 
v^ile analysing his success and failure v^ich enabled him 
to alter the map of the sub-continent and change the course 
of its history. 
24. Al Khatib, n.l7, pp.102-103. 
25. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Great Tragedy (Karachi : 1971), 
pp.64-65. 
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MUJIB'S EARLY LIFE AND FAMILY BACKGRCXJND 
Mujib was bom on 22 March, 1922 in a Bengali lower 
middle class Muslim fcimily in a remote rural village of Tungi-
para in Faridpur Zilla (now Gopalganj Zilla) of the eastern 
part of the province of Bengal of British India. His father 
Shaikh Lutfur Rahman was an enployee in a lower judicial 
court and his mother was a housewife. Mujib's early education 
was in Faridpur district. At the college level he left for 
Calcutta in 1942 and joined Islamic College there. He gradua-
ted in the year 1947, the year of Independence of both India 
and Pakistan. During his student life he was very much 
engaged in the movCTient of Pakistein. He played an irtportant 
role in the student m overoent of Muslim league. When he visited 
Calcutta for the first time, after becoming the Prime Minister 
of the new nation, he recalled that he spent some of the most 
formative years of his life in Calcutta as a student and also 
27 
as a student leader. Although the Muslim league and Mujib 
personally agitated for the rights of the Indian Muslims, 
Mujib's political views under the influence and guidance of 
26. Yatindra Bhatnagar, Mujib, The Architect of Bangladesh 
(Delhi : 1971), p.29. 
27. AI Khatib, n.l7, p.121. 
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Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy; were more for Bengali nationalism 
rather than Muslim nationalism but as the masses were working 
for Pakistan so, the politicians had no alternative but to 
follow the trends. There was at that time no indication what-
soever that the people of East Pakistan will ultimately rally 
round Shaikh Mujib for disintegration of the state that they 
themselves overv^elmingly voted for its creation in the polls 
of 1964. The reason for this is to be traced in the political 
development of Pakistan after 1947. According to Zillur R. 
Khan political stability came to India, but never to Pakistan. 
The Indicin National Congress had behind it a long political 
tradition, a solid political platform and well defined progra-
ime of political and social action. The Muslim League was 
basically concerned with mobilising the Muslim masses of India 
for one object only, namely, the winning of a separate homeland 
for themselves. This limited political objective, and the 
absence of a well-defined and widely based political platform 
made it difficult for the Muslim League to be pragmatic in 
its political actions aind practical strategies after inde-
pendence. Moreover, the style of its charismatic leader, 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah prevented intermediary leaders from sharing 
in an overall decentralised framework the party's dscision-
making process. As in many cases of charismatic leadership, 
the leadership gap thus created led to Jinnah s assumption 
of absolute and autocratic powers after the creation of Pakistan. 
This further limited the scope for political training for 
intermediary leacsrs and potential successors. The later 
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political instability of Pakistan could be attributed at least 
partially to this lack of opportunity for the appropriate 
grooming of middle level leaders for top leadership positions. 
In contrast, the Indian National Congress was a political 
movement which had historically expressed itself into a national 
party in every sense of the term/ having developed a viable 
platform and a grass root political infrastructure over more 
than 60 years of protracted political struggle prior to inde-
pendence. Diffusion and sharing of power by the top leadership 
created an apt atmosphere in which intermediary members of 
the party and its organisations could be trained for top 
leadership positions. The Congress party was quiet ready 
and politically prepared for the post-independence era. But 
the Muslim League was composed of Muslim elites of India without 
any significant organisational base and support at the mass 
level. In Bengal/ vrfiere Muslim League candidates received 
the strongest popular support/ the league's political and 
organisational weaknesses became even more pronounced and 
28 
manifested in the leadership sphere. 
28. Zillur R. Khan, n.l5, pp.1-2. 
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Although Mujib worked for the creation of Pakistan 
like other Bengalis, he was not satisfied with the poli-
cies adoapted by the leadership of the new state especially 
their intention to make Urdu as the official language of Paki-
stcin. Mujib was arrested in March 1948 v^en he was a law 
student, for leading a black-flag demonstration against Jinnah 
on the question of language. He was arrested again the follow-
ing year for leading a strike of lower-grade University emplo-
29 
yees after which he was rusticated frOTi the University. 
Mujib came to public prominence in 1954 when he was 
elected as mismber of provincial assembly from Awami League 
side as an important partner in the United Front Alliance. 
He was chosen as agriculture and development Minister in the 
provincial government headed by A.K. Fazlul Haq which was 
later dismissed by the central government in Karachi because 
of the feeling in West Pakistan that the United Front Mini-
stry in the East wing was moving towards separation and 
29. Al Khatib, n.l7, p.l. But this is being doubted by 
many people. According to them Mujib was a student 
leader in Calcutta but not in Dhaka at that time, 
he was trying to establish his leadership among the 
students but it was too early for hir to be arrested 
as student leader. Moreover, they say if he was a 
student leader, how would be lead lower grade univer-
sity employees for the language movement. Acccrding 
to them, he was arrersted on charges law and order. 
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because of series of riots which took place in the province 
between Bengali and Non-Bengali Muslims. Before the dismissal, 
the central government in Karachi summoned Fazlul Haq to the 
capital v^ere he gave an interview to the New York times 
correspondent J.P. Callahan Uiere he spoke about the desire 
30 
of East Pakistan to be independent. Mujib was elected again 
for the provincial assembly in 1956 and again joined Ataur 
Rahman Khan Ministry as Minister of Commerce and Industry 
but only for seven months. He h>ecame a central Minister in 
Malik Feroz Khan Noon's government for a short period as the 
Awami Leaguers thought that they were given em unimportant 
position in the government and therefore Mujib resigned in 
31 
1958. Mujib visited India in 1957 as a member of a Pakistani 
high-powered delegation. He was in favour of a better climate 
being created for good and neighbourly relation between the 
two countries. This can be seen from the fact that Mujib 
met both Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and President Rajendra 
Prasad. Shaikh Mujib's visit to India gave an opportunity 
to both parties to dis-^ uss many problems of mutual interests 
30. Gholam Morshed, "East Bengal Provincial Election of 
March 1954: Origin of Separatist Mo^ .^ ement in Efrt Pakistan," 
n.6, p. 127. 
31. Yatindra Bhatnagar, n. 26, pp. 25-26. 
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including the issues relating to flcxx3 control and the inpe-
diments to free flow of trade. Pakistan's fanatically anti-
India stance had all along opposed any trade relation with 
India because they thought it would only benefit India. Whenever 
they were told that it would be in East Pakistan's interest, 
their argument was that if that was so; the people of East 
Pakistan would begin to have a soft comer for India. That 
was the last thing Pakistani government was prepared to 
accept because on its hate India stance was based their entire 
popular support and political existence. E)uring this significant 
visit to India/ however, Mujib initiated talks relating to 
trade, friendship and matters of mutual interest as two good 
32 
neighbouring countries. Ten years later Mujib was accused 
of conspiring with India to work for secession of East Pakistan 
in the infamous Agartala conspiracy case, vrtiich assumed so 
much importance in Mujib's personal life and the history of 
Pakistan itself. The question here is whether Mujib's meeting 
with the Prime Minister and President of India was the beginning 
of his contacts with the Indians to achieve this aim or not? 
We shall discuss the Agartala conspiracy case in detail later 
on . Mujib became the absolute leader of Awami League after 
32. ibid, pp. 80-81. 
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the death of his mentor Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardv in 1964 
and till then not much was expected from him as his performance 
as Minister of the United Front government was not so good. 
He was known more as an agitator rather than as a statesman 
or administrator. But no doubt/ his courage and dynamic perso-
nality endeared him to the masses. According to Indira Gandhi 
the Indian Prime Minister, he was no mere individual. He 
was the symbol of the hopes and aspiration and urges of the 
people of Bangladesh who became the embodiment of the urges 
33 
and aspiration of the people of Bangladesh. 
THE SIX POINT PROGRAMME 
On February 5, 1966, the historical city of Lahore 
witnessed the seed of the dismemberment of Pakistan which 
was created as a result of the famour Lahore resolution adopted 
by All India Muslim League 26 years earlier in the same city. 
While A.K. Fazlul Haq moved the significant resolution which 
was the basis for the establishment of Pakistan, another 
33. ibid, p.224. 
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Bengali leader Shaikh Mujibur Rahman twenty six years later 
in 1966 put forward his feimous Six point programme which the 
basis for the establishiment of Bangladesh. It was during 
an all opposition conference held in Lahore after the war 
of 1965 with India that Shaikh Mujibur Rahman presented his 
Six point programme which, if studied thoroughly, would mean 
34 
the secession of East Pakistan. One can say that if Lahore 
Resolution is called "Pakistan Resolution" then the Six point 
programme can be called "Bangladesh Resolution". Why Mujib 
was not clear as Jinnah was in 1940 is because Mujib could 
not adopt Jinnah's clear - cut demand for a separate state 
as he was operating in entirely different circumstances. 
Therefore his strategy had to be a mild one. Nor was he sure 
whether the Muslims of East Bengal would opt for a separate 
state even in 1970 before the electorate. 
The vast majority of the Bengali intelligentsia, civil 
services and busines community would most likely back 
him even if he denanded a mandate for a separate state: 
but it was doi±)tful whether the Muslim voters of the 
rural areas would so easily give up their cherished 
ideals and ideology which had made them the most enthus-
iastic supporters of Jinnah in the plebiscitory election 
of 1946. It was only the army's ruthless atrocities 
34 G.W. Chowdhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan 
(London) , p. 133. 
185 
on the innocent villagers/ including their women and 
children/ ^ a t turned the whole of E^ist Bengal to 
sucession. 
The Six point programne was like many other political 
programmes - capable of many interpretation. There are different 
opinions of who was the author of the six-point programme. 
Rumours go to the extent that the Americans were behind it. 
Another was about the author Altaf Gauhar/ one of the most 
trusted and close members of the ruling elite during the Ayub 
regime that Ayub himself asked Altaf Gauhar to do this job 
at a time v^en there was great unrest in West Pakistan over 
the Tashkent Agreement/ and that Ayub wanted to divert the 
attention of West Pakistan by raising the spectre of the sece-
ssion of East Pakistan. However/ the basis of such rumours 
were questionable . It is doubtful/ that with his z»l; real 
patriotism could resort to such a 'trick'. With all his 
limitations/ Ayub no doubt was considered a great Pakistani 
leader and a stateman. A shrewd document like this was most 
likely the joint product of several intellectuals, advisers 
and associates of Mujib. A Bengali friend who was student 
35. ibid, pp. 136-37. 
36. ibid, p. 134. 
186 
leader during that period and who was against Awami League 
and against the six point told the author that, "Even those 
v^o were with Shaikh Mujib in Lahore to attend the opposition 
conference in February 1966 did not know about the six point 
prograinme till the next day of the conference when Mujib got 
37 
a paper from his pocket and read the programne. The Six point 
programme is as follows: 
1. The character of the government shall be federal and 
parliamentary in v^ich the elections to the federal 
legislature of the federating units shall be direct 
and on the basis of universal adult franchise. The 
representation in cur federal legislature shall be on 
the basis of population. 
2. Itie federal government shall be responsible only for 
defence and foreign affairs and subject to the conditiOTi 
provided in (3) below. 
3. Itiere shall be two separate currencies mutually or 
freely convertible in each wing for each region, or 
in the alternative a single currency, subject to the 
esb^ lidT-Bit of a federal reserve system in which 
The author asked Mr. Ataussamad, a well knouTi lournalist 
and correspondent of BBC in Dhaka about this story. 
His answer was that Shaikh Mujib was a secretive person 
by nature. He would tell each of his advisers part 
of his plan only. I^ egarding the author of the six 
point programme, Mr. Ataussamad is of the opinion that 
it was the product of several intellectual advisers 
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there will be regional federal reserve banks which 
shall devise measures to prevent the transfer of resources 
and flight of capital from one region to another. 
Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the fede-
rating units. The federal government shall be provided 
with requisite revenue resources for meeting the requi-
rement of defence and foreign affairs which would be 
automatically appropriable by the federal government 
in the manner provided, and on the basis of the ratio 
to be determined by the procedure laid down in the 
constitution. Such constitutional provisions would 
ensure government's revenue requirements and are not 
met consistently with the objective of ensuring control 
over fiscal policy of the governments of the federating 
units. 
Constitutional provisions shall be made to enable separate 
accounts to be maintained of the foreign exchange 
earnings of each of the federating units, under the 
control of the respective governments of the federating 
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units. The foreign exchauige requirements of the federal 
government shall be met by the governments of the fede-
rating units on the basis of a ratio to be determined 
in accordance with the procedure laid down in the cons-
titution. The regional government shall have power 
under the constitution to negotiate foreign trade and 
within the framework of the foreign policy of the country 
v^ich shall be the responsibility of the federed gover-
nment. 
6. The government of the federating units shall be empowered 
to maintain a militia or para-military force in order 
38 
to contribute effectively towards national security. 
"Hie Six-point programme was rejected by the partici-
pants in the conference of all opposition parties in Lahore 
as well as by the people of West Pakistan as they considered 
it a move towards secession. Even some Bengalis thocght it 
that way. Mr. G.W. Choudhury after analysing the sii-points 
wrote "In short/ under Mujib's six-point programme the centre 
was made a paper one; it would have not control over the country's 
fiscal monetary and budgetary policies or their execution. 
In external affairs, it made the work of foreign nanistry 
meaningless and the defence obligations of the centre would 
38. Yatind- • Bhatnagar, n. 26, pp. 255-56. 
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have worked something like those of the United iNfeticns depen-
dent on the federating units for financial contribution to 
enable it and to carry out any of its responsibilities in 
the defence of the country. So, my earlier contention that 
Mujib's six point plan was nothing but a mild scheme of sece-
ssion is borne out by any objective analysis of the pixpoeed. 39 
Mujib started a mass movement to mobilize support for his 
six point programme for which he was arrested but the movement 
went on under the leadership of other Awami League leaders 
like Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury, Syed Nazrul Islam, Amena Begum 
40 
and others. On 20 Jcinuary, 1968, the Agartala Conspiracy 
case was made public. Shaikh Mujib and others were accused 
of planning a secession of East Pakistan with the help of 
India. When the trial started in July 1968 in Dhaka it evoked 
a totally unexpected reaction in East Pakistan. 
Instead of branding Mujib as a traitor, he was made 
a hero. "The trial conferred such popularity on Mujib that 
41 
would otherwise have taken him lifetime to acquire. 
39. G.W. Chowdhury, n. 34, p. 136, 
40. Zillur Rahman Khan, n. 15, p. 13. 
41. Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender, (Karachi), pp. 
222-23. 
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The Agartala conspiracy case which was according to 
nany Bengalis invented by Ayub Khan regime to discredit Shaikh 
Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League and destory the six-point 
programme once for all, was in fact the beginning of the end 
not only for Ayub Khan and his regime but also for the iJhited 
Pakistan as the largest Islamic country of the world. This 
was mainly because it was given too much importance by Ayub 
regime in the beginning but later on this importance came 
down when Ayub Khan called for round teible conference to 
discuss the problems faced by the country and among the united 
parties was Awami League who - refused to attend unless the 
league's Chief Shaikh Mujib vas freed. Ayub Khan in the beginning 
allowed Mujib to attend the conference without the withdrawal 
of the case but the agitation launched by the supporters of 
Awami league forced him to withdraw it. This created more 
doubt about the case and the public opinion turned against 
Ayub and in favour of Mujib. G.W. Chowdhury wrote: 
So a dramatic turn occured while the plane was ready 
to tcike Mujib to Rawalpindi and the leaders were already 
at Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi Airports waiting 
to meet Mujib, he turned his face and demanded his 
release before he would participate in the R.T.C., 
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Ayub had no choice. The final step was also taken: 
The Agartala case was withdrawn and Mujib went to partiirp 
cipate in the R.T.C. as free man who was also a victor • 
The R.T.C. failed inspite of a proposed deal between 
Ayub and Mujib according to v^ich Mujib would be made Prime 
Minister of Pakistan under a parliamentary system and with 
regional autonomy for the East wing. This deal could not 
succeed due to the opposition to it by Bhutto who already 
became powerful cind Bhashani on one side and the general in 
the GHQ on the other. Bhashani who sufported Ayub earlier 
because of his reajprochment with China withdrew his support 
due to his later move to have secret deal with Mujib through 
Haroon brothers v^o were rehabilitated by Ayub and who were 
on good teons with Mujib although they were belonging to the 
43 
twenty two families. According to Ashgar Khan the R.T.C ended 
on a successful note but the intelligence both civil and military 
which was by now under full control of Yahya Khan fed Ayub 
with the information v^ich the former wanted to feed the latter 
v^o was convinced that the law cind order situation in the 
country had deteriorated to an extent that the holding of 
42. G.W. Chowdhury, n. 34, p. 37 
43. ibid, p. 38 
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elections and treinsfer of power to civilians was no more prac-
ticable. Therefore he thought that the only solution would 
be martial law but it seemed that it had happened more than 
ten years earlier when Sikander Mirza reached the same conclusion 
and imposed martial law which resulted in his departure and 
the succession of Ayub Khan. Yahya, who was waiting for the 
opportunity to come, got it at last. He met the President 
and told him: 
Itiat if the army was to be used and martial law imposed, 
he eis the hept^  of the army must be in effective control 
of national affairs. As Chief Martial Law Administra-
tor, he must, he argued, direct and control the entire 
government machinery. It did not teike long for Ayv±> 
Khan to get the message. The aging Field Marshal who 
was so fond of quoting frcMii history, albeit to promote 
his political philosophy and interest could see history 
being repeated. Of course, the roles Jhad changed 
and this time he was at the receiving end. 
This was not to surprise anyone. It was very much 
expected. S. Nihal Singh, a correspondent of the Indian E)aily, 
who was in Pakistan at that time, wrote in his paper that 
a question often asked in Islamabad was "After Ayub who?" 
44. Asghar Khan, n. 16, p. 15, 
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The answer/ he wrote, "is sinple. Whoever happens to be the 
45 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army at that time." Yahya 
Kheui happened to be the army chief emd it was he who gave 
an assurance that there would be a "smooth transfer of power 
to the representatives of the people freely nle-t<=d and imparti-
46 
ally on the basis of adult franchise. " For the purpose 
he introduced legal framework order (LFO) on 30 March, 1970, 
outlining the principles which would guide the conduct of 
47 
the elections as well as the National Assenfcly. The legal 
framework order vas criticisad especially in East Pakistan. 
Ttie leadership of Awami League, two factions of NAP, and other 
political, student and labour organisations denanded revision 
of the undemocratic provisions of the legal framework order. 
Itiey were particularly opposed to any restriction upon the 
sovereignty of the National Assembly or the powers of the 
48 
elected representatives of the people. Mujib accepted the 
45. ibid, p. 14. 
46 The Dawn 27 March, 1969. 
47. ibid, 31 March, 1970. 
48. The Morning News, 5 April, 1970. 
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L.F.O. after learning what had gone from Ahsan and because 
49 
the L.F.O. did not violate the demands of any group or party. 
But in fact the acceptance of Mujib was not real one. His 
real aim was contrary to what he was saying in public. When 
his party was defeating Yeihya's Schane of power under the 
legal framework order of 1970/ M.ujib was reported to have 
said to his inner cabinet that his sole aim was to establish 
Bangladesh. Yahya was presented with a taperecorded account 
of these talks of Mujib with his close associates. Mujib 
was clearly heard to say : "My aim is to establish Bangladesh; 
I will teaur the L.F.O. into pieces as soon as the elections 
are over. Who could diallenge me once the elections are 
over?". He also hinted to his colleagues about help from 
"outside sources" presinicibly from India. When Yahya listened 
to this and other details from his intelligence services/ 
he was bewildered. He could easily recognise Mujib's voice 
and the substance of his recorded talk. The next morning 
he was still in a bewildered state; but he was never a serious 
administrator/ so he soon recovered fran his shock: "I shall 
51 fix Mujib if he betrays me". All this unpleasant development 
49. G.W, Chowdhurv-, n.34, p.95, 
50. ibid, p.98. 
195 
did not deter Yahya from going on to fulfill his promise of 
holding "free and fair elections Non-Awami League leaders 
including Bhasani could sense the danger but they were not 
in a position to do anything as Yahya would only please Mujib, 
listen only to Mujib/ and expect good only from Mujib. The appeal 
made by the Non-Awamy League leaders including Nurul Amin 
to postpone the election was not honoured by Yahya and he 
even did not grant them an interview. Bhashani was ready 
to support the postponement of the election and his party 
51 
raised the slogan of "food before vote". Although, Bashani 
and his party put up 39 candidates for the election, hardly 
one week before the election they withdrew. Bashani stated 
that the collective heart of the NAP held so copiously for 
the cyclone victims that he had directed his candidates to 
dedicate themselves to relief work, rather than elections 
So, Awami League candidates formed a single major group, v^ich 
was followed by a combination of several right wing parties. 
As both factions of NAP could neither unite th^nselves, nor 
could they alone nominate candidates for all constituencies, 
the election battle, specially in East Pakistan came to be 
fought between the AL and the above mentioned rightest poli-
52 
tical groups. Many political observers suggest that the 
51. ibid, p.101. 
52. Rangalal Sen, Political Elites in Bangladesh (Dhaka 
1986), pp.259-263^: 
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success of AL was astonishing and this could not have been 
possible, had there been no floods and cyclone in August and 
November, 1970, and had Maulana Bhashani not withdrawn suddenly 
from the election only a week before. The rightist parties 
were disunited and as they were working for the unity of the 
country, they were taken as ready supporters and agents of 
the government. In fact they also were for genuine regional 
autonomy for East Pakistein but they were not going to the 
extent of Mujib's six-point programme. They had faced enor-
mous financial difficulties and had no real support from 
the Bengali Press. The Bengali urban elite composed of the 
intelligence, journalists, writers, government officials and 
businessmen, were solidly behind Mujib v^o was considered 
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as the future leader. All efforts to postpone the elections 
did not succeed since it could not gain the popular support. 
It had to be held without the participation of Maulana Bhashani 
and his party with the rightist parties disunited and the 
waves of Awami League swept the voting centres. Out of 162 
general seats from East Pakistan in the National Assembly, 
Awami league was 160. Of the remaining two seats one was 
won by Nurul Amin, East Pakistan Chief of PDP and the other 
53. G.W. Chowdhury, n.34, p.121. 
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by the tribal Chief of the Chittagong Hill Tract. M.B. 
Naqvi wrote in the South Asian Review that "1970 elections 
became the occasion for a revolutionary upsurge. I^e voters 
were united behind a single party and gave Awami League its 
extraordinary 160 seats. 
AL had accurately assessed the prevailing mood and 
popular feeling of the simple and not much differentiated 
electorate of East Bengal. It was predominantly a manifesta-
tion of East Bengali nationalism, which in terms of social 
composition could be seen as almost wholly lower middle class 
or in other words, petty bourgeoisie. It was emotionally 
polarised against the ruling class of West Pcikistan and was 
given to radical action and to slogans. Ilie leadership was 
55 
entirely middle cind lower middle class. After the election 
both the government eind Awami League started advocating their 
understanding of v^at the constitution would look like. The 
Yahya regime had in mind the five point on which the L.F.O. 
was based, while Awami League began to insist on the Six 
point programme. It was difficult for Yahya to reconcile his 
five point programme with the six point plein of Shaikh Mujib. 
54. Rangalal Sen, p.262. 
55. Asian Review, vol.IV, no.3, April 1971, p,223. 
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There was no doubt that the provisions for one Pakistan as 
laid down in the L.F.O. or for that matter any concept of 
a United Pakistan was irreconcilable with Mujib's six point 
plan. Ttje whole political dialogue between Yaihya and Mujib 
from 1969 up to their crucial meeting in January 1971 after 
the elections were over/ was based on Mujib's 
56 
unqualified and repeated pledge to modify his Six-point plan. 
There were many vrfio still believed that there were 
secret agreanents between Yahya and Mujib. Mujib they suspe-
ected might becane the Prime Minister of Pakistan and Yeihya 
Khan could ranain as the President. According to this agree-
ment Yahya did not heed to all calls for the postponement 
of the election which was made by many rightist parties and 
even by people like Maulana Kiashani who found that all signs 
were in favour of Mujib and his Awami League and who strongly 
believed that if Awami League came victorious in the election/ 
the Six-point programme would be implemented and East Paki-
stan would be seceded from Pakistan. These accusatiorfe of 
secret agreement between Yahya eind Mujib went to the extent 
that all circumstcinces were created by the government that 
Awami League would sweep the election including allowing them 
56. G.W. Chowdhury, n.34, p.138. 
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to rig the elec±ion. Although the armed forces were supposed 
to supervise the polls but instruction reached from Islama-
bad that "(a) don't involve yourself with polling; (b) keep 
a watch on key points; (c) stay in the background so that 
your public appearance does not provoke an angry reaction 
57 
and (d) act only to quell riot". The Army had, of course, 
contributed to the peaceful conduct of the polls by leaving 
the polling stations in the total control of the Awamy League 
and its synpathizers. Ttie polling and presiding officers 
also did not want to annoy their future rulers. In fact, 
the candidates contesting against the Awami League had a 
tough time. They had neither the party strength to counter 
the Awami League volunteers nor the protective untorella of 
the government. Some aggrieved candidates approached the 
army but got no redress because the army had instructions 
not to involve itself in the polls unless large-scale violence 
erupted. Salik Siddiq cited two typical cases. A twelve 
year old boy, raising JCfY BANGLA slogans, advanced to the 
polling booth at Chaumuhani (in Noakhali District). He was 
grabbed by a Non-Awami League candidate and produced before 
57. Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender (Karachi : 1977), 
p.2/. 
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Captain Chowdhury who waited with his platoon in the rear 
of the building. The candidate conplained that (a) the boy 
was too young to vote and (b) he was raising slogans within 
the polling station; violating the rules. The Captain said, 
"Go and report to the presiding officer. I am not supposed 
to intervene in such matters". The second incident pertains 
to Tangail where one Rahmcin was brought before Major Khan 
with the complaint that he was going to cast his vote for the 
fifth time with the connivance of the polling officer. The 
Major said, "You may be right but that is not my headache. 
Tell me if there is amy riot. There is no riot, thanks to 
CO 
the AWAMI LEAGUE GCXXTOAS (strong-arm boys)". 
There is widespread evidence to suggest that the 1970 
election was neither fair nor free. Mr. Abdul Salam, a busi-
nessman from ISiaka told the author that his servant casted 
his vote nine times and there was ncAxjdy to stop him. Another 
resident of Dhaka city confessed that his peon casted his 
vote 17 times. HP also said that his wife was appointed 
as presiding officer in one voting centre, where around 10 
a,m- Kazi Ghulam Mostafa a strong supporter of Shaikh Mujib, 
entered the voting centre with about 20 Goondas and started 
58, ibid, p.28. 
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stanping the papers. She called the police officer in the 
area zmd informed hint about what was happening but the officer 
refused to act. 
If at all, the rumours that there was a secret agree-
ment between Yahya and Mujib were true, who betrayed the 
other? While Yahya Khain congratulated the parties which won 
the election and reported to have said that Shaikh Mujibur 
Rahman was to be the future Prime Minister of Pakistan, Shaikh 
Mujib declared that he would now get down to framing a consti-
tution which would guarantee full regional autonomy on the 
basis of his party's Six-point formula. Such a cc»istitution, 
he said, had to be framed and implemented in all aspects. 
Referring to the resounding victory of the Awami League, he 
said that this verdict of the people was in fact a referendum 
59 
on his party's six point and 11 points of the students. 
Bhutto was opposing the six-point and was insisting that his 
party was the majority one in West Pakistan and therefore 
he must share power with Awami League. He met Shaikh Mujib 
in the last week of January 1971 but the meeting ended in 
a deadlock because Bhutto was not prepared to accept these 
points v^ich relate to the transfer of control over taxation, 
foreign exchange and foreign trade to the provinces. He thought 
59. Jamna Das Akhtar, The Saga of Bangladesh (Delhi : 1971), 
p.261. 
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that if these svibjec±s were taken over from the centre it 
would be inpossible to pursue an effective foreign policy. 
Bhutto made it clear that 
If power were to be transferred to the people before 
any constitutional settlement/ as demanded by Shaikh 
Mujibur Rahman, it should be transferred to the majo-
rity in East Pakistan and the majority in West Paki-
stan...In the situation faced by Pakistan, having 
a geographical distance between the two parties, 
the rule of majority did not apply. Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto thus made nonsense of the concept of Pakistan 
and set the stage for Yahya Khan's talks at Dhaka. 
Lieutenant General S.G.M. Peerzada, a close friend 
of Bhutto, who was the Principal officer of Yahya Khan informed 
the governor about the intention of the President to postpone 
the assentoly session to allow more time to political parties 
to hammer out agreenent on the draft constitution outside 
the assembly. For this purpose, Mujib was apprised with the 
President's intention. His reaction was reasonable. he 
said, 
I will not make an issue out of it provided I am 
given a fresh date. It is very hard for me to handle 
the extremists within the party. If the new date 
is some time next month (March), I will be able to 
control the situaticxi. If it is in April, it will 
be rather difficult. But if it i|2 an indefinite 
postponement, it will be impossible. 
60. ibid, p.264. 
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Itie announcenient of the postponement of the national 
assembly was made on first March without saying anything about 
the new date. There were many rumours that there was pressure 
on the President by Army Generals to make the announcement 
without fixing new date. Siddiq wrote that 
Yahya was under pressure from the hawkish Generals, 
Mujib from his extrendsts and Bhutto from the elect-
orate : who was then a free agent? How much one 
yields to such pressures and how much freedom of 
action one retains, gives the measure for a nian,-
who seeks the responsibilities of a national leader." 
Within half em hour after the announcement came the 
angry reaction. Allusive slogans were raised, shops of non-
B^igalis were looted and vehicles were destroyed. Mujib addre-
ssed a press conference eind declared that "We cannot let it 
go unchallenged". He called for conplete hartal OTI 2 March 
in Dha]ca and all over the country on 3 March and promised 
to spell out his future course of action at a public meeting 
CXI 7 March, alien he went to the goverronent house to ask for 
a fresh date saying "I assure you there is still time". 
Some of the government officials proved to be helping 
64 
Awami League. It is reported that the Chief Secretary Shafiul 
63. ibid, p. 44. 
64. ibid, fp.44-45. 
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Azam rang up General Fonnan Ali and requested him that the 
army should be called out to control the situaticMi. Although, 
the General rejected the request saying that the situation 
should be handled by the normal law enforcing agencies. The 
same attenpt was made by the Home Secretary, when Shafiul 
Azam repeated his request, the General asked him if he had 
consulted Shaikh Mujib. The answer was in the affirmative. 
The army agreed and curfew was announced and enforced. Awami 
League workers were organised in order to violate it. While 
the troops were under strict orders not to open fire, Awami 
League workers seemed to be under equally strict order*; to 
provoke firing. It was reported that an army officer said 
that he felt as if his hands were tied and he was thrown into 
the fire. Troops were jeered at and abused. "Riey were still 
obeying orders not to shoot. But their patience soon reached 
its limits. !Itiere were many stories about the atrocities 
which were comnitted by Awami League workers against the non-
Bengalis in East Pakistan during the period from 1 March 
to 25 March, 1971. Matiur Rahman wrote in his book Bangla-
desh Today ; An Indictment and Lament that there was no 
atrocity that was avoided, no cruelty that was not perpe-
-G 
65. ibid, p. 46. 
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trated/ no indecency that was not practised. Men were known 
to have been sliced upon, flayed alive/ slowly cheeped up; 
women to have been raped, to have had their breasts ripped 
off; children to have had their arms or legs anputated or 
to have been thrown on raging pyres, girls were molested before 
the eyes of their parents and then shot before the assailants 
dealt with the latter. Even today fresh stories of indescri-
bable atrocities continue to pourinto popular memory and settle 
down in the folklore of the pecple who suffered but were lucky 
enough to survive. The eye-witnesses still describe the atro-
cities which have been deeply etched in their menory. In 
such a situatiwi/ confrontation between the army and Awami 
League workers was historically unavoidable and indeed it 
was inevitable. Tlie last attetnpt was made by the President 
when he called for a conference on March 10 to be attended 
by political leaders. Bhutto and Abdulqum welccwned it but 
Mujib rejected the invitation saying that he did not intend 
to sit with perpetrators of mass murder. Talking to newsmen 
he asked how he could attend when dead bodies were still sca-
ttered about and gun shots were still echoing in the people's 
ears. In these circvnnstances, according to Mujib, the call 
for a conference was nothing short of a cruel joke. 
66. ibid, p.96. 
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Awami League came out with a new proposal on 24 March 
according to which it abandwied its previous proposal of consti-
tution coimiittees and instead/ on constitution conventions, 
•niese caiventions were to draw up two constitutions for East 
Pakistan and West PcOcistein, and the National Assembly was 
to meet to integrate these constitutions into a "Confedera-
tion of Pakistan". Itie government was convinced that Awami 
League had progressively raised its stakes from provincial 
autonony to the constitutional breeik up of Pakistan. In the 
mean time/ Tajuddin Ahmed/ General Secretary of Awami League 
declared that his party had submitted its final proposals 
68 
and had nothing to add or negotiate. 
In such circumstances; the army had forgotten what 
its true professional functions were. It thought it could 
bring the situation under control by punishing the rebels; 
it never bothered to consider how the excesses of which it 
was guilty could undo its basic aim, which was the preserva-
69 
tion of the solidarity of Pakistan. 
68. Saddiq Salik, n.57, p. 68. 
69. Katiur Rahman/ Bangladesh Today : An Indictment and 
Larient (Dhaka : 1974), p.46. 
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The army used crude methods which alienated friends 
and did not succeed in exterminating enemies. It aj^ared 
to be retaliating in blind flurry against the insults/ taunts/ 
humiliation emd provocation which it had to endure for months. 
It struck madly at the Bengalis in general forgetting that 
the Awami League was not to be equated with the entire Benga-
lis. Not only that* but the army faile to arrest any member 
of Awami League executive with the exception of Shaikh Mujibur 
Rahmein himself who claimed later to have surrendered volun-
tarily. "^^ 
Whether Shaikh Mujibur surrendered himself or not/ 
it was a fact that no single manber of Awami League other 
than Mujib was arrested. All of th«n escaped to India vrtiere 
they got shelter and later founded the "Government in Exile". 
Most of the people who suffered as a result of the crack down 
were ordinary people many of whom were not even supporters 
of Awami League, ttie army officers who planned what was really/ 
as they claimed/ the pre-enptive strike of March 25/ seemed 
to have been concerned with the iimiediate effects of their 
action rather tha" with its long-range conseq-jences or its 
impact on the psychological unity as a nation. The enemy/ 
70. ibid, p-47. 
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they set out to crush/ had been trying to convince the Bengalis 
that the Pakistan army was an army of occupation/ consisting 
of mercenaries who had nothing but utter contenpt for the 
language/ culture and way of life of this region. The antty 
behind fury/ failed to make a distinction between the Awami 
League and those who believed in Pcikistan. Its inability 
to persuade ordinary folk that it was trying desperately to 
save a cherished ideal/ reinforced Mujib's case and was a 
measure of the success of his political strategy. 
India's purpose in manoeuvering the province into an 
armed conflict was to alienate the army conpletely from the 
people/ provoke atrocities/ and ensure the destruction of 
its economy. Mujibur Rahman's followers helped India to rea-
71 lise all that she wanted or wished for. 
The military crack down was an appeir^ rt defeat of the 
B«igalis and many people believed that Pakistan's unity had 
been preserved and the trouble had ended cxice for all. Z.A. 
Bhutto who was in East Pakistan on the night of March 25 left 
Dhaka under heavy security measures and when he reached West 
72 
Pakistan, he said, "Ihahk. God Pakistan has been saved". But 
71. ibid, p.47. 
72. Asghar Khan, p.34. 
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in fact, the real trouble had just started as an all out popu-
lar revolution had started due to the atrocities conmited 
by the army which turned the whole Bengali population against 
Pakistan as a whole. In such circumstances many fled to India 
for safety. Itie problem of refugees gave India good excuse 
to take immediate action against Pakistan. India used this 
problem strategically and .prepared the world public opinion 
in her favour especially when she found that without her direct 
involvement, the Mukti Bahini could not deliver the goods. 
Without India's arm and sanctuary, Bangladesh might 
have remained a distant dream of Bengali nationa-
lists for many years to :coroe. Just as the Pakistan 
army's brutal atrocities can never be condoned, 
similarly, India's role was contrary to all the 
basic princuiles of the U.N. Oiarter and intema-
ticxial law. 
While all the prominent leaders of Awami League fled 
to India, Mujib wcis captured by the army aind was teiken to 
West Pakistan and k^Jt in an appartment which was used by 
important political detainees in Lyalipur, near Mianwali 
the Punjab prison. Although, he was not allowed to read news-
papers and listen to the radio, he had the entire library 
of the governor of Punjab at his disposal, A.K. Brohi along 
with four assistants defended hirr on the request of Yahya 
73. G.W. Chowdhury, n.34. 
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Khan. This shows that it is not true that Mujib refused to 
defend himself and he was kept in a cell where there was not 
74 
even a mattress to sleep on. According to Bhutto the special 
tribunal/ which had tried him/ found him guilty and it was 
left to Yahya Khan to decide on the sentence/ which could 
have been five years or life inprisonment or the death penalty 
but Yahya decided nothing as the war had broken out and he 
75 had plenty of other things on his mind. 
Ihe break up of Pakistan in 1971 was due to internal 
socio-economic cind political problems, which vas accumulating 
since its foundation as the largest Muslim state in the world 
in 1947. Yet outside influences and factors played a substan-
tial part in the dismeBnbennent of Pakistan. The tragic happe-
nings in Pakistan v^ich began in March 1971 and ended in 
DecaT±>er of that year were also mounted by the selfish atti-
tude of politicians from both wings and wrcMig cations adopted 
by the military Junta in Islamabad. The Indian desire to 
settle old accounts with Pakistan contributed towards v^at 
had happened. For that reason, India sought the help of the 
Soviet Union v^ich was not happy with Pakistan because of 
74. See Oriana Fallaci, n.22, p.195. 
75. ibid, p.196. 
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the latter's contribution towards the rapproachment between 
China and the U.S.A. Both U.S.A. and China were considered 
as friends of Pakistan and were thought to come to its rescue 
in the time of need but nothing was done by any one of thetn 
v^en the fall of Dhaka was eminent. This led to lowering 
the morcile of the Pakistan army auid encouraged India to fulfil 
76 
its plan to break up Pakistan. 
Yahya Khan and his colleagues in Islamabad kept promi-
sing the Eastern Command of help both moral and material but 
ultimately sent them a telegram leaving then to their fate. 
When the telegram was received by E^aka/ it was clear that 
nothing could be done. General Niazi and his colleague tried 
to get a ceasefire but it was too late eind ceasefire was acce-
pted by the Indians on cxie conditions, that is surrender of 
Pakistan forces to the Indian army. Siddiq Salik described 
the surrender in the following sentences : 
Genered Niazi sent Major General Jamshed to receive 
Nagra (Indian Generad). He asked our troops at 
Mirpur Bridge to respect the ceasefire and allow 
Nagra a peaceful passage. The Indian General ent-
ered Dhaka with a handful of soldiers and a lot 
of pride. That was the virtual fall of Dhaka 
In the early afternoon, General Niazi drove to 
Dhaka Airport to receive Lieutenant General Jagjit 
Singh Aurora, Commander of Indian Eastern Coimiand. 
76. For details, see G.W. Chowdhury, n.34, p.214. 
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A sizeable crowd of Bengalis rushed forward to 
garland their 'Liberator' and his wife. Niazi 
gave him a military salute and shook hands. it 
was a touching sight. Tine victor emd the vanqu-
ished stood in full view of the Bengalis, who 
made no secret of their extreme sentiments of 
love and hatred for Aurora and Niazi respectively... 
Amidst shouts, and slogans, they drove to Ramna 
Race Course (Suhrawardy Ground) where the stage 
was set for surrender ceremony. The vast ground 
bubbled with emotional Bengali crowds. They were 
all keen to witness the public humiliation of 
a West Pakistani General. The occasion was also 
to formalise the birth of Bangladesh...The surren-
der deed was signed by Lieutenant General Aurora 
and Lieutenant General Niazi in full view of 
nearly one million Bengalis and scores of foreign 
media men. Then they both stood up. General 
Niazi took out his revolver and handed over to 
Aurora to mark the capitulation of Dhaka. With 
that, he handed over East Pakistan... 
After the surrender of the Pakistani army in East Paki-
stcin and the birth of Bangladesh, Yahya Khan had to go as 
the army was badly humiliated. It was not possible for any 
Army General to take over from him. So, the only alternative 
was Hiutto and his party whic±» conmanded the majority in West 
Pakistan in the last election. On 20 December, Bhutto took 
over from Yahya Khan as the President of Pakistan. After 
becoming President, he met M-jjib and told him that he became 
the President of Pakistan ana the Chief Ifertial Law Administrator. 
77. Siddiq Salik, n.41, pp.210-13. 
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It is reported that Mujib asked him/ "When did they make you 
78 
a General". Bhutto freed Mujib on 8 January, 1972 and was 
taken to London by PIA flight. Two days later/ he arrived 
in Dhaka amidst wild rejoicing after passing via Delhi where 
he was received by Indira Gandhi. 
There were several reasons for Bhutto's action. There 
were pressures from great powers beside some pressures from 
within Pakistan to free Mujib as a good gesture so that the 
case of Pakistani prisoners of war would be looked sympathe-
ticcilly. Bhutto also had some expectation that Mujib might 
reciprocate by coc^ jerating with him to establish closer ties 
79 betwe^i the two countries. There was a leadership vacuim 
in the new bom country and csily Mujib could fill that vaccum. 
If Mujib did not return on time to Bangladesh/ there would 
have been a power struggle and in that case the Indian army 
would have found reasons to stay cxi. If Mujib was killed 
by the Pakistan army, he would have be«i immortal and he 
would have been considered as the greatest martyr in the Bengali 
history, but the cost to the people would have been much 
80 higher. Like any country which came out of a devastating 
78. AI Khatib, n.l7, p.100. 
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war, Bangladesh was facing innumera±>le economic and social 
problems. Mujib had to face those problems and find suitable 
solutions to them. He started with the most pressing problem 
first/ the law and order situation. The first step in this 
direction was to get the guerrillas surrender their arms to 
the government authority. He succeeded in this regard to 
a large extent with the exception of some Maoist groups in 
the northern region where the army was ordered to take action 
81 
and as a result, fifty to sixty Maoists were killed. Another 
problem which Mujib faced, was that of Beharis in Bcingladesh. 
As has been mentioned earlier, the Beharis were the main 
tcirget of the Awami League workers before the army crackdown 
on Meorch 25, 1971. There was a sense of insecurity among 
the B^aris after the surr«K3er of the Palcistan army. So 
some pockets of Beharis gave tough resistance and refused to 
surrender their arms. Hie Mujib government had to deploy 
the regular army in areas like Mirpur and Mohammadpur in Dhaka 
with specific orders to make Beharis surrender their arms. 
82 The army had to use Mortars and even to lay seige. There 
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were many other problems which Shaikh Mujib had to handle. 
Rehabilitation of the refugees who had fled to India during 
the nine months civil war, restccaticn of roads, bridges ancj^  
railway lines v^ich were destroyed during the war, putting 
the economy back on the rails, the presence of the Indian 
army in the country, the issue of the Pakistani prisoners 
of war and the issue of the so-called collaborators were some 
of the problems v^ich the new government under the leadership 
of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman had to face and continued to face 
almost till the last days of his regime. No solution was 
readily available because Awami League had no definite social 
or economic programme except the Mcinifesto prepared during 
1970-71 election. Even during the civil war period, the 
government in exile did not make any plan according to which 
go 
the country could have been steered towards stability. 
ECC»01IC POLICY 
As Awami League claimed to establish 'Socialist Economic 
Order' it had to do scxnething to justify its claim. So, the 
abandoned property order was promijlgated soon after the birth 
of the new state; later on laws of Nationalisation of Banks, 
Insurance Companies and Major Industries were passed which 
brought 80 to 85 percent of the Nation's entire industrial, 
bsn-drc and insurance companies under direct government control. 
83. Moudud Ahmed, n. 21, p. 12. 
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These laws and orders were misused by the workers of Aweimi 
Le^ue and led to the ultimate failure of the economic policies 
84 
of Shaikh Mujib government. 
FOREIGN POLICY 
In the sphere of foreign policy'. Shaikh Mujibur Rahman 
declared that his foreign policy was that of Non-alignment 
but in fact/ he adopted a pro-India/ Pro-RLJSsian policy. 
This was mainly because of the historical and geograpiiical 
factors and because/ Bangladesh would not have been created 
had there been no Indian intervention. The Pakistan army 
surrenderd not to the Banglade^i army or to the freedom fighter 
but to the Indian army. So/ many thought that India may not 
withdraw its forces from Bangladesh but infact by March 1972 
all Indian forces left Bangladesh. When Indira Gandhi visited 
DhaJca for the first time a friendship treaty Wcis signed by 
the two countries. "Complaints are often aired in Bangladesh 
that India imposed on it the Friendship treaty of 1972. However, 
sources close to Shaikh M-jjibur Rahmar. suggest an entirely 
different story. Rather thar. being pressured, Shaikh was 
84. For details, see ibid, pc. 13-20. 
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the one v*io approached Indira Gandhi on such treaty and on 
his insistence, the friencship treaty was signed during the 
Indian Prime Minister's first visit to Bangladesh. Mujib's 
insistence on signing the treaty may be explained in two 
ways. First/ Mujib wanted to show independence. He further 
belie.^ that the act of signing a treaty would cfermstrate 
that Bangladesh was capable of managing its own affairs and 
making decisions on its own. Second/ it is argued by many 
in Bangladesh that Mujib may have wanted Indian support in 
85 
any future political upheavals in his country. However/ the 
treaty with India did not help much to solve many problems 
between the two countries. The dispute over the maritive 
belt/ the sharing of Ganges waters/ disputes over the Muhurir 
C^ ar and Purt»asha Island in the Bay of Bengal are prcfclems 
v^ich could not be solved till now. These problens were very 
conplex in nature and their solution required fersighteiiess / 
forbearance/ and great patience on the part of leaders of 
86 both countries. 
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Although/ U.S.A. recognised Bangladesh immediately 
after liberation/ but it alongwith its other Western Allies 
were not happy with Shaikh's policy. The influence of the 
pro-Russian elenents inside Awami League did not please the 
western block. China did not recognise Bangladesh during 
the reign of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman in solidarity with Pakistan. 
Not only that / but she used Veto to prever.t Bangladesh from 
joining the U.N. For the same reason sore Muslim countries 
did not recognise Bangladesh. This forced Siaikh's government 
to cibandon its danand to try Pakistan prisoners of war and 
that led to Pakistem's recognition of Banglade^ which attended 
87 
the historic Islamic Summit Conference at Lahore. 
In order to justify his failure in fulfilling the 
promises/ he gave to the people before the war of independence/ 
Mujib maintaied a commcxi theme in his repeating the same every 
now and then. He also would always talk about the ccwispiracy 
against Bangladesh without explaining who were making those 
conspiracies and vtiat action the government was taking against 
them. Knowing that he had nothing to give to the people he 
felt insecure and consequently his speeches mainly contained 
sermons/ advices/ orders, threats, warnings without offering 
a 
87. For details. See Woudud Ahmed, n. 21. 
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any new sense of clirec±ion to the people to build new society. 
Inspite of the public sentiment against the government the 
opposition could not offer any programme due to their lack 
of leadership and organisation. The main opposition came 
from within Awami League when the student wing of the party 
split into pro and cinti-Mujib groups. The latter challenged 
Mujib and charged the Awairi leaguers with corruption and 
supression. It erronously warr.ed Mujib that, "The army will 
not fire on the people, but if you press, it might take action 
89 
against you and the ruling clicrae". 
Mujib was annoyed at this, though he did scant little 
to correct the situation. Be only put the blame on others. 
He did dismiss some members of parliament on charges of smuggling, 
nepotism, emd corruption but 'in the process, he discarded 
everything Bangladesh was supposed to repres«it: constitution, 
the rule of law, freedom of speech, the right to dissent and 
equal opportuity. Gradually tragedy in Bangladesh settled 
into permanence. If the ne-- state did not collapse within 
the first eight months of its fD'jnding it ^^ RS only due to the 
sincere and altruistic efforts of international community. 
88. ibid, p. 223. 
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UNROD, the United Nations Relief Gyration in Dhaka, VBE an 
unprecendented rescue mission both in magnitude and effective-
90 
management/ one of the U.N.'s unsung success stories. 
Although, there were strong and genuine criticisms 
against Mujib and his party by the opposition parties particu-
larly by Moulana Bhashani and J.S.D. but nothing serious could 
happen. As the rightist parties were not alleged to operate, 
the parties in the field could not provide an alternate leader-
ship because the J.S.D. leaders were still yojng and Maulana 
was doing politics in his own style. He never contonplated 
to be a ruler in the country. In such circimstances, inspite 
of Awami League's popularity declined, the opposition could 
91 
make only limited headway. 
Towards One Party System 
Mujib developed a psychological fear-cotnplex and the 
more he tended to believe that there were conspiracies against 
him, the more he would seek the help of thos^ whom he thought 
are sincere to him. He found that NAP(M) and C.P.B. were 
90. ibid, p. 20. 
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reliable allies and he believed v^at they were trying to sell 
thp idea that they alongwith Awami League were the only patriotic 
parties in the country. Ttiese two parties could convince 
Mujib that a broader jdliance between Awami League and the 
two parties will be good for the country and for Mujib himself. 
According to Moudud Ahmed, "In the process of building the 
alliance, the plan to turn the country into one-party s\'stem 
also began to take its shape. In the two-year rule certain 
hard political facts led to dominate the thoughts of Shaikh 
Mujib/ nurtured and advanced by the CPB ar>d NAP(M) and a section 
of the Awami League close to him. These facts and argvinents 
were : (1) the country did not make much progress as the economy 
was sinking and the law and order situation cmtirued to deteri-
orate. (2) The conspirators and the vested interest groups 
were active to frustrate all atteirpts of the govemmait in 
bringing stability in the country. (3) Itie opposition political 
parties were behaving in an irresponsible manner and a large 
section of people were still in possessicxi of arms and were 
using than for dacoity, robbery, looting of bazar and banks 
and secret killings. (4^ The Awami LeaCTje was faction ridden 
down to the grass root lerel and corruption within the mert)ers 
earned a bad name for the party. (5) As Bangladesh was young 
and a poor country a V^ srinscsr -type parliamentary darocracy 
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would not help in bringing economic progress; it needed a 
solid period of quiet stability to ensure development. (6) 
aiaikh Mujib was omnipotent and subsequent election was won. 
There was no recison why he should carry the bad name of the 
Awami League. (7) Ihere was no real opposition or alternative 
in the country and so there was no necessity of allowing 
those 'Non-Existing' parties to create unnecessary chaos. 
(8) To achieve a socialist transfcriTBticn doctrinaire workers 
were necessary and a party like Awami League could not provide 
such workers. (9) To establish a socialist economic order 
strict discipline and doctrinaire cadres were essential requi-
rements and a bourgeois peirlianientary system was ccntradictcey 
to such pnprprjTJfiifP . With gjflirting social interests a 
socialist transformation was not possible to a±iieve. (10) 
NoiAere in the world could a socialist economic order establi-
she under a multi-party bcxirgeois democratic systan. As any 
socialist transformation wculd require radical structural 
changes, the bourgeois institutions and interests would have 
to be controlled and removed with an iron hand and this would 
be impossible to do under the existing system. (11) Parliamentary 
democracy was a luxury for a developing country like Bangladesh. 
Whsn the entire people were cehind Shaikh Mujib and were his 
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supporters why not sustain the unity of the people by estab-
lishing one single party in the country. (12) With all the 
comnitments Mujib macSe to the people including the one to 
stop exploitation of man all these years/ he \^ BS to act now 
to fulfil these comitments. (13) Mujib was taken to Moscow 
for treatment by a special Soviet plane and he stayed there 
for nearly three weeks where he was accorded a red carpet 
reception ty the Kremlin leaders. Mujib as a leader of his 
people received better treatn»ent in the Ease than the West. 
(14) Mujib was bom to be a reformer, "A liberator" for common 
people, a "Nation Builder" and a Philosopher of MUJIBABAD 
and therefore with his support and popularity the Bengalis 
now had a historic chance to render themselves from economic 
exploitation, bondage sls.'ery and this great task auid respon-
sibility now rested on Mujib's shoulders for realizing that 
dream. It was only Mujib who could do it and that he ought 
not to miss this opportunity/ it was the demand of history 
that Mujib played the role of a Messiah.92 Although Mujib was 
know to be a moderate politician who came to power on the 
promise of d«nocracy, he gradually started listening to the 
praise of his personality, his omnipotence and statesmanship 
92. ibid, pp. 226-27. 
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frcxn sychophants and vested interests. 
From the beginning of Novenber 1974, the leaders of 
the pro-Moscow p ^ i e s had also been advocating the 
abolition of parliamentary system. The embassy of 
the most powerfiiL socialist state in Dhaka was reported 
to have encouraged Mansur Ali, Shaikh Mujib's trusted 
Home Minister, to c^ t for the single party system. 
The pressures of the radical opposition, constant prodding 
by Shaikh Moni, Mansur Ali and pro-Moscow leaders, 
Mujib's own proclivity to identify the state with the 
party all of Xbese propelled Mujib to introduce a one 
party system. 
The dissatisfaction of the people over their economic 
well-being and security of life and property was mounting. 
The chaos and anarchy was increasing among members of Awami 
League and this made Mujib realise that the Awami League 
was no longer an asset to him because the party had earned 
a bad name, "niese reasons alongwith the design of left parties 
and left elements in Awsni League coincided with the personal 
desire of Mujib to rule the country alone and to establish 
himself as a nation builder, a creator of a socialist economic 
order in the country. By the end of 1973, Mujib started taking 
ccxistitutional nB^uree . He changed the ccxistitution, changed 
the president first and then assoiBd the post himself and declared 
the emergency and introduced harsher laws like the special 
powers act and new print control order for the printing press 
93. Talukdar Maniruzz-aran, The Bangladesh REvolution and 
its Aftermath. (Dr.aka: 1980) o. 180. 
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and publicatic«is. The proclamation of the energency was 
mainly to deal with political problens because the government 
had neither any plan nor they were serious to confront criminals 
for which they claimed to have proclaimed emergency. Mujib 
had already decided to make radical changes in the political 
system where only one party could exist and the President 
became suprene over all executive, and legislative and judicial 
organs of the state. The final step was taken on January 25, 
1975 when the parliament passed the fourth amendment bill 
into act at a speed unprecedented in the history of law making. 
That was done without discussion or debate. Mujib was made 
President by ousting the quiet and placid Mohamroadullah from 
the office even without giving him the opportunity to resign. 94 
Mujib asserted in parliament that the constitution was changed 
in order to 
Establish the economic freedom of the masses in an 
exploitation free society and to establish socialism 
and denocracy of the exploited... a fvmdamental diange 
was necessary in the ctxistitution in order to create 
a healthy administration where people would be able 
to sleep peacefully and would be free from injustice 
and repression.95 
94. Mo-jdjd Ahmed, n. 21, pp. 228-35. 
95. ibid, p. 243, 
226 
The authoritarian measures v^ich were taken by Shaikh 
Mujibur Rahman were too extreme and it was obvious that with 
the exceptic»i of the pco-ftecrv groups and some of Awami League 
members the rest of the people were not particularly happy 
with those measures. They found that Mujibur Rahman had gone 
back upon one of his promises and inposed upon the state 
evils with which he used to charge and criticise the Pakistan 
government. Parliamentary democracy, b^ ' which he used to 
swear, had been gagged; most of the newspapers had been forced 
to fold up. He then sought to establish himself as an all-
powerful President who could rule by decree and remained una-
ccountable. The national assembly was d^jrived of its powers, 
the judiciary was reduced to the status of a subordinate branc±i 
of and entirely s;jbserviant to adninistration; the right 
of citizens and the judiciary's power to enforce than were 
constitutionally taken away. The most amusing part of the 
process was that the constitution the Awami Leequecs thanselves 
framed in 1972 and which they used to v^ hold as a guareuiter 
of pe::pLe's ri^ Tts had new to be largely scrapped. One after 
another the clauses relating to the findamental rights were 
aborted or suspended under one pretext or another. Bangladesh 
was transformed into a police state on the model of the Soviet 
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96 
satellite in Eastern Europe. 
Mujib while contradicting in practice the political 
platitixSes he had promised overlooked the possible reaction 
of the armed forces to his new systen. He brushed aside the 
suggestion of both pro-Moscow leaders and his trusted nephew 
Shaikh floni that precautionary measures be taken against a 
97 possible anny coup. Beside the authoritariar. measures adopted 
by Shaikh Mujib/ there were many grievances of the army against 
him and his political regime. The worst among those grievances 
was the dismissal of a few army officers because they were 
harsh with Awami League workers vho were involved in smuggling 
practices. Among other grievances were that the share for 
the army in the budget was slim. TYie creation of Rak3dii Bahini 
with a lot of privileges annoyed the regular army and its 
nEry regiments. The army was ordered to collect unauthorised 
arms but when Awami Leaguers were involved the army was asked 
not to disturb them. The arms recovery and antismuggling 
operaticxiS/ therefore ended in an administrative fiasco, only 
98 
serving to increase the army's hatred for the Mujib regime. 
96. Matiur Rahman, n. 69, p. 124-
97. Talukder Maniruzzaman, n. 93, p. 18-
98. ibid, p. 185, 
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However, what accelerated the anny intervention was the personal 
grievances of the coup leac3ers. TYiose grievances led to the 
bloody coup which was staged on August 15, 1975 and in which 
Mujib eind all menfcers of his fairdly were eliminated. The coup 
leaders asked Khanda3car Mustaq Ahmed to assime the presidentship 
and this led to speculation that the anti-Indian faction of 
the Awami League was involved ir the coup. But Mustaq denied 
this and said that he did not know anything at all about the 
coup plan and that he was contacted by the officers after 
Shaikh Mujib was killed. He accepted to assijme the presidency 
because any delay in the formation of the new government would 
99 have brought Indiem intervention. 
Thus neither Mujib nor his system could survive. He 
was pathetically buried alongwith his system. According to 
Zillur Rahman Khan: 
There was a s«nse of loss and unhappiness that filled 
the hearts and minds of B«igalis (both masses and elite) 
after Mujib's death, but there was also a feeling of 
relief among the elite that the country might bc^voiding 
the direction of a constitutional dictatorship. 
99. ibid, pp. 186-7. 
100. Zilur Rahman Khan, n. 15, D. 131. 
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However Anthony Mascarenhas c3oes not agree with Zillur 
Rahman completely about the reaction of the masses regarding 
the killing of Mujib. In his book, Bangladesh a Legacy of 
Blood, he wrote that no tears were shed for Shaikh Mujibur 
Rahman. Moulana Bhasani, who had a few months earlier pledged 
total 'support' for Wujib's 'Second Revolution' quickly issued 
a press statement welcoming the historic change and offering 
fullest political support to Khandaker Mostaq's new government. 
In London, a group of young Bangladeshis stormed the t^^ 
OcninLssicn and symbolically pulled down Mujib's photographs 
assaulting and insulting his personal intelligence officers 
posted in London. The High Commissioner Syed Abdus Sultan, 
v^o had always shown himself greatly devoted to Mujib, was 
one of his most trusted appointees. Curiously enough, instead 
of having the boys arrested for trespassing and vandal isrri 
the High Commissioner «itertained th^n to high tea in his 
office after ranoving all photographs and the wall hemgings 
of Mujib v^ich normally adorned the rooms of the building. 
In Dhaka, Khandekar Moshtaq lost nc time in trying 
up the evidence of the massacre in Dhanmondi. Mujib's family, 
alongvith the semiabats and the Monis were quietly buried 
in Banani graveyard in the cantoanient. M-jjib's body along 
was floun by Air Force helicopter to Tungipara and buried 
in the village graveyard. It was there that Bangabandhu's 
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final humiliation took place. According to Brigader Manzoor, 
when the news of the coup and assasination became known; some 
villagers broke in and looted Mujib's ancestral home. It 
was a sad story in the history of leadership in South Asia. 
Itie heights the charismatic leader had reached were as unmarked 
as the abysses to which his charisma fell. 
After a rule of three and a half years of Shaikh Mujibur 
Rahman, the personality of the undisputed political leader 
of Bangladesh had vanished and the dreams of Golden Bengal 
had faded into the dusty archives of historical irrelevance. 
Shaikh Mujib made high-sounding promises to the people of 
Bangladesh but all those promises did not see the light of 
the day. This led to the unavoidable loss of confidence in 
the leader and the party. The independence which came through 
tears, toil and blood rapidly turned sour, distasteful and 
useless. The Awami League government was confronted with 
problans from all directions but the party leadership was 
not politically matched to the historical tasks. Unabated 
corruption and looting in all sectors of the government resulted 
in a cofiplete collapse of the economic backbone of the country. 
Never before had a leader who rose to power on the ungrudging 
support and will of the people seen his fall and even piiysical 
annihilation at such a tremendous speed. 
101 Anthom- Mascarenhas, n. 89, pp. 82-83. 
102 K. Ali, Bangladesh, A Hew Nation (E*iaka: 1982), 
pp. 196-7. 
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LEAE€RSHIP CRISIS IN SRI LANKA 
Sri Lanka is not an exception from other South Asian 
countries where hereditary leadership is not uncommon. Of 
the seven Prime Ministers of the country, four belonged to 
one family network and, two to another. W. Dahanayake, a 
school teacher by profession, was the first middele class prime 
Minister, who occupied the office outside the orbit of these 
families. But his government curiously lasted only for three 
montlis. Sam D. Bandaranayaike said when he joined the conmunist 
party that the SLFP seemed only interested in a game of musical 
chairs by which a Bandaranaike or a Senanayke can alternatively 
come to power". Wh«i S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike returned frc*n 
England after completing his study at Oxford in 1925, he was 
welcomed at his native village. The people lost no time in 
looking to him and his family as their natural leaders. Later 
another MP could still claim "if our family has done any 
service to the people, it was not with that of getting votes 
but strictly because our fairily is bound to serve and protect 
them"^ 
J. Jup, "Political Leadership in Sri Lanka" in P.N. 
Panoey, ed., Lea5ership in South Asia (New Delhi : 1977) 
p. 455. 
ibid., p. 487. 
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The United National Party which has ruled Sri Lanka 
for most of its independent period was known as "Uncles and 
Nephews Party". Even in 1970 when Dudley Senanayake relinqui-
red the post of leader of opposition, he handed it to his 
relative J.R. Yoyamardena who later became party chairman 
and then I>rime Minister and ultimately Presid«it of the country. 
The Sinhalese Buddhists regard Sri Lanka as their 
land which they should protect and preserve, The existence 
of very powerful minority groups such as Tamils and the Roman 
Catholics always eycks3 a sense of insecurity in the mind 
of Sinhalese. They looked with sudden to Tamils v^o tended 
to lean on Tamils in India . Millions of Indian Tamils were 
seen to provide cultural and political succour. As stated 
by Jayaratnam Wilson, 
The conservative Sinhalese leadership have on various 
occasions utilized this fact to advocate cntproiise 
as solutions to the problem. Don Stephen Senayake's 
"Middle Way", Solomon Bandaranaike's "Middle Path", 
and J.R. Jayewardene's "dharmishta (Just and reighteous) 
society" eure examples of this tactical approach. Ttiese 
political appeals found a ready response among Sinhalese 
who were in their temperament accoinnodating .exc^t 
v^en roused by political and communal passions". 
3. ibid, p. 486. 
4. A . Jeyaratnam Wilson, Political in Sri Lanka, 1947-
1979, (London: 1979), p. 112, 
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When we lcx)k into the Sri Lemka politics we find that 
it is dxiinated by two political parties/ namely the United 
National Party and Sri Lanka freedom party. The U.N.P. was 
organised by D.S. Senanayake in 1946. It was basically a 
denocratic socialist party/ conriitted to mixed economy with 
enphasis on private sector and in external affairs keen on 
maintaining the Qmrmwealth connection cind ties with the 
West while at the same time desirous of achering to neutralism. 
The party's leadership came from D.S. Senanayake and his nephew 
Sir John Kotelawala in the first phase, Dudley Senanayake 
in the second and J.R. Jayewardene in the third phase which 
started in 1973. 
Sri Lanka Freedom party was founded by S.W.R.D. Bandar-
anaike in 1951 after he resigned his post in D.S. Senanayake 
government. Within five years the party succeeded in throwing 
out the U.N.p. government cind replaced its economic policies 
by a radical socialist programme v^idi stood in contrast to 
the U.N.P.'s conservative predisposition/ go-slow approach 
ibid., p.117. 
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and benevolent paternalism. In the field of foreign policy, 
the party initiated and improvised Bandaranaike's concept 
of "dynamic neutralism". This meant that Sri Lanka strived 
towards friendly relations with all countries and steered 
clear of any of the major power blocks. 
In the beginning, the party stood for making both the 
Sinhalese and the Tamil as the official language and at the 
election of 1952 Bandaranaike claimed that if returned to 
power he would effectively undertake the switchover from English 
in twentyfour hours but with the Sinhalese pressures he cha-
nged to Sinhalese only with provision for "the reasonabale 
use of Tamil language". In 1956 the parliament enacted the 
official larjguage act in the wake of Sinhalese - Tamil cla-
shes following an F.P. organised satyagraha against the propo-
7 
sed legislation. 
Within a short span of two and a half years S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike managed to bring about reforms in all fields. 
Bandaranaiake made Sinhalese the official language and accorded 
6. ibid, p.125. 
7, ibid, p.127. 
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Buddism an honourable place in the country. Ayurveda as system 
of medicine was state sponsored and a commissioner was appoin-
ted to oversee the concerned department. Wages all round 
increased. Itie workers more often than not received their 
legitimate rights. S.W.R.D. established a cultural depart-
ment to encourage and ensure performance eind practice of reli-
gion, literature and art. He pronptly inaugurated a provi-
dent fund schene for all workers. Furthermore/ two new Budd-
hist monastry universities were rapidly created. He also 
nationalised the Colombo port and the omnibus services. He 
rescued the farmers from the clutches of their absentee land-
lords; established diplomatic reciprocal missions with Russia, 
China and other socialist countries. He was successful in 
packing off the British from their base and joining India 
Q 
as a neutral force in South East Asia. 
No doubt, the SLFP under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and 
later under his widow was more enterprising and dyncimic. 
TTiey took Sri Lanka into the Afro-Asian mainstream and sought 
a clear position for Sri Lanka in the council of Non-aligned 
nations of the world. "Hieir policies gave Sri Lanka an identity 
8. D.B. Dhanapala, Madam Premier (Colombo : 1960), p.8. 
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Sri Lanka was to be taken for granted by the West. In the 
spheres of trade and comnerce it vras no more a monopoly of 
the West for Sri LanJca now established trade relations with 
9 
the Comnunist countries and got aid from both the blocs. 
These policies were initiated by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike 
as early as 1951/ the year the SLFP was founded. In the inau-
gural speech he announced his policies which were known as 
the dynamic and exclusive "Bandaranaike policies". He said: 
We stand for a new constitution framed with the appro-
val of the people... In foreign affairs we want 
full freedom to enable us to act in the best interest 
of the people... Economically we intend to elimi-
nate unetployment and to give all our people the 
highest possible standard of living... In regard 
to the renewal of spiritual values we feel that all 
necessary help ^ould be forthcoming from public 
as well as the government to Buddhism as well as 
all other religion.';.. « Socially we shall immediately 
implanent old age pensions, health and unemployment 
insurance... In health we intend to provide the 
people of this country with a really adequate and 
satisfactory health service — In education we 
intend to see that illiteracy is eliminated without 
delay and that free educaticxi is fully implemented 
both in the body as well as in the spirit... 
9, A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, n.4/ p.244. 
10. Maureen Seneviratne, Sirimavo Bandaranaike : A Biography 
(Colombo : 1975), pp.141- 42. 
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Ttie political leadership in Sri Lanka was in turmoil. 
Although, it continued to be dominated by the English educa-
ted elite/ it was being ruled by either conservative modernist 
represented by the UNP or by the traditional left wing groups 
who had to seek alliance with SLFP elements who pleaded for 
moderate political options. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson summarised 
the position of Sri Lankan political leadership in the thirty 
years period after independence in the following words : 
in the thirty years since independence Sri Lanka 
has had eleven Prime Ministers, one of whom held 
office on three different occasions and another 
an two. In effect there have been eight persons 
v^o have held the office of Prime Minister, and 
of than one served for more thein three and a 
half years while two went on for a little more 
than four and a half years each and two others 
lasted their full term of five and seven years. 
Further, in this span UNP and SIF.P have dominated 
the political scene. In the first phase each 
of these parties had a nine years run, the UNP 
from 1947 to 1956 and the SLFP from 1956 to 1965. 
In the second phase, the UNP with its allies 
had a five years run, 1965-70, while the SLFP 
with its partners completed its 1970-75 terms. 
Added to all this is the fact that the six changes 
in government have all been effected in a peaceful 
and ccwistituticxial manner. This record is unusual 
cortpared to what hcis happened in many of the new 
states of Asia and Africa. 
11. A. Jeyaratnam, n.4, p.279. 
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LEADERSHIP OF SIRIMAVO BANDARANAIKE 
Sirimavo Ratwatte was bom in the home of her mother's 
aunt in the town of Ratna Pura. The event was an occasion 
for rejoicing to the whole family. Mr. and Mrs. Barnes Rat-
watte had lost two children prior to this child birth. A 
sooth-sayer who was consulted, told the young mother that 
it would be far better for her to have this third baby away 
from her own home and keep the child in a different environ-
ment for the first few months of its life. Ttie birth took 
place on 17 April, 1916 and the baby was big, bouncing, bony 
and beautiful. At the age of eight years Sirimavo began her 
formal schooling at a secondary school in Colombo. Both her 
parents were of the opinion that their children should have 
sound education and also that the children should be sent 
away frcxn home for their education> St. Bridget convent shool 
in Colonfco was chosen for her. It is in this school that 
Sirimavo spent eleven years of her life where she was singu-
larly able to identify herself with rural people. She posse-
ssed a talent for mixing with her class and dormitory mates, 
for making friends, though her manner was far from effusive. 
But her quiet unhurried ways and certain strengths in her 
bearing attracted others who were less adapatable to their 
circumstances. Nothing was too labourious, too mundane or 
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too insignificant for her attention. In 1934, she was changed 
from a carefree girl, intoxicated with life and its promises 
into a sober young woman. She had once witnessed a peasant 
woman die which had left a permanent imprint in her mind. 
At the age of 24, her parents selected for her a man 
older than her by couple of years who was known to the family 
but not known to her and whom she had not met even in a casual 
way socially or moved freely in his ccxnpany, although the 
two families were acquainted. He was Solomon West Ridgeway 
Dias Bandaranaike who was a Minister in the state council 
nd who was a good orator with a golden toungue and also a 
good writer vrfio belonged to an aristocratic family. Although, 
he was an aristocrat by birth, he had come out on the side 
of the common man and established his reputation as one of 
their chief spokesman. The marriage took place in May 1940 
with a traditional ceremony known as the "Mala Karalaraina" 
or tying of a gold chain round the neck of the bride. it 
12 
was to be later called the wedding of the century. 
12. D.B. Dhanapala, n.8, p.16, 
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As IcMig as Mr. Bandaranaike lived she was always in 
soft focus, providing the necessary rich background for her 
brilliant husband and looking after her children. She also 
took keen interest in the Mahila Samiti novement and devoted 
all the time she could spare for that purpose. 13 
Mrs. Bcindarcinaike was sinple in habits and dress/ un-
usually unsophisticated in manner, charmingly gracious by 
nature. She had not only to face the political and social 
struggles of Bandaranaike but also had to put up with Bandara-
naike himself v^o was a very difficult man to live with, being 
highly individualistic if not eccentric, living as he did 
14 
at a terrific pace. 
But in spite of the difficulties she experienced with 
her husband, she could come to his rescue whenever she found 
him in difficulties. This was clearly reflected vrfien she 
advised him to resign from the coalition government in 1952. 
13. ibid, p.25. 
14. M. Seneviratne, n.lO, p.136. 
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I think the day has arrived for you to resign from 
the government, from the United National party. 
It is not your own party after all/ have you not 
realised that? It has be«i apparent to me this 
past year or so that you are worried and unhaf^ >y. 
You are a misfit there. I don't think you can 
ever adiieve anything in this present stalemate. 
You are an embarrassment to than just as they are 
an obstacle to you.15 
These words gave weight to his own feeling and he told 
her that he would give every consideration to what she said. 
Mr. Bandaranaike was thinking of resigning from the UNP cind 
forming his own party. So/ he digested the advise of his 
wife and informed his friends and supporters that he has deci-
ded to quit and asked them to help him in drafting his resig-
nation speech v*iich he delivered the same day - the Budget 
Day - and which was clear and concise, he said : 
I do not intend on this occasion to indulge in any 
discriminations or personal bitterness - the issues 
involved are far too iiiportant for that. When I 
assisted in the formation of the United National 
party and when I myself agreed to serve in the pre-
sent govt/ I did so in order to ensure the stability 
of govt which was needed peurticularly at the begi-
nning of the new era of freedom./ I also hopped 
that as time went on there would be an increasing 
tendency towards progressive policies and greater 
readiness to deal effectively with the many impor-
tant problems that face our country I have been 
15. ibid. 
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the member of the legislature and a minister for 
many years. I may have made many mistakes. I venture 
to hope/ however/ that I have also been able to 
render some small service of value in the positions 
which I occupied in the legislative of the country.-^ ^ 
The advice of Sirimavo to her husband proved to be 
correct as he established his party which in five yeai? time 
could capture power and ruled the country till his assasination 
in 1959. During the tenure of Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike as 
Prime Minister, his wife Sirimavo became the first lady of 
the land. This position was supposed to be occupied by the 
wife of the Governor General but as he was a widower the alter-
native was the wife of the Prime Minister. The charming and 
unsophisticated first lady performed her duty successfully-
The new position of both the husband and the wife did not 
make much change in their life style . They chose to live 
in their own home in Rosemead Place rather than move into 
•Tenple Trees'- the Prime Minister's official residence. All 
formal arrangements was done at Tonnple Trees but according 
to Sirimavo/ 
16. ibid, pp.138-139. 
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my husband and I really preferred and thoroughly 
enjoyed the more intimate/ the smaller get-togethers 
we organised for a few special guests or for visi-
ting dignitaries in our own home at Rosmead Place. 
It was usually a dinner party, an informal buffet, 
and it was on such occeisions I came to know perso-
nally, such great and eminent men and women as 
lord and lady Mountbatten, Pandit Nehru and his 
brilliant daughter Indira, Chou-wi-Lai, the erudite 
and affabale Chinese Prime Minister, King Mahendra 
(late) of Nepal and his exquisite Queen, vivacious 
Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, Sir Herald and Lady 
Maonillan. So gracious and dignified, the ebullient 
president Tito and his stately, handsome wife, 
Madam Jonanka Broz, President Suoekambo and several 
others. And I was struck by one remarkable facet 
in the characters of all these people ; their extreme 
simplicity. 
After the assassination of Mr. Bandaranaike, Sirimavo 
kept aloof from political life for sometime but when power 
struggle started between different factions of SLFP an idea 
was presented to her by a group of party stalwarts that she 
was most suitable to lead them. "Rie idea was both feasible 
and acceptable to her. She became President of the party 
and after the election she was sworn in as the first woman 
Prime Minister in the world. In her first speech as Prime 
Minister she said : 
17. ibid, p.162. 
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The free votes of the people democratically cast 
at the last general election are a clear indica-
tion that the policies enunciated by the late 
Mr. Bandararaike have been endorsed by a vast 
majority of the People of this country. These ^^g 
policies will generally be pursued by my government. 
Thus, the rather sudden emergence of Sirimavo Dias 
Bandaranaike in Sri Lan3can politics and her stibsequent appoint-
ment as the world's first woman Prime Minister on 21st July 
1960 have caused surprise to many people in and outside the 
Island Nation- As a matter of fact, Sirimavo started her 
political career only when the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLEP) 
entered into a traumatic frfiase following the assassination 
of her husband and the party chief/ S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike 
in S^tanber, 1959. The party was torn with dissaisions between 
rival groups/ Left wing eind Right wing/ over the way in v^ich 
the investigations into the assassination were being handled. 
This led to the resignation of W. Dahanayake from the Prime 
Ministership as well eis the leadership of the SLFP. The lea-
dership then passed on to C.P. De Silva for a brief period 
imtil Sirimavo/ realisisng the inperative need to maintain 
unity in the party/ decided to involve herself actively in 
19. For the position of parties in three general elections, 
See A.J. Wilson, Electoral Politics in kri Emergent State 
(London : 1975), pp. 164-65. 
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its affairs. On 7 May 1960 the SLFP elected her as its president, 
and in July 1960 she led the party to a convincing victory 
at the general elections held in that nonth. In the si±)sequent 
general elections held in 1965 the SLFP had lost its position 
to the United National Party (UNP), but recaptured the government 
19 in 1970 elections. 
The eleven year rule of Sirimavo (1960-64, 1970-77) 
which forms the basis for assessment of her leadership in 
this chapter was significant for manifold reeisons. It was 
during her regime that Sri Lankan Constitutional system under-
went a considerable change. As regards the country's foreign 
policy, Sirimavo raised the stature of Sri Lanka in the inter-
national arena. Also there were several incidents such as 
an abortive coup d'etat, unprecedented economic crisis, and 
aggravation of Sri LanJca Tamils grieveinces and its adverse 
impact on the ethnic amity posed threat to the regime's sta-
bility and the parliamentary democracy of the country. 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFC«MS 
Djring the period 1965-70, the thinking on the consti-
tution underwent considerable change, and the SLFP - led 
coalition adopted the position that the imediate need of the 
19. For the position of parties in three general elections. 
See A.J. Wilson, Electoral Politics in An Emergent State 
{London : 197"), pp.164-65. 
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country and of the people was not a piecemeal repair of the 
Soulbury constitution. l^e main charge was that the United 
Front (UF) parties (SLFP - Lanka Sama Samaja Party - Conmu-
nist party) / expressing their unanimity over the need to end 
the last yoke of foreign (British) domination, disassociated 
themselves from the Select Committee appointed in 1965 by 
the Dudley Senanayake government. The leadership of the UF 
proposed ein alternative line of action/ and appointed a three-
party committee for constitutional affairs consisting of five 
mentjers under the chairmanship of Dr. Colvin R. de Silva. 
The committee examined the working of the Sulbjry constitu-
tion, and on the basis of this experience and its deficie-
ncies, alternative proposals for a future constitution were 
20 
made. In 1968 the UFin its comnon prograirme, categorically 
stated their desire to establish a constituent assenbly, and 
the 1970 election manifesto included the historic clause which 
sought the mandate of the people to permit the members of 
parliament to function simultaneously as a constituent ass«±)ly. 
The 1970 election victory unequivocally endorsed the mandate 
sought by the UF, and the constituent asse-±;ly was adopted 
to show that their desire was to ranove the taint of int^ eria-
20, For details on this subject, See S.R. Chakravarti / et. 
al, Turmoil and Political Zhange in Scuth Asia (Jaipur: 
1978rrp-84. 
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lism from the existing system of government/ and also because 
of the fact that it was the only democratic method of deter-
21 
mining the constitution of a free country. Itjerefore/ from 
the very outset, the process of constitution making amounted 
to an open assertion of the freedom, sovereignity and indepe-
ndence of the people. In a similar line, Sirimavo indicated 
that the new constitution could seek to achieve, viz, streng-
then the oneness of the Nation : establish a socialist society 
and safeguard the country's freedom, independence and national 
22 
sovereignty. 
Itie main principle advocated in the first Republican 
constitution of 1972 was the establishment of "Socialist Demo-
cracy" in Sri Lanka. In this context the constitution envisa-
ged full realisaticn of all rights and freedoms of citizens 
including group rights, securing full arployment for the v^ole 
country, the distribution of the social product equitably 
among citizens, the development of collective forms of property 
21. W.A. Wisma Wamapala, "Sri Lanka in 1972, Tension and 
Change", Asian Survev, vol.13, no.IV - 2, February 1973, 
p.219. 
22 Ceylon Daily News, 20 July 1970. 
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such as state property or cooperative property/ distribution 
ajvd exchange as a means of ending exploitation of man by man, 
raising the moral and cultural standards of the people and 
the organisation of society to enable the full flowering of 
human capacity both individually and collectively in the 
23 
pursuit of the good life. 
Significantly/ the constitution gave enphasis to the 
National Unity, tettitorial integrity/ development of cultures 
and languages/ democratic structures of the government and 
opportunities to the people for participation in the national 
life and government including civil and judicial administra-
ti<xi. Of course, this made an excellent reading of the 
constitution. It appeared to be a coherent eind a cohesive 
political document. However, c»i the other hand, when we take 
a critical view of the same constitution whic*i appeared to 
be emphasising secularism, socialism and democracy, providing 
equal c^portunities to all the comnunities in the national 
life, it made Sri Lanka virtually a theocratic state serving 
sectarian interests. According to article 68 of the consti-
23. The Constitution of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) (Colombo : 1972), 
Chapter V/ Article 16 (2), p.9. 
24. ibid. 
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tutiori/ Buc3dhism was gremted special status/ if not mac3e the 
state religion. Ttiis was despite the fact that in article 
25 18 (1) (d) freedom of thought, conscience and religion had 
been granted as a fundamental right. Ttius the constitution 
which appeared to be combining the principles of secularism 
and socialism, provided a special provision for Buddhism. 
Thus it was a queer situation where the constitution simulta-
neously provided for two mutually opposite aspects. It guaran-
teed the secular character of state and also made it theo-
cratic by asking it to work for procnotion and perpetuation 
of Buddhism. 
Similarly, the constitution made Sinhala as the official 
language of the country and the use of Tamil language had 
27 been permitted vide article 8 (1). It may be noted here 
that the use of Tamil to a limited extent granted under Tamil 
28 
Language (Special provisions) Act No.28 of 1958 had not 
been considered as a provision in the constituticxi but as 
a si±ordinate legislation. Thus, though one of the objectives 
of the constitution was to foster national unity, in its actual 
operation it was creating in this way national disunity. 
25. ibid, Chapter I, p.4. 
26. ibid, Cnapter IV, p.11. 
27. ibid, Cnapter III, p.5. 
28. ibid, Cnapter V, p.18. 
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On the structural side/ the constitution envisaged 
29 
a centralised legislature called the National state assembly. 
It was made the supreme instrument of the state/anexercising 
executive and judicial as well as legislative power in the 
name of the people. Also provision was made to establish 
a constitutional court with limited powers to advise on the 
30 
constitutionality of acts of the ass«±ily. 
The new constitution was a tough one/ which in the 
opinion of some critics imposed serious limitations on the 
democratic process euid political syst«ti. It did away with 
the various checks and balance inhibiting the legislature 
from giving effect to the will of the people expressed through 
elected representatives. The supranacy accorded to the uni-
cameral legislature was evident from the fact that the consti-
31 tution had/ m effect abolished the right of judicial review. 
On the other hand/ the UF government seemed to be strcHigly 
aitrenched in the majority ethnic/ religious and linguistic 
groups, but in sequel to its religious and linguistic policies 
29. ibid, Chapter VIII, pp.16-21. 
30. ibid, pp. 54-57. 
31. Urmila Phadnis, "Sri Lanka Today", Current History, Vol.L, 
no.XIII, NovOTiber, 1972, p.211. 
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it discriminated against minority groups and laid the basis 
for increased tensions. In the process/ as Howard Wriggins 
32 
observed, minority interests were ignored and inter-communal 
hostility reached a new height. Its by product was the noti-
ceabale increase in ethnic cleavage and social conflict. 
Similarly/ the section dealing with fundamental rights 
had been criticised for containing no reference to the right 
of a person to own property. The charge was also made that 
what has been guaranteed in one section of the constitution 
33 has been taken away in another. This reference related 
to that provision which enable the National state Assembly 
to pass laws which might infringe on fundamental rights were 
considered as necessary in the interest of National security, 
unity and integrity, national econc«Tiy, public safety, public 
order, protections of public health and morals and for the 
34 protection of rights and freedoms of others. This provisicwi 
placed the fundamental rights entirely at the mercy of the 
legislature majority of the day. 
32. Howard Wriggins, Ceylon ; Dilernmas of a New Nation (Prin-
ceton : 1968), p.462, 
33. A.G. Noorani, "Constitution of Ceylon", Tribune, vol.17, 
no.29, p.5. 
34. ibid. 
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It may also be interpreted that the inclusion of the 
pixvisicn ior the development of collective forms of property 
is an att«npt to inject a little bit of Marxism into the 
constitution. It is also an endeavour to incorporate slogans 
into the constitution. Apart from these/ the fact was that 
the objectives formulated were central to the transformation 
of a capitalist society into a socialist society. However/ 
it represented a positive declaration in the directicn of the 
establishment of a socialist society. At the same time, the 
absence in the relevant portions of the constitution for any 
grant of positive rights to private property injected a certain 
sense of insecurity into the minds of the prc^ jertied classes 
in the country. 
SAFE GUARDING THE REGIME 
The SLFP government was rocked in 1962 and 1971 by 
two highly calculated threats posed to the Sirimavo regime 
and her leadership. While the first one came in the form 
of coup de state , in 1962 which was carried out by a group 
of senior anry and police officers and a few others mainly 
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with a view to overthrow the government, the revolutionary 
armed uprising in 1971, spearheaded by the youth of Sri Lanka 
reprersenting the revolutionary organisation called Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), was aimed at radically altering the 
political future of the country. Indeed/ at least on the 
second occasion, the Sirimavo government had really to demons-
trate its organisational and administrative effeciency and 
capability to preserve the political system by foiling the 
attempt of undemocratic elements. To trace out the reasons 
for these two incidents, it may well be noted that the policies 
pursued by Sirimavo were primarily responsible for the creation 
of such ciisis situations. To take up the case of 1962, it 
was 5U1 established fact that coup attempt was the manifestation 
of the displesure of Ceylcxi's t)?3per middle class whose customary 
manner of living had been eroded by the measures taken by 
the Sirimavo government to avoid the adveincing economic crisis, 
heavy taxes, travel restrictions and virtual heming of many 
ittports. The background of the twenty-nine conspirators who 
were anre^ ed before executing their plan was a testimony to 
this fact. Among the men arrested as participatns included 
police officers (including retired officers), regular army 
officers, officers in the volunteer force, civil officers 
and other civilians. Nearly all of ther were Christians, 
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most of them Roman Catholics. Many of them came from wealthy 
and prominent familiee,had been educated in prestigeous schools/ 
and generally represented the "Privileged Class" against whom 
the egalitarianism of the SLFP was directed. 
Since the 1962 coup seemed to have been poorly planned 
and to have had very limited support/ the government foiled 
it in no time. In the aftermath of the attempted coup the 
Sirimavo administration, with a view to preserve parliamentary 
democracy/ hurriedly introduced in parliament a draconian 
measure known as the "Coup Bill", to ajply retrospectively 
to the January 1962 Plot. 
The Bill, strongly criticised by the International 
Commission of Jurists, provided the death penalty for broadly 
defined offenses against the state or against Minsters, allowed 
suspects to be held sixty days without charge, modified the 
rules of evidence/ eind established a "Trial at Bar" before 
the panel of three Judges chosen by the government in place 
of a Jury trial. 
35. Robert N. Kearney, "Itie New Political Crises of Ceylon"/ 
Asian Survey/ vol. 2, no. 4, JUne 1962/ p. 27. 
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The "Coup Bill" did not save Sirimavo from yet another 
armed challenge from a coterie of young radicals (Jxing ^®^ 
second term. At the outset; it can be observed that the socio-
economic and political developments appeared to have contri-
buted to the ripening of conditions for the appearance of 
Tifi 
a revolutionary movenent of the JVP. For this, the government 
was held rresponsible as it was tardy in the implementation 
of its socialist prograime, in tackling the rising cost of 
living/ in the control of agency houses, and in the effective 
37 iiTcilaTHTtaticn of the state monopoly of trade. Also the Sirimavo 
regime failed to set up an administrative machinery to involve 
the masses through people's acnmittees ' workers' councils and 
advisory contnittees. Not only that, vdiile calling for austerity 
it chose a particularly incorrect time for einnouncing a raise 
in the allowance of MPs and salaries of cylon Administration 
Service personnel. The bolstering of the inport of Peugeot 
cars and the many trips abroad by the MPs did not help in 
improving the image of the UF government. Most important 
36. For the origin and character of the JVP and the shift 
in tactics and perspectives of the long established 
left parties, see, Robert N. Kearney and Janice JigginS/ 
"The Ceylon Insurrection of 1971", Journal of Common-
wealth and Comparatie Politics, March 1975. 
37. For an excellent analysis on this subject, see, Robert 
N. Kearney, "Educational Expansions and Political Vo-
latility in Sri Lanka: The 1971 Insurrection", Asia.-. 
Survey, vol. 15, no. 9, September 1975, pp. 727-744. 
256 
of all; it did not help in portrayig any dramatic change, 
even in the outward acpearaioe ' ^^'^ ^^^ P^^^ followed by 
the previous government. 
As it waS/ the minimal promises of the UF gouerrmaTt 
had been reduced to mere words. As a result, the rate of 
increase in un«rployment accelerated Rice-ration ^^s restored 
but at three times the price ptanised ' ^^ the Ceylonization 
of the tea-estates, the Finance Minister, N.M. Perena, admitted 
his helplessness: "We have agitated for the Nationalisation 
of the tea estates for "the peist forty years. After assuming 
38 
office, I realise that it is not advisable to do so now". 
The plan for the naticnalisaticn of foreign banks was shelved. 
People who had voted the UF into power in 1970, v;^ ^ of aourse, 
making their own cissessments. 
During the electicMi cottpaign the coalitic«i candidates 
accused the right (UNP) of being extravagant. But after the 
election, the present government bought Praich cars for all 
its electd m«it)ers, who also went on frequent trips abroad. 
Itie UNP has been accused of beig a tool of the World Bank 
38. Fred Halliday, "The Ceylonese Insurrection" in Robin 
Blackburn, ed. Explosions in a Sub-continent (Middlesex: 
1975) pp. 185-86. 
257 
and Western interests. But what Yvd changed? Being progressive 
abroad, by recognising North Korea and the Provisional Revolu-
tionary government of south Vietnam did not mean being prog-
ressive at home. 
Considering the limitations under which the UF government 
had to function, it was quite a harsh assessement but it increa-
singly contributed to the advantage of the JVP. Despite disi-
llusionment, the JVP continued to support the UF government, 
while critically evaluating its performance, and held this 
position till atleast the beginning of 1971. Criticism in 
itself, has never been the sole reason for the failure of 
a government but the UF seened inclined to feel so following 
the mammoth public meeting of the JVP on 27 February 1971 
in Colombo, the government came down heavily upon it, and 
thus brief respite the party had enjoyed in open politics and 
organisation came to an abrupt end. 
Over the period of a few months preceding the April 
uprising, a series of events took plaoe to alarm and alert 
the government. On 6th March a group calling itself the "Mao 
Youth Front" attacked the American Embassy and the confrontation 
39. Jacques Decomoy, "Ceylon-A Case of Persistent Political 
Myopia,' Le Monde Weekly (English Edition), 1-7 July, 
1971 p. 4. 
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resulted in the death of a police man. Sirimavo believed this 
as a " carefully planned armed attack" which was the culmina-
40 
tion of indications of an iirminent attack on the government. 
On 10th March a bomb blast in Sabaragamuva province brought 
about the death of three youths. The accident revealing some 
of the plans afoot brought government action in a heavy way. 
Wijeweera/ the JVP chief/ and five others were arrested on 
13th March and incarcerated in Jaffna Jail/ and emergency 
was clanped on 16th March. Following this/ another bomb blast 
shook Peradeniya on 20th March further iirpinging upon Sirimavo 
the seriousness of the situation. She stated in parliament 
on 23rd March that inquiries had revealed the existence of 
a carefully planned att«rpt to manufacture/ store and distribute 
41 hand-bombs on a wide scale. 
On 2 April/ the politbureau of the JVP met and decided 
to launch an attack for the capture of power. Itie plan included 
a countrywide attack on police stations simultaneously/ as 
well as a concerted attack upon Colombo with the objective 
of the capture of the Prime Minister, other ministers and 
the senior officials of the armed forces. Immediately after 
the outbreak of the uprising, parliament was adjourned and 
40. Ceylon Daily News (Coloirto), 24 March, 1971. 
41. ibid. 
259 
Sirimavo instructed her 13/000 strong police force and 11/000 
strong army to crush the JVP. Initially/ because of danger 
in the Colombo area, the forces were concentrated there/ but 
soon they were to be dispersed to various areas. 
In the first week of the uprising the ranks of the 
JVP seemed to have increased phenomenally. According to an 
42 
account/ they outnumbered the armed forces by three to one. 
Feeling its numerical inferiority/ the government/ through 
a decree/ called up its reserves and begain fresh recruitment 
with the specific provision that no one under thirty-five 
years of age need applyf^ itiis was indeed a sign of the paranoia 
which the government suffered in relation to the youth of 
the country. When the situation came to a head/ Sirimavo 
decided to appeal to friendly countries for help. The appeal 
drew a response from an assortment of countries - the UK/ 
the US, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Egypt, India, PaJcistan 
and China. Britain was the first to supply war materiads 
in the form of small arms/ spare parts for grounded planes 
as well as helicopters. The arrangement for the supply of 
42. Time (London)/ 19 April 1971. 
43. Fred Halliday/ n. 38, p. 200. 
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these was made through its Singapore base. Ttie Indian help 
came on 13 April. It sent its frigates to patrol the coastal 
water around the Island and also some defence personnel to 
guard the Katunayake airport on the West coast. It also/ 
alongwith Pakistan and the US gave helicopters. Ttie USSR 
sent Six MIG 17 Jets with training facilities and crev.', two 
K 26 troops - carrying helicopters/ with 60 Soviet personnel 
44 in toto. China's assistance/ materially/ was a long term/ 
interest-free loan for Sri Lanka/ amounting to Rs. 150 Millions 
45 
which came even latter. 
It was the filtering in of this aid that not only pre-
cipitated the crisis/ but also increased the number of casua-
lities/ especially on the side of the JVP. From 16th April 
the government knew that it was only a matter of time before 
the end came. In her broadcast to the Nation on 25 April, 
the Prime Minister declared that it would only be a matter 
of time before the insurgents were hunted down and warned 
that she would have to give the order for a military offensive 
by the Armed Service/ v^ich she did, Sirimavo also gave 
44. Ceylon Daily News, 19 April 1971. 
45., ibid/ 27 April 1971. 
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four days to the youths of the JVP to surrender and it was 
implied that softer mesures and even aimesty would be granted 
to those who capitulated. The immediate result was surrender 
by those who had been peripherally or lightly connected with 
the movement. By the deadline inposed through date of surrender 
46 
3978 people had come forward to give up their armed struggle. 
What happened in the weeks of April and May 1971 provided 
a historic cind harrowing experience for the island • But 
it must be noted that the government though ill prepared was 
hardly taken unaware by the uprising. The Sirimavo government 
had desisted from early action against the JVP partly because 
of its own misjudgCTient regarding the movements influence 
and boundciries, as also because of reluctance arising from 
its now more authentic image as a left wing government euid 
opposition from some of its me±)ers who called for leniency^ 
Itie fact/ that it was a section of its own people who fought 
with such intensity shook the foundations of the ruling govern-
ment and proved to be enotionally traumatic for the public. 
For, after all said and done, it was their own young boys 
47 
who were getting killed. 
46. ibid, 25 April, 1971, 
47. ibid, 6 May 1971. 
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SLFP showed a great awareness of this fact and when/ 
referring to the movement, it capitalised on it by skillfully 
differentiating between the leadership and the rank and file. 
This not only brought the vacillating elements in the movement 
arond to its point of view but was also useful for isolating 
the leadership and breeding mistrust and doubt among the follo-
wers. Completely denying the ligitimacy of the JVP, Sirimavo 
began by regarding the leaders as: 
A group of disgruntled and designing persons from the 
rejects and the unwanted of practically every recognised 
political party, motivated by overwhelming personal 
ambitions, personal frustrations and disappointment, 
2UTd rasy^ y for instant solutions to all ills of the 
world. 
l^e movement, she declared, was , "backed by big money, 
diabolical minds and criminal organisers" who were "operating 
through youngmen cind women vrficwi they had successfully led 
49 
astray" She made successive appeals through mass media referring 
to then as 'misguided children', assuring them of a return 
to peaceful life, and portraying herself a mother figure with 
foregiving nature. Other SLFP leaders also spoke in similar 
terms, exposing an organised policy decision on the handling 
of the movenent. 
48. ibid, 25 April 1971. 
49. ibid, 9 April 1971. 
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MISMANAGEMENT OF THE TAMIL PRCeLEM 
The demand for language rights was the main issue that 
brought the Tamils to streets against the Sirimavo regime. 
Even during her first tenure of office, the tamil leadership 
was irked by the policies pursued by the Sirimavo government 
with regard to the recognising of language rights of the mino-
rities. Following the failure of Sirimavo to implement the 
Tamil Language (Special Provision) Act of 1958 along with 
the Official Language Act of 1956 as envisaged in her first 
50 
speech from the throne. Chelvanayeike/ the c±iief of the Federal 
party (FP) called all the Tamil speaking public servants to 
'Refuse to learn Sinhala' and asked them not to help in the 
52 implementation of the Official Language Bill, On 14 April 
1961. As a symbol of Tamil self government; Chelvanayakam 
inaugurated the 'Tamil Arasu Postal Service' Tamil Govemntent 
Postal Service) with its stanp and post offices in Jaffna. 
50. D.B. E*icinapala/ n. 8, p. 33. 
51. Times of India (New Delhi), 25 Dec«±)er 1960. 
52. Ihe Hindu (Madras) 31 January 1961, 
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This was forcibly suppressed by troops and the mernbers 
of parliament belong to the FP were arrested on 18th April 
53 
and held in detention for the next six months. Thus, the 
agitation launched by the FP was not only a movement directed 
towards obtaining official recognition to Tamil language but 
also a protest movement against the implementation of the 
Sinhala official Language Act of 1956. However, the Tamils 
achieved nothing as the government came out with heavy hand 
to deal with them. 
Nearing conclusion of her premiership in 1964, Sirimavo 
claimed that: 
the disabilities placed on the majority comnunity (Sinhalese) 
has been removed. Wieir language and religion have 
been developed and their rightful place ensured. While 
respecting the rights of the minorities, the government, 
with mindful of its obligation to the^Majority of the 
people, has restored their lost rights. 
Ttiis shows so mudi the government's tilt towards protecting 
the interest of the Sinhalese community, showing apathy towards 
the problans of the minorities. But in the 1965 election-
eering, the SLFP, with a view to capture Tamil vote bank. 
53. James Jupp, Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy (London: 
Frank Cass 1978) p. 183. 
54. Robert N. Kearney, Cocrmunalism And Language in the 
Politics of Ceylon (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967) 
p. 122. 
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promised to implement the Tamil Language Act in a manner acce-
55 
ptable to both the Tamils and the Sinhalese. This time the 
FP cDuld ill afford to believe the words of Sirimavo, and turned 
to the camp of the UNP v*iich assured to introduce regulation 
for the use of Tamil and to establish district councils. 
With the inauguration of first republican constitution, 
the Tamil comnunal politics attained an explosive nature in 
the Island. The constitution had derogated even the elementary 
protection which the i^ rdls had enjoyed under the previous 
constitution. Without even offering a satisfatory language 
concession to the minorities based on the provisions of the 
Bandaranaike - ChelvanayeOcam pad: or prescribing New provisions, 
the constitution regarded the regulation passed under the 
Tamil language Act of 1958 as a subordinate legislation. 
Also, for the first time, the Tamils residing out of Northern 
and Eastern provinces, including the government employees 
in Colombo, felt their difficulty when the language declaration 
in the cc»istitution provisioned for them to learn Sinhalese. 
^k5reover, the use of Tamil in the courts of Northern and Eastern 
provinces left to the discretions of the National State Assembly 
55. ibid., p. 123. 
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rather than giving constitutional guarantee. Above all, the 
elimination of clause 29 of the Soulbury constitution which 
dealt with the protection of the interest of the minorities 
caused serious insecurity in the minds of the Tamils. 
To assert the freedom, dignity and rights of the Tamil 
people and to fight against the planned discriminatory policies 
of the UF government, the Tamil United Front (TUP), comprising 
five Tamil political parties, was formed on May 14, 1972. 
At its iraqural conference, five basic resolutions were adopted 
demanding amendment of the constitution, participation of 
the Tamil MPs in the works of the National State Assembly 
Coimiitroent to a non-violent method of struggle, the observance 
of non-violejice in thought, word and deed , and the release 
of the supporters from Jails. 
"Hie frOTit, during its cotrpaign in the North, stated 
that "with the present distorted electoral pattern, and the 
denial of elected representatives to ten lakhs of Tamil planta-
tion workers, the Assembly was by no means a Microcosm of 
56. W.A. Wisma Wamapala, n. 21, p. 223. 
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the Nation". Itie government/ they further argued, paid no 
heed to the mainstream Tamil opinion, and in addition the 
press censorship and the emergency regulations prevented a 
true dialogue between the people and the authors of the consti-
tution. 
In June 1972, the TOF called off their boycott of the 
assembly, and began attending the asserriDly with a view to 
get the constitution amended within a period of three months 
in the pursuance of its six point plan such as official language 
to Tamil, citizenship to all , abolition of special privilege 
to Buddhism/ equal status to all religions and equal right 
to all / liquidation of caste and untouchability and decentra-
lisation of power?^ llie failure to amend the constitution 
resulted in the launching of a non-violent strugtle to regain 
the lost freedom and rights of the Tamil people. Ttie cortpaign 
of protest by the TUF began on 2 October 1972/ and the following 
day S.J. Chelvanayakam/ the leader of the TOF, resigned his 
seat in the National State Assanbly. Further he sought reelection 
from the same constituency to ascertain the future of the 
Tamils - 'Whether they are to be a subject race in Ceylon 
58 
or a free people'. He asked the people to vote for the second 
alternative. 
57. National State Assentoly Debatets, vol. 1, no. 5, 4 July 
1972/ cols. 348-49. 
58. ibid, vol. 2, no.6, 3 October 1972/ cols. 883-84. 
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Finally the poll outcome favoured the TUF which led 
to crystalisaticn of the Tamil demands as the focal point 
of the movement was transferred from "Equality demand" to 
"Self determination". m a historic statement in the wake 
of his election victory, Chelve^iayakam announced that the 
Eelam Tamil Nation should exercise the Sovereignty already 
59 
vested in the Tamil people and become free. Addd to denial 
of language rights to the Tamils was the discriminatory policies 
pursued by Sirimavo in higher education, government employment, 
resource allocation to the Tamil districts and denial of autonomy 
to the provinces. With a clear move to restrict the number 
of Tamil students in higher education, the government introduced 
'Standardisation Scheme' whidi prescribed more marks for the 
Tamils than the Sinhalese in getting admissions in Universities. 
Since 1970, as a result of Colombo's discriminatory policy, 
the perentage of the Tamils in government service declined 
while the Sinhalese registered a steep rise. As regards central 
resources allocation, the Sinhalese districts got an edge 
over the Tamil districts. Last but not least the devolution 
of power at district level did not satisfy the Tamil leadership. 
Ttie net result wag the emergence of the Tamil Militancy and 
birth of "Eelam Movement". 
59. N. Tiruchelvam, 'The Making adn Unmaking of Constitution-
Some Reflections on the Process, Ceylon Journal of 
Historical and Social Studies , vol. 7, June 1977, p. 
21. 
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ECONOMIC POLICY : ERA OF CRISIS 
Establishment of "Socialist Economy" V«P the core objective 
of Sirimavo's economic policy. Towards this end, she ventured 
to formulate several fiscal policies. The government had 
nationalised petroleum distribution as it established The 
Petroleum Corporation and took over 25% of the assets of the 
American Oil Companies such as Shell/ Caltex and Esso. 
Further, it nationalised insurance business as well. 
In 1961, the government established the People's Bank, both 
as a commercial bank and as a source of rural credit. Notwith-
standing the government's determiend efforts to achieve alround 
economic progress, the years since 1960 saw much slower economic 
growth than those before. The government continued with deficit 
financing; during the years 1960-64, the deficit was nmiifi 
at cin annual average of Rs 440 Million or 20% of the total 
60 
expenditure. The main factors behind this state of imbalance 
had been unfavourable terms of trade, decline in prices 
and foreign exchange rates which adversely affected the economic 
development of the country. 
60. Satchiu Ponnambalam, Dependent Capitalism in Crisis: 
The Sri Lankan Economy, 1948-80 (London 1984), p. 45. 
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Since the mid fifties, the merchandise export income 
had not shown any increasing trend. At best it had been constant. 
Ttiis situation had obviously been due to a decline in export 
prices because the export quantity had shown a tendency to 
increase. On the other hand, the value of imports had increased 
to a high level. It may be noted that the rise in the import 
value had been due to an incease in the quantity of impotts 
as well as the escalating prices. ITius the trade balance 
reached a new hight of Rs. 210 Million and the net external 
assets fell to a new low of Rs. 422 Million. Between 1960 
and 1964, the external resource gaip, i.e. the difference between 
current plus capital account foreign exchange earnings rein 
at Rs. 200 Million a year. Hiese problems, v^ich reached 
crisis proportions in the late 1960s and the 1970s, had clearly 
surfaced in the early 1960s during the SLFP government itself. 
But the government failed to understand these early warning 
signs as springing from the deformed structure of the economy, 
but lived in the hope that they were merely passing clouds. 
61. ibid. 
62. ibid. 
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Table - 1 
GOVERNMENT FINANCE 
(in million rupees) 
Revenue 
Expjenditure 
Current Account Surplus 
Capital Expenditure 
Net Cash Deficit 
1960-61 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 
1443 1585 1613 1763 
-1400 -1519 -1609 -1706 
43 66 4 57 
491 471 482 535 
-463 0392 -462 -443 
Method of financing: 
A. Non-Expansionary 221 
AAlinistrative Borrowing 29 
Foreign Aid 
Local Non-
Bank Borrowing 
27 
165 
213 
-34 
94 
154 
302 
-1 
97 
206 
400 
-57 
100 
243 
Expansionary 
Borrowing from Banks 
Use of Cash Balances 
2412 
241 
-
179 
179 
-
161 
115 
ci 
43 
18 
25 
Source: Sri Lanka/ Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs,' 
Recent Econcanic Trends, Septejrber 1966, Quoted in 
S. Ponnairbalam, n. 60, Table 31, p. 46. 
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The government had tried to overcome the balance of 
payment disequilibrium in various ways. Import ad exchange 
controls were imposed and have existed for the past one and 
a half decade. Through these controls the use of foreign 
exchange had been restricted to the inport of most essential 
goods and services. In the absence of any flow of private 
long term capital; the government made use of foreign assistance 
mainly in the form of long term and short term loans. It 
also borrowed from the bank and non-bank institutions such 
as the Insuremce Corporation, the Employees Provident Fund 
and other state owned saving institutions on a massive scale 
as shown in Table - 1. 
Even during the second term of her office (1970-71), 
Sirimavo's government was confronted with a grave economic 
crisis v^ich was highly unprecedented. Ttie crux of the problem 
was that the prices of the country's principal imports more 
specifically of food items had risen to unprecedented heights 
with dramatic rapidity while there had been no correspoding 
rise in the price of its exports. In 1948-60, the rise in 
import price was cnlv 46% whereas in 1960-73 it rose to 
152 percent. 
63. Donald R. Snodgrass, "Sri Lanka's Economic Developnent 
during Twenty Five Years of Independence", The Ceylon 
Journal of Historical and Social Studies, vol"! IV, no. 
101' , January-Decembe.- 1974, p. 121. 
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Itie expenditure on social welfare schemes rose at a 
rapid rate during this period (1970-77). Thus expenditure 
on food subsidy; health and education/ increased from Rs. 
6514 Million in 1960-61 to Rs. 1645 Million in 1974 which 
64 
was around 40% throughout the period. Significantly, the 
import of food stuff alone had incurred a heavy expenditure. 
And the total subsidy constituted Rs. 1092 Million in 1975; 
Rs. 997 Million in 1974, Rs. 732 Million in 1973; Rs. 660 
Million in 1972 and Rs. 612 Million in 1971. This was about 
40% of the gross import programme. As a sequel to the heavy 
expenditure on food stuffs; the normal allocation of foreign 
exchange for vital industrial and agricultural sectors had 
been minimised. 
With rising allocation for food stuffs; the government 
found foreign sources to finance for its inports. Table -
2 shows the extent to v*iich the country's irrports were financed 
by running up external d^ts. As a result; the country received 
a serious setback in its efforts to achieve a rapid improvement 
in the balance of payments - which continued to the most vul-
nerable sector of Sri Lanka economy. The deficit in the balance 
64. IPSA News Review on South Asia, Noverrtoer 1975, p. 1157. 
65. ibid, p. 1158. 
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of payment was the highest ever recorded so far amounting 
to Rs. 13,320 million in 1977 as shovm in Table-3. 
On 9 October 1971, the government announced a five-year 
economic development plan for the period 1972-76 'to boost 
a sagging economy and to lay the foundation for a further 
advance towards a socialist society'. TVie plan argued that 
a drastic change in economic policies has become necessary 
and stressed the need to breeik away from past policies. In 
placing the plan before the people, the Prime Minister stated 
that 'such policies have only created stagnation and frustration 
67 
and led the country into a blind ally. Itiis, therefore, 
meant that new policies and new attitudes are necessary to 
lay the foundation, for a better future. 
"Hirough the development plan, the government intended 
to launch serious efforts for the economic uplift of the country, 
by increcising production in both the agricultural and indus-
trial sector finding jobs for nearly 750,000 Persons and 
68 
raising the level of income. For this, the plan was provided 
66. Sri Lanka Ministry of Planning and Enployment, Five 
Year Plan, 1972-76 (Colontoo:1971), p.l. 
67. ibid, p.11. 
68. K.M. Gunasekara, "The Econotny of Sri Lanka, 1948-73," 
The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies, 
vol. IV, no. 122, Januarv-December, 1974, pp. 82-83. 
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with a total outlay of Rs. 14,820 million, of which 9% was 
allotted to agriculture, 70% to industries, 1.3% to transport 
and cotmunications and 3.4% to construction and housing. The 
plan hoped to achieve a rate of growth in GNP at 6% annually 
during the plan period 1972-76, and an increase in per capita 
real income from Rs. 910 per annum to Rs. 1150 per annum in 
69 1976, and provision of employment for 810,000 persons. 
Over the plan fseriod, it was decided that the private 
sector would be responsible for nearly 50% of the total invest-
ment. This means, that the plan, despite its commitment to 
the idea of a socialist economy, placed reliance on the active 
participation of the private sector. Though it had been empha-
sised in the plan that private foreign investment would be 
welcomed, the view of the private sector was that no incentives 
had been provided to assist them in the implanentation of 
the plan. This therefore, demanded a restatanent of government's 
strategy on private foreign investment, and a white paper v^ich 
was issued in July 1972 provided more incentives to the private 
foreign sector. 
69. Central Bank of Ceylon, Report - 1972, p. 13. 
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However, the question of plan implementation received 
little attention. Itie plan was to commence in 1978/ but the 
1971-72 bucSget did not coincide fully with the annual targets 
of the plan. The eibandonment of certain taxation proposals 
by the Minister of Finance created a crisis for both the budget 
and the plan. The Prime Minister herself admitted that as 
a result of economic difficulties, increased by the world eco-
nomic problems, it was discovered that the plan could not be 
70 inplemented as envisaged. Even money allocated for developmen. 
had been used to import food items. 
Hie main reason for unprecedented econcmic crisis was 
the shart fall in rice production. At the end of previous 
government's (UNP) term of office in May 1970 the rice prodjc-
tion reached an all-time record level of 75% of self-sufficiency. 
Had this pace of development been sustained over the last three 
years the country would well have reached 90% self- sufficiency 
by 1974, cind would have been totally independent of 
71 foreign suppliers of rice by 1975-76. Instead there had 
70. Ceylon Daily News, 29 December 1974, 
71. K.A. Da Silva, "Mrs. Bandaranaike's Government in Trouble' , 
The Round Table, vol. 63, no. 251, July 1973, p. 512. 
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been a decline in the level of rice production during Siri-
mavo's, term of office. Amidst this, as the government came 
to power by promising to increase the quantity of rice on the 
ration, it had to provide a smooth supply of food and even to 
abolish the existing system of rationing 'subsidiary food 
stuffs". 
Table 2 
FINANCING OF IMPORT, 1971-77 
(Million rupees) 
1977 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
I. Imports 
II.Source of 
foreign 
Financing 
Loans 
Grants 
Suppliers 
Credit 
Short-Term 
Trade 
Credits 
Bank Borro-
wing 
IMF Draw-
ing 
2218 
468 
105 
58 
658 
— 
146 
2153 
415 
100 
52 
593 
12 
225 
2644 
335 
94 
240 
769 
— 
137 
4663 
462 
282 
429 
836 
16 
377 
5334 
886 
541 
368 
723 
36 
369 
5417 
943 
492 
356 
910 
1 
273 
6290 
1184 
490 
153 
225 
222 
938 
Total 1465 1397 1575 2402 2923 2975 3194 
III.Foreign Finan-
cing as percentage 
of total 
imports 66.1 64.9 59.6 52.2 54.8 55.0 51.0 
Source: Central Bank of Ceylon, Annual Reports, 1976, n.60, 
p.99. 
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Table - 3 
External Debts Oitstanding 1971-77 
(Million rupees) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Official Long 
term Loans 1919 2337 2687 2936 3705 4968 10593 
Suppliers 
Credits 75 94 329 620 787 633 963 
I.M.F. Drawings 448 466 464 628 830 916 1212 
Bank Borrowings 334 352 245 262 302 309 552 
Total 2776 3249 3725 4446 5624 6826 13320 
Source: Central Bank of Ceylon, Annual Reports, ibid. 
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The year 1974 had an intensive activity/ especially 
in the agricultural sector. The government concentrated on 
a food production drive - a total war on the food front. 
Sirimavo eqphasised that agriculture should be given priority 
over industries in the context of a food crisis to pjll the 
country out of its econcmic difficulties. In early 1975/ 
she launched a cash progranme for food production in order 
to achieve self-sufficiency and to achieve economic freedom. 
She appealed to her countrymen to participate in the programne 
and forget their political difference at a time when the country 
72 
was 'on the brink of calamity'. 
^ e most immediate short term economic strategy was 
to concentrate on agricultural production - particularly food 
production. In August/ 1975 the government launched two major 
crop diversification projects/ covering nearly 150,000 acres 
to replace uneconomic plantations. On the other hand/ Sri 
Lanka tried to mci>ilise economic resource through external 
aid to finance the agricultural expansion scheme. Besides 
the Sri Lanka Aid Group's assurance for a large scale of assi-
stance/ the government received in 1975 grants amoijnted to 
72. IPSA News Review on South Asia (New Delhi), February 
1973/ p.69. 
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Rs.558 million and Rs.738 million and as bilateral credits 
which included Rs.202 million from China. To finance immediate 
needs/ the government sought assistance from the IMF for a 
73 
Rs.234 million loan in foreign exchange. 
Also the government increased allocation for develop-
ment. The five year plan was revised in 1975, the capital 
expenditure for 1976 showed ein increase of 40% from Rs.2086 
million in 1975 to Rs.2940 million in 1976. Most of which 
74 
was earmarked for development expenditure of economic nature. 
Ihe allocation for national planning was doubled. An importcint 
item of expenditure in this was the doubling of the capital 
to Rs.250 million for the food production drive within the 
decentralised budget. To promote investment in the private 
sector, the government repealed the much dreaded business 
acquisition act of 1971 as further inducement to local and 
foreign investors. The act was considered a great disincentive 
to private investment. As a result of these measures, the 
Sri Lanka econcmy benefitted little/ if not deteriorated 
further. 
73. ibid, January 1973, p.1161. 
74. ibid. 
75. For an extensive analysis of the economy in 1976, see 
P.V.J. Jayesekera, "Sri Lanka in 1976 : Changing Strate-
gies and Confrontation", Asian Survey, vol. XVII, no.2, 
January 1977, pp.208-217. 
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SIRIMAVO'S REFORMS 
Never had the Sirimavo government introduced smy far 
reaching measures to reform the administrative system except 
a few during the first term of her office. In 1960/ within 
a week of formation of the government / she brought out some 
minor healthy trends in administration. To recapitualate/ 
(a) the nuitt>er of ministers were brought down to the minimum 
by combining portfolios, (b) orders were issued on her personal 
authority to curtail expenses on foreign tours of ministers, 
party menfcers, and officials, (c) abolition of unnecessary 
unproductive jobs was declared by the treasury chief, 
(d) provision for an interim budget for the first three months 
of the next financial year (1960-61) had been made instead 
of asking the Governor-General for authorising expenditure 
from the consolidated fund, (e) a new department of Foreign 
Aid was set up which functioned under the Prime Minister her-
self, and (f) cinother department of National Planning was 
set up to function under the Finance Minister. However, 
her second terr of office had witnessed some administrative 
inefficiency and delays which, indeed, shook the stability 
of the Sri Lanka system. 
76. Krishna Prasanna Mukerji, Madam F>rime Minister : Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike (Colombo : 1960), pp.62-63. 
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But the uprising of the JVP in 1971 had, no doubt, 
instilled into Sirimavo's UF government a sense of urgency 
for radical socio-economic reforms. To promote the welfare 
of the people, she undertook several pioneering measures. 
Of the many schemes devised in this direction, settlement 
schemes such as youth settlement, cooperative settlement and 
land reform settlement were significant in the sense that 
they had broad appeal to create unerrployment and increase 
agricultural production at low cost, maintain econoiric and 
social equality between members, develop cooperative forms 
of organisation, achieve self-reliance and managanent by 
the marbers, cind integrate the new settlements with surround-
ing comnunities. 
In the mid 1960s there were about 200,000 uneqployed 
youths in the age group 19-25 years, about 40 per cent of 
whom were educated up to the General Certificate of Education 
77 (Grade 10). Despite the urban orientation of many of than, 
there was a growing realisation that serious steps would have 
to be taken to redirect their energies and to find ertployment 
77. Nihal Amarasinghe, "An Overview of Settlement Schenes 
in Sri Lanka", Asian Survey, vol.16, no.7, July 1976, 
p.627. 
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for them in agriculture. Unemployed youth had little chance 
of finding places on the colonisation schemes at that time; 
as the selection process gave preference to landless people 
with large families and agricultural experience. Although 
provision was made later for selecting 10% of the settlers 
from among educated youth; this plan met with little success 
in solving the growing problem of unemployment among educa-
ted youth. To eradicate this problan; the youth settlement 
programme was initiated during the UNP government in 1966/ 
cind expanded by the Sirimavo regime. 
The achievement of youth settlement schene proved less 
than v^at was expected. After a review of the schanes in 
1971, the land commissioner recomnended that a number of these 
schemes with no chance of success be closed down, and that 
no new ones be started. However, a small number of economi-
cally successful sch&aes were permitted to expand, particularly 
those based on high value crops. 
In 1971 the SLFP government initiated 'Cooperative 
Agricultural Settlement' — projects to provide anployment, 
particularly to the educated uneirploveo with a satisfactory 
income level which would be ccmparable with rewards in alterna-
tive employment; and to conserve foreign exchange. 
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It was proposed to establish cooperative farms on an electoral 
basis, priority being given to areas where unemployment was 
acute and where infrastructure development cost vrould be low. 
The size of a cooperative settlement was to be a mini-
mum of 100 acres. The roenbers selected for these settlements 
had to be residents in the electorate within a radius of five 
miles from the project,. in the group 18-35. Itie members 
were to form a special coc^ serative society or join cin existing 
primary cooperative society. Funds were to be drawn from 
the share capital of members, greints from the government and 
equity capital from other institutions approved by the autho-
rities. lt»e projects were to be administered by the commi-
ttee of management with a project Manager responsible to the 
committee Ttie land was to be assigned to cooperative socie-
ties on a long term lease. 
Sixty five cooperative farms covering an area of 14,581 
acres were approved for development during the period 1971-
73. By the end of 1974, 52 settlements had been started and 
78 
provincial employment for 3183 persons. However, the schane 
78. ibid. 
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failed to achieve its expected target due to many reasons. 
Some of them are : selection of individual with no commitment 
to farming/ insufficient understanding of the objectives and 
concepts of cooperative farming by the individuals selected, 
dissatisfaction amongst members who were largely educated 
youth and who expected supervisory positions, lack of oroper 
motivation and even personality conflicts among selected indi-
viduals, the selection of persons with vested interests in 
their ancestral village, particularly paddy fanning v^ich 
led to long periods of absence from the settlement, and the 
unwillingness of the Sinhalese youth to work alongside Indian 
labour. 
The nationalisation of the estates belonging to public 
companies, both foreign and local, was one of the most sig-
nificant decisions taken by the Sirimavo administration in 
the direction of achievanent of accelerated economic, develop-
ment. This came into effect with the passing of the Land 
Reforms (Amendment) Law of 1975 by the NationalState Assembly 
supported by all parties, in October 1975. This historic 
79. Interim Report of the Panel on the Mid-Country Region, 
Development Proposals for LRC Lands Managed by USAWASAM, 
Mimeo (1975), cited in ibid. 
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piece of legislation brought to a close more than a century 
of foreign ownership in the plantation sector, which had been, 
and still is, the mainstay of country's economy. 
The Land Reform (Amen<iTient) Law of 1975 vested in the 
Lan3 Beform Comnission (LRC), already set up under the 1972 
Law, control over 415,608 acres of estate lands belonging 
to 232 public companies. Itie number of estates that came 
80 
within the take-over amounted to 396. Of these 376 were 
managed by the agency houses (The Law provides for their take 
over SiS well) while the remaining 20 estates were managed 
by owning ccmpanies. Approximately 50% of the estate lands 
81 
natiOTialised belonged to the sterling companies. 
Following the nationalisation of estates, the government 
undertook land reform settlanent and villctge expansion schemes. 
These settlements were established in pursuance of the obje-
ctive of land reform law of 1975 \^ich limited the ownership 
of land to 50 acres per family except for paddy leind where 
the ceiling was 25 acres. Any privately held land in excess 
of this ceiling was to be acquired by the Land Reform Commi-
ssion and developed or resettled in a way that would increase 
82 
erployment and productivity. 
80. Central Bank of Ceylon, Bulletin, October 1975, pp.779-
80 
81. ibid. 
> 2. N. Balakrishnan, "Sri LariKa in 1975 : Political Crisis 
and Split in the Coalition", Asian Survey, vol.16, no.5, 
May 1976. 
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The policy adopted by the Land Reform Commission with 
regard to settlements had been kept flexible. The planning 
of each settlement was done by the officers of the Land Reform 
Cofimission in consultation with the members of the coopera-
tives. The fincincial requirements were advanced as loan from 
the Land Reform Commission. In the selection of members, 
priority was given to citizen members of the estates. Other 
members were selected from nearby villages on the basis of 
need, background and ideological commitment. Land rights 
were held collectively, and managed by cin executive commission 
and supporting organisations. 
During the mid 70s there were 165 cooperative settle-
ments covering an area of 48,000 acres and providing employ-
ment to 17,000 persons. As regards the success of these pro-
jects, they were hurdled by multifarious factors such as wrong 
selection of menbers without taking into account of their 
suitability and ideological commitment, and lack of technical 
know-how, emd the selection of farm enterprise requiring 
83 
specialised skills and experience. 
83. For details, see, Annual Report, n.60, 1974. 
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Besides, a nuinber of progressive welfare measures were 
also undertaken by the government. It nationalised in 1950 
the majority of schools inparting primary and secondary educa-
tion. A special committee on housing appointed in 1970 reco-
mmended among other things a scheme to take over privately 
owned houses and to distribute them to their present tenants 
and others in need of accommodation. In the sphere of econo-
mic development, the measures were nationalisation of the 
Bank of Ceylon, the biggest commercial bank in the Island 
and entire petroleum aind insurance business in Sri Lanka. 
Finally, the government expanded the commercial activities 
of the cooperative v^olesale establishment which was responsi-
ble for the iirport and distribution of essential commodities, 
virtually elbowing out the private trade. 
FCREIOJ POLICY UNDER SIRIMAVO'S GOVERNMENT 
Sirimavo continued adroitly the policy set in motion 
by her husband. Friendly and cordial relations were maintained 
with all the countries. However, unlike the UNP government, 
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during Sirimavo's regime, Sri Lanka shifted her foreign policy 
orientation more to the left. This was quite obviuous consi-
dering the existence of a powerful left wing component in 
her government and her own preference for closer association 
with non-aligned and comnunist states which were opposed to 
all forms of western colonialism. She became more outspoken 
in her anti-colonialist and anti-militarist approach to foreign 
policy. At the end of 1963/ the Sirimavo government refused 
permission to the US Seventh Fleet to enter Sri Lanka territo-
rial water and protest against the presence of this fleet 
in the Indian Ocean. At a Banquet in her honour in Peking 
in January 1963/ Sirimavo declared : 
Ttie Natiore that have newly emerged in Asia and 
Africa must stand together in their struggles or 
must run the risk of succumbing once more to the 
rapacious designs of the West. The old saying 
that vmited we stand divided we fall applies with 
equal force to nations as it does to individuals. 
The spirit of Bandung is in part of crystallisation 
of this thought. "Hie seven years that have elapsed 
since that historic conference have been the birth 
of nations v^ich like ourselves shook off the shack-
les of colonialism and enjoy <OTce more the sovere-
ignty that is rightly theirs. 
84. S.U. Kodikara, Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka : A Third 
World Perspective (New Delhi ; 1982), p.106. 
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The indictment of the rapacious west in her speech 
led comnentators to consider Sirimavo's Non-Alignment policy 
to be different from that of her husband oriented in favour 
of the communist countries/ while the speech was largely meant 
as an expression of Sri Lanka's anti-colonialism, on which 
Sri Lan)ca government had always held strong views, there is 
no doubt that relations with the West during Sirimavo's regime 
became considerably strained. 
ROLE IN NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT 
As regards Sirimavo's role in Non-Aligned Movement/ 
it may be said that the movement picked up ntxnentum and star-
ted to play a significeint role in international politics during 
the period 1970-77. While addressing the Lusaka Conference 
in Septarber 1970, Sirimavo reaffirmed the need to adhere 
to the tenets of Non-Alignment. She stated that her government 
was pledged to pursue an active and constructive policy of 
N":;n -Alignment in foreign affairs. The policy of Non-Align-
ment was extremely important to Sri Lanka because that consti-
tuted a frontline defence against external threats. Since 
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Sri Lanka had limited resources for defence/ she had to rely 
85 
on the support and friendship of the Nc«-Aligned cocmiunity. 
ITiis attitude was fundamental to Sri LanJca's policy of friend-
ship with all countries. 
The Non-Aligned policy followed by Sri Lanka attained 
a high water-mark when Colombo hosted the fifth Non-Aligned 
suitmit, the first of its kind to be held in Asia in 1976. 
The core of the Government's policy stance at the conference 
was the attempt to reassure the Western powers that Non-Aligned 
diplomacy does not envisage a confrontation with them. This 
was indeed the central message that the E>riine Minister conveyed 
through her inaugural address to the rest of the world : "That 
search (for a system of world economic relations) is glcA>al 
cind its emphasis is on cooperation, not confrontation. Confro-
86 
ntation is a negative concept". 
85. For details/ Sri Lanka Department of Information, Text 
of the Speech by Sirimavo Bandaranaike in Lusaka in 9 
SepteiTt>er 1970, Press Release, no.7, 1970. 
86. P.V.J.Jayasekera, n.75, p.216. 
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This in effect was the culmination of the back-peda-
lling in the UF's originally declared ideologically oriented 
anti-western foreign policy. Despite the repeated calls for 
unity among the Non-Aligned Nations, the Prime Minister also 
cissured the West that they do not constitute cinother bloc. 
Sri Lcinka's role on the whole was to push the Non-Aligned 
movement back to the centre from the left-radical direction 
it had taken after the Algiers conference of 1973. 
The real conduct of Sri Lanka's Non-Alignment was deci-
sively influenced by the domestic considerations, both poli-
tical and economic. The political orientation of the parties, 
the economic vulnerability of a anall and primary commodity 
producing country and the over-all commitment to pursue an 
independent stance propelled successive governments, in Sri 
Lanka to adopt Non-Alignment cis a major plank of their foreign 
,. 87 policy. 
Thus, in various Non-Aligned conferences Sirimavo advo-
cated the restructuring of existing international relationship. 
Participating in the Algiers conference of Non-Aligned states 
she said : "It now SOOTIS appropriate to provide an economic 
dimension to the concept of Non-Alignment in terms more concrete 
87. Rikhi Jaipal, Non-Alignment, Origins, Growth and Potential 
for World Peace (Delhi : 1983), p.24. 
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than has been the case so far". With a view to breaking 
the monopoly of the multinational banks of the industralised 
countries, she called for the establishment of a commercial 
bank for the Third World. She also suggested the development 
of a currency having the support of the Third World to compete 
89 
with the reserve currencies of the developed world. She 
also mooted the idea of a world fertiliser fund at the thir-
tieth session of the economic commission for Asia and Far 
East held in Colombo in March 1974. This was accepted with 
some alterations under the name of Agricultural Development 
Fund. The ColcMtibo Summit conference of 1976 also gave much 
stress on economic development. While submitting the decision 
of the ColOTto summit to the 31st Session of the UN General 
Assembly in September 1976, Sirimavo stated thus , 
a constcint thread running through all the economic 
documents of the Colombo summit is the emphasis 
on collective self-reliance. I should make it 
clear that this approach is not one of hostility 
and confrontation Rewards any single country or 
group of countries. 
88. Algeria Department of Information, Collection of Speeches 
by Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries 
(Algiers, 1973), p.137. 
89. Urmila phadnis and Sivananda Patnaik, "Non-Alignment as 
a Foreign Policy Strategy : A Case Study of Sri Lanka", 
International Studies, vol.20, no.1-2, January-June 1981, 
p.236. 
90 Cited in S.U. Kodikara, n.84, p.144. 
294 
SIRIMAVO AS AN ADVOCATE OF PEACE IN INDIAN OCEAN 
A notable aspect of Sirimavo's non-aligned foreign 
policy was her advocation for demilitarisation of the Indian 
ocean. Indeed, the genesis of the concept "The Indian Oceain 
as a zone of Peace "could be traced back to the conference 
of heads of states of the Non-Aligned countries held in Cairo 
in 1964 when Sirimavo formulated it for the first time, jt 
was mainly due to her effort that the Cairo Non-Aligned con-
ference adopted two resolutions which impinged directly on 
the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. While 
one of them envisaged the creation of zones devoid of nuclear 
weapons covering the oceans of the world especially those 
oceans v^ich had been previously free of nuclear weapons, 
the other resolution condemned the big power's efforts to 
91 
establish and maintain bases in the Indiein Ocean. However, 
during the period 1965-70, the Indian Ocean peace zcxie concept 
was rarely discussed. But, with the advent of Sirimavo into 
power in 1970, the concept was revived. 
91. UAR, Ministry of National Information, Conference of 
Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries, 
October 5-10, Cairo 1964, p.350. 
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The principal thrust of Sirimavo's policy was aimed 
at getting acceptance in international cotmiunity of the Indijm 
Ocean peace zone proposal. In the Lusaka conference of Non-
Aligned nations in September 1970/ Sirimavo told the delega-
tes of her proposal at the 1964 Cairo conference to convert 
the Indian Ocean area into a nuclear free zone. She said 
that Latin America and Africa had already been accorded such 
a ocean should join us not only in giving effect to the proposal 
92 but also in keeping the Indian Ocean as area of peace. 
A resolution was accepted by the Lusaka Summit calling upon 
the UN General Asseirbly to adopt a declaration of the Indian 
Ocean as a zone of peace v^erefrom big power rivalry would 
be eliminated. In the comnonwealth conference in Singapore 
in January 1971; Sri Lcin3ca forcefully put forward the 
case for a zone in the Indian Ocean. Sirimavo stated that 
the final objective of the peace zone would be to stabilise 
the Indian Ocean as a power vacuum so that the abrasive confli-
cts of the cold war do not enter it and the region could con-
centrate on the solution of its major problems of security, 
93 
underdevelopment. 
92. "Ceylon Premier at Lusaka Conference", Ceylon Today 
(Colonto), vol.19, nos.9-10, September-Octctoer 1970, 
pp.5-6. 
93. Cited in Kodikaro, n.84, p.141. 
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In fact, one of the motive forces that inpelled Sri 
Lanka to advocate for the peace zone proposal was concern 
for its own security. Being a small island in the vast expanse 
of Indian Ocean/ it felt vulnerabale and thought its national 
security to be in danger due to the increasing rivalry of 
the great powers. Thus, participating in the proceedings 
of the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1971 Sirimavo 
stated our object is to contain the activities of foreign 
powers and ensure that they do not make our part of the world 
94 
a battle ground for their rivalries. 
She defined her zone of peace proposal as follows : 
The essence of our proposal is that in the Indiaui 
Ocean a defined area shall be declared to be a 
zone of peace and reserved exclusively for peaceful 
purposes under an appropriate regulatory system. 
Within the one no armaments of any kind, defensive 
or offensive, may be installed on in the sea, or 
the adjacent seabed or on leind areas. Ships of 
all nations may exercise the right of transit but 
warships an6 ships carrying warlike equipment, 
including submarines, may not stop for other thein 
energency reascms for a techmical, mechanical or 
humanitaricin nature. No manoeuver by warship of 
any shall be permitted. Naval intelligence opera-
tions shall be forbidden. No weapon tests of any 
kind may be conducted. The regulatory system to 
the established will be under effective international 
control. 
94. Ceylon Daily News, 12 October, 1971. 
95. Ceylon Today vol.20, nos 9-10, September-October 1971, 
p.14. 
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On 16 December 1971, the UN General Assernbly passed 
a resolution entitled 'Declaration of Indian Ocean as a Zone 
of Peace'. Its acceptance by a large number of countries 
and the establishment of an ad hoc committee of the UN under 
Sri Lanka's leadership to take further steps for implementa-
tion of the proposal were major personal triumph for Sirimavo. 
The efforts of the UN Connittee were succeeded by the 
meeting of foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned countries which 
was held in Lima in August 1975. Itie Lima declaration of 
30 August 1975 took into account the different attitude of 
the big powers. It expressed anxiety over the establishment 
of the military base in Diego Garcia and urged the littoral 
states not to cooperate with the big powers in their military 
activities. All these reiterated in the resolution adopted 
by the fifth Non-Aligned summit held at Colombo in August 
96 1976, under the Chairmanship of Sirimavo. 
96. See Ministry of External Affairs of India, Documents 
of the Gatherings of the Non-Aligned Countries (1961-
82), New Delhi, 1983, p.202. 
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Thus/ various international forums like the UN, the 
Cortmonwealth of Nations Non-Aligned Conference had been uti-
lised by Sri Lanka with a view to mobilise support on the 
issues pertaining to Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Amongst 
the Indian Ocean countries, Sri Lanka played a leading role 
in using the methods of conference diplomacy to deal with 
the problem of Indian Ocean. In geographical position and 
non-controversial image made it ideal for such peace keeping 
responsibilities. 
SIRIMAVO'S POLICY TOWARDS CHINA, PAKISTAN AND INDIA 
Ttie rapid deterioration of India's relations with 
China and Pakistan during the Sirimavo period involved a vital 
question of policy for the Sri Lan3<an government. Sri Lanka's 
relationship with these countries may be assessed in the context 
of its overall response to the Indo-China war of 1952 eind 
the Bangladesh crisis which led to Indo-Pak war in 1971. 
As regards Sino-Indian dispute in October 1962, Sri Lanka 
did not formally support Indian stcince in the dispute or brand 
China the aggressor. This attitude created considerable consi-
deration on the Indian side. However, it was not completely 
unreasonable on Sri Lanka's part to have pursued a neutralist 
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policy in the conflict between the two big Asian powers. 
Ihe economic vulnerabilities inherent in a small country like 
that of Sri Lanka, imposed considerable constraints on its 
action. Sri Lanka exported more than 60 percent of her total 
rubber exports to China, and lacquired from her more than 
40 percent of her total rice iiiports under the rubber-rice 
barter agreement. China had been providing liberally, since 
1957, economic assistance to the Island. Thus, China had 
stuck for quite some time to a pattern of aid and trade quite 
97 favourable to Sri Lanka. Hence, an unqualified support 
to India would, therefore, have adverse repercussions on 
the Sri Lankan economy, sri Lanka neutrality on this issue also 
emanated from the approadi that the limits of Non-Aligned 
were actually applicable to Sino-Indian conflict as to the 
98 
conflict between power blocs. 
In the midst of the conflict, Sirimavo contacted both 
New Delhi and Beijing to explore devices for a ceasefire. 
Ihe Indian government set a pre-condition for ceasefire that 
97. Anuradha Muni, "Sri Lanka's China Policy : Major Trends". 
South Asian Studies, vol.8, no.l, January 1973, pp.72-
98. 
98. S.U. Kodikaro, Indo-Ceylon Relations since Independence 
(Colombo : 1965), p.54. 
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Chinese troops should withdraw to the dividing line of 8 Sept-
en4)er 1962. But China stuck to the view that the 7 November 
1959 arrangement should be respected. However, the ceasefire 
was made effective on the midnight of 21-22 Novanber, 1962 
and China announced the withdrawal of its troops to the line 
as existed on 7 November 1959. 
But as the line of demarcation was still not resolved 
Sirimavo convened at Colombo a conference of six Non-Aligned 
countries to find out possibilities of bringing a conciliation 
between the two warring parties. As the emissary of the Colombo 
powers, she went to New Delhi and Beijing to convince them 
about the efficacy of the power's proposals for durable peace, 
99 but It was a futile exercise. 
As far as the Bangladesh crisis was concerned, Sri 
Lcinka maintained that it was cin internal issue of Pakistan 
and considered East Pakistan's demand as one of fratricidal 
and separationist in nature. It provided transit facilities 
to the West Pakistani troops and arms to send to the Eastern 
wing for suppressing the Bangladesh revolt. 
99. See Urmila Phadnis, "Ceylon and Sino-Indian Border Conflict", 
Asian Survey, vol 3, no.4, April 1963, p.194. 
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Side by side Sri Lanka also showed its anxiety with 
regard to the influx of refugees to India and took the atti-
tude that this was a problem of humanitarian concern of the 
world community. The settlement of this problem was an urgent 
matter and while Sri Lanka emp^ iasised on the policy of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other states, it main-
tained that accelerated political and constitutional proce-
100 dures in Pakistcin might facilitate the return of the refugees. 
The prevalence of crisis in the immediate and its internationa-
lism through involvement of external powers was viewed with 
great concern auid auixiety by Sri Lanka. She weinted restora-
tion of peace in the region. Sirimavo also took efforts to 
act as a mediator between the two countries to establish 
peace. She proposed to convene a Non-Aligned conference akin 
to that of 1962 on Sino-Indian border crisis. 
However/ the outbreak of a full-fledged war between 
India and Pakistan in Decenfcer 1971 culminating in the «tier-
gence of Bangladesh as an independent entity altered the situa-
tion. The transformation of a situation needed a new apprai-
sal of the entire issue by Sri Lanka. The shift in Sri Lanka's 
perception was clearly seen from the stand taken by her in 
the UNO. 
100. Ceylon Daily News, 13 December 1971, 
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On 8 Decent>er 1971 in the General Asseinbly, Sri Lanka 
voted for the Argentina resolution which called for immediate 
ceasefire and withdrawal of Indian troops. However, while 
speaking in the security council for which Sri Lanka sought 
special permission, its delegate Amarasinghe maintained that 
political settlement of Bangladesh issue was the key to the 
Indo-Pak conflict and wanted the withdrawal of troops to succ-
eed the settlement . 
Subsequent reports indicated that Sri Lanka refused 
to comply with Pakistcin's request of reopening the issue before 
the UN General Assembly. Ttius, during the critical phase, 
Sri Lanka by her Non-Coimiital stance, tried to manipulate 
both India and Pakistem to keep a balance of power to preserve 
her own national security. But when Bangladesh became a 
fait acconpli, Sri Lanka reformulated her stemce in the context 
of the energing power configuration in the subcontinent. 
The Sirimavo government had always maintaianed a con-
sciously cordial relationship with India. It was only during 
her period several bilateral problems were amicably settled. 
Ilie most remarkable diplomatic achiev^nent of Sri Lanka's 
relations with India was the signing of the Indo-Ceylon agree-
ment of October 1964 pertaining to the question of persons 
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of Indian origin in Sri Lanka. Under the agreement/ Sri Lanka 
decided to grant citizenship to 300,000 of an estimated 9,75/000 
persons of Indian origin in the Island. India agreed, on 
its part, to grant Indian citizenship and repatriate to India 
525,000 such persons, the period of the validity of the agree-
ment being 15 years. Natural increase in the stipulated num-
bers for repatriation to India and grant of Ceylon citizenship, 
respectively, were also envisaged under the agreement, which 
provided for transfer of assets of repatriates upto a speci-
fied limit. For the 150/000 persons who were not covered 
by this agreement was negotiated in 1974. According to Sirimavo-
Indira Gandhi agreement, both the countries agreed to share 
the total number equally, i.e. 75,000 to each. 
During the goodwill visit of the Indian Prime Minister, 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi to Sri Lanka in April 1973, the issue of 
102 
Kachchativu was discussed in detail. The Joint Communique 
issued at the end of her visit stated that discussions on 
the Island of Kachchativu and related matters such as the 
101. For details, Lalit Kumar, India and Sri Lanka, Sirimavo-
Shastri Pact (New Delhi ; 1977). 
102. 'India - Sri Lanka Joint Communique", Foreign Affairs 
Record, vol.19, no.4, April 1973, pp.190-193, 
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median line and fishing rights would continue and an early 
decision arrived at. Ttie Sri Lankan Premier paid a visit 
to India in the following year. Both the Prime Ministers 
discussed Kachchativu and other related matters. After deta-
iled discussion and examination, and agreement was signed 
in 1974 which defined the boundary between India and Sri Lanka 
in their historic waters in Palk Strait and Palk Bay. This 
also solved the problem of overlap v^ich arose due to the 
extension by both countries of their territorial waters from 
six to twelve nautical miles in 1967. Although the agreement 
did not refer specifically to Kachchativu, the island became 
a part of Sri Lanka under the agreement. As a matter of 
fact, the most notable aspect of the agreement from Sri Lankan 
perspective was that it put an end once and for all to the 
long dispute over the ownership of the island. 
The agreement substantively strengthened the relations 
between the governments of Indira Gandhi and Sirimavo. Sri 
Lanka also extended its political and moral support to India 
on some vital isses. While several countries condemend India's 
nuclear explosion in May 1974, Sri Lanka accepted India's 
stance on using its newly acquired nuclear capability only 
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for peaceful and productive uses. Besides, when Pakistan 
tried to use the 15 member ad hoc UN Committee as a forum 
to attack India over the nuclear explosion, Sri Lanka in its 
capacity as Chairman of that comniittee prevented the former 
^ , . 103 from doing so. 
Another agreement was signed by the two countries on 
23 March, 1976 to demarcate the maritime boundary between 
104 
Sri Lanka and India in the Gulf of Mannar and the Bay of Bengal. 
The agreement stipulated that each party would have sovereign 
rights and exclusive jurisdiction over the continental shelf 
and the exclusive economic zone as well as over their resources, 
v^ether living or non-living, falling on its side of the boun-
dary. The agreement also required each party to respect rights 
of navigation through its territorial sea and exclusive econo-
mic zones in accordance with its laws and regulations and 
the rules of international law. The agreement envisaged that 
if any single geological, petroleum or natural gas structure 
or field existing on one side of the boundary was exploited 
on the other side of the boundary, the two countries should 
103. S.D, Muni, "Kachchativu Settlement : Befriending Neigh-
bouring Regimes", Economic and Political Weekly, vol.9 
no.28, 13 July, 1974, p.1121. 
104. Ceylon Daily News, 25 March, 1976. 
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reach agreement as to the manner in which the structure or 
field shall be most effectively exploited and the manner in 
which the proceeds deriving therefrom, shall be apportioned. 
By a supplementary agreement of 22 Novent>er, 1976, 
Sri Lanka and India determined the extension of their maritime 
boundary in the Gulf of Mannar from position 13m defined in 
their March 1976 agreement to the trijunction point which 
was agreed upon by India/ Sri Lanka and Maldives in July 1976. 
With the conclusion of this agreement/ the maritime boundary/ 
in the entire stretch from the Bay of Bengal to the Indian 
Ocean had been demarcated between the two countries. 
DECLINE AND DOWNFALL OF MRS. BANDARANAIKE 
Among the reasons responsible for the decline and even-
tual downfall of Mrs. Sirimavo Bcindaranaiake/ the most impor-
tant was her political performance and the inability to recog-
nise the reality obtained in her country during 1977. The 
105. IPSA News Review on South Asia April 1976, p.294, 
106. Indian Express, 23 November/ 1976. 
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state controlled media which projected a positive picture 
of her government and her political image among the masses 
denied her the opportunity to know the full reality of the 
actual happenings in the country. Misled by her own assess-
ments she did not respect the views of her own party members 
who were having differences of opinion with her thinking that 
they were jealous of her popularity. Similarly, she did not 
tolerate her partners eind their political opinions in the 
coalition. These were people who were indeed responsible 
in bridging her back to power in 1970. For instance, she expe-
lled the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) in August 
1975 inspite of the fact that there were very important indivi-
duals among then who had rendered her very valuable help in 
the forming of the coalition and forging the much required 
solidarity. 
Seeing the fate of their canrades, the Communist party 
(Moscow) did not want to face similar humiliation and decided 
to leave the coalition and withdraw their support to her. 
It is necessary to mention that the United Front government 
had three important ministers who were marxists. Almost all 
of them had provided the brain and the foresight for the United 
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Front and when they departed the coalition lost its creative 
force. However, the electorate did not understand the reason 
behind the existence of the Marxists from the United Front 
and therefore they did not vote for these Marxists in the 
107 
1977 election. 
Another important factor which was responsible for 
her defeat in 1977 election was the unpopularity among the 
youth. The so called socialist experiment of the U.F. had 
lost favour with the youth, an important sector of the electo-
rate, not because it failed to fulfil its promises but because 
the leadership had turned extremely arrogant. 
Inspite of the fact that there were many progressive 
legislations during her rule, the gross mismanagCTent, wide-
spread corruption, nepotism and bribery undermined her better 
legislation and finally defeated her. Her rival Junius Richard 
Jayewardene siezed the op^rtunity and exploited the arbitrary 
and dictatorial posture of Mrs. Bandaremaike. He was able 
to provide a reasonable alternative econcxnic programme that 
was attractive to the electorate. 
107. For details see Bruce Mathews, "Recent Developments 
in Sri Lanka Politics", Pacific Affairs, Spring 1978, 
vol.51, no.l. 
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Inspite of massive propaganda by the government contro-
lled media, she in fact could only appeal for more time for 
the social experiment to bear fruit. With no other specific 
achievement in the public sector and due to serious financial 
difficulty in the plantation industry, Mrs. Bandaranaike had 
to concentrate on her charismatic leadership. But her personal 
charisma and social achievements were not enough to hide the 
central fact that her premiership had been an economic dis-
aster, at least in the eyes of her own people. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The year 1969 witnessed the political rise of almost 
all the leaders of the present study. Although, Indira Gandhi 
became Prime Minister of India in 1966, the period from 1966 
till 1969 was a formidable political trial for her. After 
the death of Lai Bahadur Shastri, the Congress high command 
was apprehensive over the successor. Morarji Desai being 
the senior most leader of the ruling party at that time was 
an obvious candidate for the highest political office. As 
a matter of fact, ^ k^ rarji Desai was an aspirant for the Prime 
Ministership after Nehru. He had waited in the wings for 
too long. Even at the time of Lai Bahadur Shastri's assum-
ption of power, he was not particularly happy because he thought 
that he deserved the post more than anyone else. But he acce-
pted the course of events, thinking that the next chance will 
be his own. After the death of Shastri, a group of powerful 
Congressmen headed by the Congress President Kamraj was not 
prepared to accept Morarji as Prime Minister due to their 
doubts over his stubborn and strong personality. They found 
that the only way to be in complete comrnand was to choose a 
weak prime minister vdio would follow their advice . They 
mistakenly assumed that Indira Gandhi was a weak person. 
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On the other hand, Indira Gandhi took the matter in 
her own stride. She did not over react at the suggestion 
of her name and did not display any anxiousness. She did 
not lobby for the highest office and left the matter of cam-
paigning for her to others. This attitude made many of the 
power seeking Congressmen do their best in her favour. This 
was, undoubtedly, the first display of her political skill 
and competency. 
After coming to power, Indira Gandhi proved herself 
to be a capable prime minister who was unwilling to be dire-
cted by any person or group in the party. Ttiis was not liked 
by those who worked hard to make her prime minister. So, 
they started conspiring against her and after the death of 
Zakir Hussain, they decided to nominate Scinjiva Reddy as Pre-
sident. Although, Indira accepted him in the beginning, she 
soon realised that it would be a mistake on her part to support 
Reddy. So, she asked the member of the party to freely exer-
cise their conscience and she herself lent her full support 
to V.V. Giri. This precipitated the split in the party and 
she emerged the strongest leader of the Congress. Nov*' she 
was in a privileged position to implement her political, 
economic, and social prograiimes. So, the year 1969 was a 
landmark in that she emerged as a very powerful leader with 
a promising future in India. 
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conference, and consequently paved the way for the second 
martial law in the short history of the largest Muslim country. 
The declaration of new martial law was welcomed by 
Bhutto since it promised a general election. In the election 
of 1970, the P.P.P. emerged as the largest victorious party 
in West Pakistan while Awami League emerged as the only party 
in the East wing - (except for two seats). Although, Bhutto 
was jubiliant to emerge as the strongest leader in West Paki-
stan, he was considerably unhappy over the performance of 
Awami League in the East as that could deny his plan to beccane 
the prime minister of the vrfnole country. 
The third political leader of the present study, Shaikh 
Mujibur Rehman, the President of All Pakistan Awami League, 
was in jail in the year 1969 charged with political conspiracy 
to secede East Pakistan in collaboration with India. His 
party took the opportunity of the trouble against Ayvb Khan 
and started a movement. When Ayub called for the Round Table 
Conference, Awami League made it a condition not to attend 
unless their leader - Sheikh Mujib - was free and the cons-
piracy case against him withdrawn. Ayub Khan had no alterna-
tive but to accept their demands. Sheikh M ujib attended the 
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In neighbouring Pakistan, v*iile General Ayub Khan 
celebrated his "Decac3e of progress and Development" in the 
last quarter of 1968/ his real trouble had already started 
with the release of Z.A. Bhutto after a short spell of poli-
tical detention. BhuttO/ the obedient and ambitious follower 
of Ayub for many years, found in the "Tashkent Declaration" 
a convenient excuse to revolt against his master. He was 
not allowed to resign immediately after the declaration from 
his foreign ministership but he did not keep his opposition 
to Ayub a secret and started creating trouble for him. After 
resigning his position, he started a movement exploiting the 
illness of the old general, the existing discontent of the 
masses especially in the Eastern wing of the country and the 
hard work by the opposition leaders to oust what they called 
a military dictator. 
When Ayub Khan realised that his days were numbered 
he tried to honourably transfer power in a constituticxial 
way and therefore called for a Round Table Conference in which 
all political leaders were invited including Sheikh Mujibur 
Rehman of Awami League and Z.A. Bhutto of P.P.P. Although 
all leaders attended the conference, Bhutto and Bhashani were 
conspicuous by their absence which led to the failure of the 
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conference as a heroic figure. There were rumours that there 
was an understanding between Ayub and Mujib to make the latter 
as prime minister but the martial law was seen to have interu-
pted the understanding. 
As has already been mentioned, the victory of Awami 
League in the general election conducted by Yahya Khan/ Sheikh 
Mujib became the most important person in Pakistan. Yahya 
even called him "the future prime minister of Pakistan". 
But his insistence on the six points programme of his party 
showed that he was not interested in the prime ministership 
of Pakistan rather he was hoping to be the father of Bangla-
desh. With this aim in mind/ he capitulated to the heird core 
of Awamy League v^ich led to his arrest and subsequently to 
the military crackdown on the Bengalis. Itie civil war in 
East Pakistan and the ultimate military intervention by India 
led to the creation of Bangladesh and the victorious return 
of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman as the first president of the new 
nation. 
Wie fourth political leader of our study, Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike was indeed the first woman prime minister in 
the world. Neither her family background nor the political 
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climate obtained in the island nation of Sri Lanka indicated 
that she would ever rise to power and become the first woman 
prime minister on 21 July 1960. Although, she was married 
to the brilliant, Oxford educated politician and successful 
prime minister of Sri Lanka, the political experience she 
obtained during her late husband's tenure was not sufficient 
to provide her the position of the prime minister. On the 
death of her husband she was brought into politics by a group 
of party stalwarts, very similar to the syndicate group which 
brought Indira Gandhi to power. By adopting the tactics of 
her late husband and by raising the slogans he used to raise 
she was able to beccwne the Prime Minister within a year of 
his death. Having failed to deliver the goods, she lost the 
1965 election for the United National Party. As has been 
discussed in the relevemt chapter, she remained in the oppo-
sition from 1965 till her return to power in 1970. In the 
year 1969, Mrs. Bandaranaike started her electicai canpaign 
vrfiich resulted in her return to power in 1970. 
Having traced the political rise of all our four lea-
ders, an attempt was made to study the specific circumstances 
that brought them to power. It was more than clear that all 
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of them came to power through a democratic process promising 
certain popular prograniDes to the masses whose confidence 
they enjoyed. It was necessary then to focus upon each of 
the leaders under study with respect to his or her performance/ 
political conduct/ personal integrity and overall leadership 
qualities. 
As was discussed, Indira Gandhi emerged as the most 
powerful leader in India in 1969. Her emergence led to the 
split of her party. Instead of leaving her weak, the split 
left her faction stronger than before and she became free 
to implement her policies without any political impediments. 
After the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971 and the subsequent birth 
of Bangladesh she was adored as the Goddess of India. She 
was recognised as so by no less a political rival than Atal 
Behari Bajpai and she was awarded the highest award of the 
country. 
In a vast country like India with huge political, 
social and economic problems, Indira Gandhi was in no position 
to fulfill all her promises to the people. The world economic 
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crisis had its detrimental inpact on the domestic situation 
of India and Indira Gandhi's performance. By 1975 she had 
become so unpopular that many leading political observers 
began to wonder as to who would replace her. Indira's position 
had become so uncertain that even an unimportant politician 
like Raj Narain who filed a case against her and won it/ could 
challenge her political credibility. 
At that time, it was said that she advised to relinquish 
power but her son San jay was opposed to the idea. She gave 
up being prime minister Indira to become dictator Indira by 
arresting all the opposition leaders including people like 
L.P. and Morarji Desai and declaring ©nergency. For nearly 
two years, Indira ruled India with an iron hand. No doubt 
that during the anergency period there was econcxnic progress 
and political stability due to the repressive measures applied 
by the authoritarian government. Itiis led Indira Gandhi to 
believe that she had gained popularity among the masses. 
It was this miscalculation and lack of political judgement 
on her part which prompted her to declare election. But the 
people of India did not forgive her and voted her out of power 
in the election of 1977 in a miserable manner in which she 
became the first sitting Prime Minister who lost her security 
in her own constituency. 
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After the humiliating defeat of the Pakistan army in 
East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh, Z.A. Bhutto was 
called back to assume power as President of the remaining 
Pakisteui as he was attending the U.N. session which was dis-
cussing the war between India and Pakistan. Indeed Bhutto 
assumed power at a very critical moment in the history of 
Pakistan which could only be compared with the critical moment 
of the birth of that nation in 1947. Bhutto certainly succeeded 
in facing the challenging task of restoring the morale of 
a defeated nation. He launched a diplomatic campaign to free 
the 93000 prisoners of war. For that reason, he refused to 
recognise Bangladesh, although he freed Sheikh Mujibur Rehman 
and sent him to Dhaka via London and Delhi. And for very 
sound political reasons he visited India and signed the historic 
"Simla Agreenent". 
In 1974, the second Islamic summit conference was held 
in Lcihore and with the good offices of some Muslim leaders 
Bhutto recognised Bangladesh and the two Muslim heads of State 
left for Dhaka to escort Sheikh Mujib to attend the summit 
conference. That was a substantial success for Z.A. Bhutto 
vtiich led him to be arrogant of his position and made him 
intolerant to criticism from the opposition. He could not 
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even tolerate his own partymen to voice any dissent against 
him. As it has been mentioned in the relevant chapter, the 
people in general and the middle class in particular felt 
suffocated and helpless about the authoritarian temperament 
of Bhutto. It was true that Bhutto introduced many progress-
ive measures which adversely affected the middle class but 
on the other hand benefitted the poor. As it has been mentioned 
in the Chapter II Bhutto made a tremendous success 
in the field of foreign policy especially with the muslim 
world. The Lahore Islamic summit provided him the opportunity 
to kjecome the chairman of the conference and this added to 
his |x3pularity among the muslim masses of Pakistan, and his 
image among than. 
In 1977 the political situation was different from 
that of 1970. In 1970 Bhutto appealed to all sections of 
society and they came forward to lend him their solid support. 
Now in 1977 the position was different. But Bhutto was mis-
takenly sure of his popularity and his ability to use diffe-
rent methods in order to remain in power. So, he called for 
an election which he could have won comfortably if it was 
a fair and free election but he would not be satisfied with 
less than two third's majority. Therefore, he went for massive 
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rigging which angered the opposition that launched a movement 
against him. This movement turned violent and consequently 
led to the military take over and ultimately the revival of 
an old murder case in which he was directly involved. It 
was on this case that he was convicted and executed in ^ril 
1979. 
When Bangladesh was bom as a new nation/ Sheikh Mujibur 
Rehman's fate was not known as he was still in a Pakistani 
prison. His life was certainly at stake had Yahya Khan rema-
ined in power in Pakistan. But fortunately for him Bhutto 
took over power eind with his political foresight he considered 
it wise to free Mujib and return him to Dhaka so that the 
bitterness could be minimised. Mujib was accorded a heroic 
reception at E^aka where millions of Bengalis turned up to 
take a glinpse of their beloved leader. When Sheikh Mujib 
arrived at Dhaka, the Indian army was still in full control 
of Bangladesh and it was not an easy task for the new leader 
to bring the war torn nation to normalcy. No doubt, his return 
prevented bitter infights between various political factions 
in the newly bom nation. 
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As we have discussed in the chapter on Sheikh Mujib, 
he was a better agitator than a statesman/ for he failed mi-
serably to solve the problems for which the Bengalis had revo-
lted in the very first place. He suffered from a fear conplex 
and the more he tended to believe that there were conspiracies 
against him/ the more he sought the help of those he thought 
were sincere to him. He was made to believe himself to be 
a reformer and a liberator of common people. He saw himself 
as not only a nation builder but more importantly a philoso-
pher of Mujibism. 
It was worth recollecting that Indira Gaindhi was the 
first foreign head of government to visit Bangladesh and sign 
a friendship treaty with Mujib. It is said that the treaty 
was signed at Mujib's insistence as he was keen to prove to 
the world that Bangladesh is a fully sovereign country. Alth-
ough he made several public declarations to bring the Pakistani 
prisoners of war to trial/ this trial could not materialise 
hjecause POWs were already in India and he had no means of 
conducting such a trial. 
By the end of 1974 Mujib was more than convinced that 
multi-party system was unsuitable for Bangladesh and he was 
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made to believe that one party system was the only solution 
to all the problems facing Bangladesh. He embarked on consti-
tutional changes - whereby the President became supreme over 
all executive, legislative and judicial organs of the state. 
The parliament was made to pass what was known as "The fourth 
amendment Bill" into an act at a speed unprecedented in the 
history of law making. Mujib was made E>resident by ousting 
the existing President without even giving him the opportu-
nity to resign as if he was a mere private servant. All these 
measures were taken, according to Mujib, to establish the 
economic freedom of the masses for an exploitation free society 
and to establish socialism and democracy of the exploited. 
The constitution which was framed by Awami L eaguers in 1972 
and which was considered to be a guarantor of people's rights 
had to be largely scrapped. Indeed, Sheikh Mujib cind his 
party v*io fought Pakistein in order to establish democracy 
in what they called Golden Baingladesh turned it into a police 
state on the model of Soviet satellite in Eastern Europe. 
As it has been mentioned in the chapter on Mujib, he 
grossly overlooked the possible reaction of the armed forces 
to his practical contradictions. And the grievances of the 
army against him had certainly multiplied. The dismissal 
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of some army officers/ the slim share of the army in the nati-
onal budget and the creation of Rakhi Bahini to counter the 
army were among those grievances which led to the army coup 
on August 15, 1975 in which Mujib and all members of his family 
were killed. The coup leaders did not assume power themselves 
but instead they invited one of Mujib's close associates -
Khandakar Mushtaq Ahmad to assume presidency. Thus neither 
Mujib nor his system could survive as the Bengalis were not 
prepared to accept dictatorship. 
As we have discussed in the chapter on Mrs. Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike, her party did not c*)tain a clear majority and 
therefore she had to forge a coalition in order to form the 
government in 1970. For this reason, she had to accomnodate 
different points of view and political prospectives with which 
she did not necessarily agree. There were several incidents 
such as youth revolt in 1971 aimed at radically altering the 
political future of the country and v^ich posed a real threat 
to Mrs. Bandaranaike's government. line 1971 revolt caused 
enormous damage to life and property. It was so strong that 
the government was not in a position to control the situation 
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by itself. It had to seek help from friendly countries such 
as India; Pakisteui and China. 
We have already elaborated on the constitutional reform 
that was carried out during Mrs. Bandaranaik^s second term 
in office. Her party along with its partners in the coalition 
expresse agreement over the need to end the British influence 
in the constitution and therefore the committee which was 
formed by the previous government was not acceptable to them. 
They formed their own caimittee which gave alternative proposals-
including the establishment of constituent assarbly and by 
1972 the first repi±)liccin constitution was adopted in which 
emphasis was laid on socialist democracy, national unity and 
territorial integrity. 
During the election campaign, Mrs. Bandaranaike accused 
the U.N.P. government of being a tool in the hands of the 
western countries and the in.temational financial institution 
such as the World Bank and IMF. In order to live upto her 
promises she strengthened her government relationship with 
the socialist countries and followed the policies of Non-Ali-
gnment. This can be seen, as we have already suggested in 
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the chapter concerned, through her mediatory role in the Indo-
Chinese conflict of 1962. Sri Lanka being a small and poor 
island nation, she tried to use her conciliatory approach 
in securing a respectable position in the i,ntemational arena 
and global politics. Her tireless efforts for the creation 
of a zone of peace in the Indian ocean and her mediatory role 
gained her considerable respect in the international community. 
The government of Mrs. Bandaranaike unlike in the 
field of foreign policies was not so successful on the economic 
front. The promises of her group in the coalition 
turned to be mere words as the rate of unemployment increased, 
inflation accelerated and the policy of nationalisation abando-
ned. Mrs. Bandaranaike was never able to come to grips with 
the central economic issues that plauged her attempts and 
even the entire administration. Although she was a shrewd 
and capable organiser, she seemed unable to comprehend the 
rapidly changing political configuration of 1970s. 
The ethnic problem including the language rights of 
Tamils posed a considerable challenge to Srimavo's regime. 
During her first tenure of office the Tamil leaders were unha-
ppy over the policies of her government v^ich did not provide 
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full recognition to the language rights of the Tamil minorities. 
She failed to inplement the S pecial Provision Act of 1958 
which prompted the Tamil speaking civil servants to refuse 
to learn Sinhala. Her government's policies led to a sharp 
decline in the percentage of minorities in civil services 
of the country. Furthermore/ due to the uneven allocation 
of central resources, the development of Tamil vis-a-vis the 
Sinhalese districts was markedly poor. This resulted in the 
emergence of the Tamil militancy vrfiich posed economic as well 
as political problans for her. 
Mrs. Srimavo Bandaranaike was no different from the 
other four leaders of our study in so far as adopting totali-
tarian measures. We have seen how all the leaders came to 
power cind how they were so generous in giving promises which 
none of them lived up to, especially in the economic field. 
Mrs. Bandaranaiake was the worst of the four in this regard. 
Although, she made some progress in the field of foreign affa-
irs and the image of Sri Lanka was raised high internationally, 
her economic policies were a complete failure at heme. Simi-
larly, her performance in the social sphere was lagging behind 
the expectations of supporters. 
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As we have seen, in the election of 1970 she had managed 
to forge a successful coalition which won 116 out of 151 seats. 
Thereby/ she had displayed a remarkable political skill in 
bringing broad sections of political forces into a United 
Front. In the course of her rule, she could not keep up such 
political skill and personal competency. Her expulsion of 
LSSP (Lanka Sama Samaj Party) from the coalition in August 
1975 was the first political misjudgement on her part. A 
crucial set back for her was the disassociation of the commj-
nist party in 1977. IX:ring her last four months she was only 
supported by SLFP and when the election campaign started, her 
popularity had certainly declined. The reason for this was 
the fact that there was wide spread bribery, corruption and 
nepotism at all levels of her administration. There was also 
a marked abuse of the state controlled radio and press which 
essentially proved to be damaging for her. It is not surpri-
sing therefore that she was on the defensive side of the elec-
tion campaign while strong rivals siezed the opportunity to 
provide a reasonable economic alternative. The electicHi of 
1977 was therefore conducted in a climate which was entirely 
unfavourable to Mrs. Bandaranaike so that her defeat was more 
than inevitable. 
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We have seen in the preceding pages the manner in which 
four irrportant political leaders of South Asia came to power, 
continued in power and finally went out of power. Itiere is 
a remarkable similarity in the leadership pattern between 
the leaders as well as striking dissimilarities. First of 
all, the similarities can be seen in the fact that the poli-
tical, social and economic conditions of all the countries 
which were ruled by the four leaders in the present study 
had the same characteristics and contradictions. The entire 
region was under British colonial rule and all the countries 
concerned inherited common problens emd prospects including 
parliamentary system from the Westminister Model. However, 
Bangladesh was bom out of Pakistan and both of the countries 
were bom out of the largest country in the present study, 
India. While Pakistan was created as a result of the demands 
of the Muslims of the subcontinent for a homeland, Bangladesh 
was created by the denands of the Bengali Muslims who were 
imhappy in a United Pakistan. While India and Sri Lanka, 
at the time of their independence, had a rather strong demo-
cratic institution, both Pakistan and Bangladesh lacked those 
qualities and in fact their creations were mainly due to the 
charismatic leadership of Jinnah and Shaikh Mujibur Rehman 
respectively. 
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Inspite of the fact that the four countries of our 
present study are anong the developing countries where men 
are in better position than women especially in the realm 
of leadership, two leaders of our study were women while, the 
other two were jnen. Although/ the two women inherited the 
leadership (from her father in case of Indira Gandhi and husband 
in case of Mrs. Srimavo Bandaranaiake), their performance 
showed that they were worthy successors of worthy predecessors. 
Ttieir rise to power were not less democratic than the rise 
of the two men, Bhutto and Mujib. All of them came to power 
through democratic processes. But as we have seen in the 
study of each of them, all of them tended to deviate from 
the path of democracy in order to cling to power. The two 
women did not go to the extreme end of dictatorship and there-
fore had to submit to democratic rule and accept the verdict 
of the people v^ iile the two men werre so arrogcint that they 
anbarked on dictatorial jneasures v^ich aimed at changing 
democratic processes in order to remain in power for the rest 
of their lives. While Mujib killed democracy by abolishing 
multi-party system in Bangladesh and instead introducing one 
party rule, which left no way for the Bangladeshis to remove 
him except by physical elimination which took place in 1975, 
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Bhutto went for massive rigging of the 1977 election in Pakistan 
which led to a movement against him that resulted in a mili-
tary take over which involved him in a political murder case 
where he was tried, convicted and executed in 1979. 
It is indeed ironic to note that both the men leaders, 
by adopting authoritarian ways, did not only loose their seats 
but also lost their lives. On the contrary, the two women 
leaders by accepting the democratic verdict of the people 
no doubt lost their seats but saved their lives (Mrs. Geindhi 
was assassinated due to other political reasons that is beyond 
the scope of the present study). By doing so, they kept open 
the possibility of their return to power and in fact that 
was materialised in the case of Indira Gandhi and may be that 
would have been the case for Bandaranaike, had the recent 
election in Sri Lanka been fair. This is evident from the 
fact that she lost with a very narrow margin even while she 
protested that the election was massively rigged. 
In the light of these four case studies of two men 
and two women leaders, can we say that women leaders are 
more democratic than men leaders? Or is it merely an acci-
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dental phenomena? In order to provide adequate answers to 
those questions it would be necessary to look beyond the nature 
and scope of the present investigation by incorporating leader-
ship patterns in other parts of the world of both men and 
women. However, given the empirical evidences in the present 
thesis, it may be perhaps legitimate to pose the above questions. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
Selected Text of Audio-taped interview with 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike carried out by the author 
Question : What do you think are the qualities of a 
successful leader? 
Answer : Any good leader must be able to take the 
right decisions for the good of the country. 
Not only that. He or she should be able 
to implement it. It is necessary to understand 
mistakes. A leader should be able to correct 
the mistakes. To accept mistakes is a great 
quality. It is necessary for a leader to 
remain flexible. 
Q. How does a leader become popular? 
A. The popularity of a leader rests in making 
people accept the decisions. To make people 
confident in your leadership is an important 
quality. 
Q. How are women leaders different from men 
leaders? 
A. Women are much more conscious of their duties. 
Q. In what way? 
A. Women take decisions much faster and implanent 
them also. There is no wavering among women 
leaders. 
0. How would you compare your leadership with 
that of Mrs, Gandhi's? 
A. Mrs. Gandhi was able to implement her deci-
sions. She was known for taking rapid deci-
sions as I have always done. However Mrs. 
Gandhi faced more problems because her country 
is large. Again the population of India 
is much larger and also diverse. 
11 
Q. What made you decide on politics? 
A. I never felt I had any leadership qualities 
in me when I was a student. I was not at 
all conscious, politically. In the earlier 
stages I did not have any intentions of conte-
sting elections. I was very interested in 
social work among women. The inspiration 
to enter into politics came after marriage. 
I was in all political and social struggles 
with my husband... I was always ready for 
self-criticism, etc. I mean even criticism 
from outside. In the July 1960 elections, 
I assisted my husband especially in the cam-
paigns. .. 
Q. If I may interrupt you, how would you explain 
your political defeats? 
A. You see, people's expectations are sometimes 
different. I mean of the government. 
Q. How would you explain the defeat in 1977? 
And also your power to contend with it even 
after that? 
A. The expulsion of one of the parties that was 
in coalition with the United Front no doubt 
contributed to it. 
Q. Can you elaborate? 
A. In the last presidential election I also made 
an effort to work with an alliance but as 
you know it did not seem to work. In the 
beginning the alliance wanted me to boycott 
the elections, a decision which I personally 
resented. Coalitions are always faced with 
peculiar problems. In India, for instance, 
people in different political parties got 
together and defeated Mrs. Gandhi but later 
they were not able to sustain. 
Q. What about economic problems? 
A. In 1977 people were unhappy about the infla-
tion. The opposition promised changes so 
they were accepted. 
Ill 
Q. What concrete political programmes do you 
have in mind for the future? 
A. I cannot say anything right now. I am not 
able to say now because it will depend on 
what political situation prevails when I come 
to power. 
Q. In India some people feel that you were the 
cause of ethnic tension. Would you like to 
comment? 
A. No, no. That is not true. It was there earlier. 
There were several problems. The plantation 
workers from India could not be absorbed totally. 
It was not easy. There were no easy solutions 
to the problems arising out of specific situa-
tions and confrontations etc. 
Q. What do you think of leadership in South Asia 
as a v^ole? 
A. We are underdeveloped nations. Socialist 
steps are difficult to implement. Where poli-
cies were implemented it was difficult to 
create an immediate effect due to several 
reasons. This is not only true of Sri Lanka 
but it is true of India/ Burma; Bangladesh, 
Pakistcin. The sharing of wealth was a major 
problem in these poor countries. Of course, 
it goes without saying that different countries 
in the region have different problems. Sri 
Lanka has its own share of problems — spe-
cific problems that may not be there for other 
countries. For instance, Pakistan is diffe-
rent from Sri Lanka, with regard to the speci-
fic situations etc. Pakistan being under 
dictatorship in the past for years is faced 
with different problems than Sri Lanka. 
Q. What about foreign policy? 
A. I succeeded a lot because of non-alignment... 
Mrs. Gandhi was not very happy about Sri Lanka's 
role during Bangladesh crisis. But I had 
explained to Mrs. Gandhi. The antagonisms 
in certain situations with India created 
strong public opinion in Sri Lanka. But on 
the whole such public opinion did not affect 
Sri Lanka's overall foreign policy. 
IV 
Would you like to comnent on the democratic 
processes in Sri Lanka? 
A. The elections are becoming more violent. 
I have suggested that there must always be 
rapid initiatives taken to stop this degene-
ration. I have already suggested, as you 
can see from the newspaper clippings here 
that international observer committees should 
be set up to check election processes from 
this degeneration. We have to think of other 
steps and suggestions to stop violence and 
other malpractices. As you know I have filed 
the case in the court regarding this. The 
parliament will have to decide something also. 
The decisions in this regard have to be awaited 
from the courts. As the evidence has still 
to be produced in the courts the decisions 
cannot he predicted. 
Q. What about your personal political position? 
A. You know I was opposed to the change that 
took place in the parliament in 1977. At 
that time/ I was even deprived of my civil 
rights. I had filed a case in the courts 
and had even won it. Itie amendments initia-
ted by the opposition was just to get me out 
of politics and not for any other reasons. 
There was no such revenge against amendments 
per se vtiich I had made earlier. 
